UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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LI BRARY OF CONGRESS

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COPYRIGHT OFFICE SECTION 1201

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RULEMAKING HEARING: EXEMPTIONS FROM PROHIBITIONS ON CIRCUMVENTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES THAT CONTROL ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS

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Wednesday, May 14, 2003

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The hearing was held at 9:00 a.m. in the 2002-4C, UCLA

Law School Moot Courtroom, Los Angeles, CA, Marybeth Peters,

Register of Copyrights, presiding.

PRESENT:

MARYBETH PETERS Register of Copyrights

DAVID CARSON General Counsel of Copyright

CHARLOTTE DOUGLASS Principal Legal Advisor

ROBERT KASUNIC Senior Attorney of Copyright

STEVEN TEPP Policy Planning Advisor

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

A-G-E-N-D-A

SESSION ONE: LITERARY WORKS: FILTERING SOFTWARE CENSORWARE PROJECT
James Tyre
JOINT REPLY COMMENTERS Steve Metalitz
Questi ons
SESSION TWO: LITERARY WORKS: MALFUNCTIONING, DAMAGED, OBSOLETE RESEARCH AND SECURITY: INTERNET ARCHIVE Brewster Kahle
Mari an Sel vaggi o
THE ASSOCIATION OF COMPUTING MACHINERY Barbara Simons
GEORGE ZI EMANN
JOINT REPLY COMMENTERS Steve Metalitz
Questi ons
SESSION THREE: SOUND RECORDINGS AND MUSICAL WORKS THAT ARE ON COPY-PROTECTED CD'S
ELECTRONI C FRONTI ER FOUNDATI ON Gwen Hi nze
IP JUSTICE Robin Gross
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA Steve Marks
MACROVISION Mark Belinsky
Questi ons

P-R-O-C-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:10 a.m.

MS. PETERS: Good morning. I'm Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights. And I would like to welcome everyone to the first day of hearings in Los Angles in this Section 1201 anti-circumvention rulemaking.

The purpose of this rulemaking proceeding is to determine whether there are particular classes of works as to which users are or likely to be adversely effected in their ability to make noninfringing uses if they are prohibited from circumventing technological measures that control access.

That's quite a sentence.

Today we have several sessions. And the first one will deal with filtering software. The second will deal with malfunctioning, damaged and obsolete technological protection measures, as well as research security in the public domain. And the afternoon session will deal with copy protected CDs.

You should know that comments, the reply comments and the hearing testimonies will form the basis of evidence in this rulemaking which, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce will result in my recommendation to the Librarian of Congress. The Librarian must make a determination before October 28, 2003 on whether or not there

1 will be any exemptions to the prohibition during the next 2 three year period. 3 The entire record of this, as well as the last 4 1201 rulemaking, are on our website. We will be posting the 5 transcripts of all hearings approximately one week after each 6 heari ng. 7 The transcripts as posted are uncorrected, but 8 each witness does have an opportunity to correct the 9 transcri pts. 10 Let me take this moment to introduce the rest of 11 Copyright Office panel. To my immediate left is David Carson, 12 who is our general counsel. To my immediate right is Rob 13 Kasunic, who is senior attorney and advisor in the Office of 14 the General Counsel. To his right is Charlotte Douglass, who 15 is a principal legal advisor to the General Counsel. 16 I'm going to try to change this. Last time I 17 said to the far was Steve Tepp. That's the far left. And he 18 said I've never been characterized that way, Marybeth. So, to 19 the left of the General Counsel is Steve Tepp 20 MR. TEPP: That's even worse. 21 MS. PETERS: Whatever. Policy planning advisor 22 in the Office of Policy and International Affairs. 23 The format of each hearing is that each panel 24 has 3 parts. First, the witnesses present their testimony, 25 and obviously this is your chance to make your case and your

1	chance to rebut his case. Then we get to ask questions and,
2	hopefully, they will be equally tough for each side. You
3	should not take any of our questioning as an indication of
4	what we think. This is just the exercise by which we dig out
5	information. Even our facial expressions should not in anyway
6	be taken to reflect what we think. Because the truth is at
7	this moment we have made no decision, and we haven't even sat
8	down amongst ourselves to talk about any particular exemption
9	or what the evidence is. So it's all totally wide open.
10	If in fact this hasn't happened there's an
11	opportunity to the panel for each of you to question happen.
12	Mostly it's happened that during our questioning you sort of
13	question each other.
14	Obviously, because we have some time constraints
15	here, we do reserve the right to ask each person who testifies
16	to answer any additional questions. And, obviously, those
17	questions will be made and the answers will be made available
18	to everybody.
19	I want to at this point thank David Nimmer of
20	USCLA who was instrumental in getting these very nice
21	facilities for us, and actually thank UCLA for all the work in
22	making this possible.
23	So without further ado, I should mention that
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	Jeff Joiner has joined us, and he's an attorney with NTIA,

1 he's representing the Assistant Secretary that I referred to 2 as having a consultation involving in this process. 3 The first panel is dealing with filtering 4 software. And the witnesses are James Tyre from Censorware 5 Project and Steve Metalitz, who filed on behalf of many 6 copyright owners a very extensive statement. 7 So we start with the proponent of an exemption 8 and then we go to the other side. So we will start with you, 9 Mr. Tyre. 10 MR. CARSON: The mi crophones. 11 MS. PETERS: Oh, yes, the microphones. The 12 microphones are actually not to project the sound to everybody 13 who is here. The microphones are solely to assist the 14 recorder. So, when you speak as when we speak, you need to 15 really speak out so that everybody in the room can, in fact, 16 hear you. Okay? Thank you. 17 MR. TYRE: Thank you. My James Tyre, as you 18 indicated. I'm here on behalf of the Censorware Project. 19 I'm probably at least a little bit of a mystery 20 both to you on the panel and to Mr. Metalitz because, unlike 21 the people who spoke in Washington all of whom I know fairly 22 well and also unlike Mr. Metalitz, I was unable to submit 23 written comments. So I come here as a bit of a blank slate. 24 And that being the case, I want to tell you just a little bit 25 about myself and what the Censorware Project is to put the

testimony I'm going to give in perspective.

I am a lawyer here in the Los Angeles area. I have been in practice since 1978. Much of my practice, though not all of it, has been devoted to First Amendment issues. And it was the First Amendment aspect of Censorware that brought me into this particular field that got me interested in it:

First, really as something interesting just to explore, then working really with it. Then starting to think about the legal ramifications of it.

The Censorware Project is a group currently consisting of four people, myself, Jonathan Wallace, Jamie McCarthy, Bennett Hazelton. Originally there were two others, including Seth Finkelstein from whom you heard a great deal when you had a session in Washington. Seth has not been a part of the group since about 1998/1999, somewhere in that area. But certainly he was essential when we started the group.

What happened is that it was around 1995 when the issue of Censorware began to become an issue. Seth was telling you that he had been on the Internet since 1985. He had been seeing a lot of changes in it. I cannot tell you that I'm much of an Internet veteran. But fairly shortly after I did get onto the Internet, I happened upon an email discussion group that had to do generally with issues of censorship regarding the Internet, and specifically it was

1 censorware. And I got interested in it, not so much in the 2 sense that I was immediately thinking about filing a legal 3 case or anything of that sort, but I got interested in the 4 implications, specifically First Amendment implications, at 5 some point other possible theories that might be available for 6 use with censorware. And, obviously the First Amendment 7 implications would apply only if the censorware was being used 8 in a public institution. 9 We have never taken the position, I don't know 10 anyone that's ever taken the position, that if a family 11 chooses to use censorware in the home or if a private 12 corporation chooses to use it at the workplace, that there are 13 any First Amendment issues there. We may criticize it because 14 we don't like censorware does, but we make no claims that 15 there's any particular legal significance to it. 16 In any event, it was in 1995/1996 when this was 17 really a hot topic, and it became quickly apparent that there 18 was a group of us that had a fairly common interest. And I 19 should also indicate that one of the other witnesses from whom 20 you heard a lot in Washington, David Burt, was a part of these 21 discussions. I believe I first encountered him on the Internet 22 in 1996 or possibly 1997. 23 So many of us who have been working in this 24 field, regardless of which side we're on, are old 25 acquaintances. Whether we're friends or not is a different

story, but we've known each other for quite a long time.

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effect has.

But what happened was, and I know you've heard a little bit about the <u>Mainstream Loudoun</u> case in Virginia.

That case, actually, was essential to how the Censorware Project came to into being. And it's actually a good illustration of what the kind of work we do and what the

Jonathan Wallace, one of the founding members of the Censorware Project, like myself, is also an attorney. And he had done some writing on his own site, "The Ethical Spectacle, " spectacle. org about what he viewed as some of the legal issues involving censorware. And it was a very good essay he wrote. This would have been probably in 1996/1997. And it was about that time when in Loudoun County, Virginia the public library was considering putting in censorware, and specifically a particular version of X-Stop called the Felony Load. And a lot of censorware companies and censorware products have changed names, so I just indicate that the product that then was known by X-Stop then was manufactured by a company called Log-On Data Corporation. That product actually is the product of one of the three companies that signed on to David Burt's comments, that being 8e6 Technologies. At some point the company changed its name. So we're talking about a product of that company.

But there was a group in Loudoun County called

1 Mainstream Loudoun. It was extremely concerned with the 2 implications of censorware being used in their libraries. So 3 the head of that group sent an email to Jonathan Wallace and 4 said we really like what you've written in your essay, but can 5 you help us? Can you give us something more tangible. And, 6 again, this was before the Censorware Project as a group 7 existed. But Jonathan contacted two people: Myself, Seth 8 Finkelstein, said can we do something to help these people. 9 The answer was yes. 10 You've heard about some of the decryption work 11 that Seth Finkelstein did. At that time he decrypted the X-12 Stop blacklist. He and I together poured through that list 13 looking for the flaws in it and we fed the results from that, 14 from our work there to Jonathan Wallace who wrote a scathing 15 article about X-Stop. 16 One of the interesting things was that X-Stop 17 was a fairly new product on the market at the time. And it 18 had gotten a number of glowing endorsements from quite a 19 number of people, including specially David Burt, who at that 20 time was still a librarian not working for N2H2. 21 And we put out that report. And everybody went, 22 in effect, "Oh, my God." And everybody who endorsed that 23 product, including David Burt, ran away from it as fast as 24 they could. Everyone except Loudoun County Public Library 25 system.

So, the lawsuit was filed with a lawyer by the name of Bob Guenfeer representing the plaintiffs, who were library patrons. Shortly thereafter a group of website owners whose content was being blocked in the libraries represent by Ann Beeson of the ACLU intervened on the plaintiff's side in that case. The lawsuit went forward.

David Burt makes a technically correct statement but very misleading statement in his chilling reply to the effect of there's nothing in the court record to indicate that the Censorware Project in general or Seth in particular had anything to do with developing the evidence in the case. That statement is 100 percent correct and 100 percent misleading.

Because what happened was Seth decrypted the list not just once, but on many, many, many different occasions because you want to see what happens as they find out about new bad blocks, whether they unblocked them, what new they've added to the black list, things like that. Through the Censorware Project we were analyzing the lists, we were going through the lists. We were feeding the list bad blocks to the appropriate people involved in the case.

So it may well be that the court record says that library patron X has a declaration that says "I found these 6 bad blocks using the library terminals and, thus, using X-Stop as installed in the libraries." Guess were he found out where to look at those websites?

1 That was the impetus of how the Censorware 2 Project was formed. The three of us working on that and then 3 we added in three other people as we went on to other 4 projects. 5 The first project we did as a group was a 6 dissection, also based on decryption of CyberPatrol, which 7 you've heard a good deal about, specifically in the context of 8 the Microsystems lawsuit. A lot of these products, as I said, 9 have changed names over the years and CyberPatrol along with 10 another product SurfWatch now have been merged into a product 11 called SurfControl, which I'll be talking about a little bit 12 today. So I want to sort of keep the players straight. 13 It's interesting one of the things that's said 14 in the joint reply comment; and for this purpose, I'm talking 15 about joint reply, hopefully you will just assume that I'm 16 focusing on the joint reply filed by Mr. Burt. I have no 17 indention of sliding or viewing Mr. Metalitz' comment, and I 18 will address some of the things you have. But I'm sure he 19 would agree that there's a great deal more detail, and 20 properly so, in the joint reply of the censorware companies 21 than in that which Mr. Metalitz put together. 22 Mr. Burt said, and I believe this was actually 23 in his testimony as opposed to in the joint reply, he said 24 have reports based upon decryption ever really helped you at 25 all? And he said "No, they don't help us at all." And, of

1 course, I'm paraphrasing. I don't have an exact quote in front 2 of me. Because they just talk about a few sites here and 3 there. They're really not of any use to us. 4 Well, there's this interesting little phenomenon 5 because every time we have done a report, regardless of what 6 the software it is, and we have done major reports upon 7 CyberPatrol, X-Stop, SmartFilter, WebSense and -- I'm missing 8 one. There's one other, I'm temporarily blanking on it. 9 five of them. Every time we've done a report, within 2 days 10 the appropriate censorware company has gone through our 11 reports, whether they were based on decryption or some other 12 techniques, and guess what? The sites that we said were bad 13 blocks suddenly are off the list. It's folly to say that the 14 censorware companies do not pay attention to what we do and 15 that they put little credence into the reports that are based 16 upon decryption or other techniques. 17 We started the Censorware Project in 1997. We've 18 been doing this since then. We're strictly a volunteer group. 19 We all have real jobs, other things to do. 20 These kinds of reports, frankly, are a great 21 deal more difficult to do than they used to be. I remember the 22 good old says when a censorware black list might have 10,000 23 or 15,000 items on it. It was big news in the industry when 24 the first censorware black list had 100,000 items. Now, 25 according to David Burt's testimony a month ago, and I believe

him, the N2H2 black list has 4 million items on it. It's hard 2 work to go through these lists. So it's not as easy to do 3 these kinds of reports as it used to be. But, every report 4 that we have done based upon decryption and based upon other 5 techniques we have used, has been taken very seriously by the 6 censorware companies and by other people. 7 My primary purpose today is to go through and 8 counter some of the statements that Mr. Burt made, both in his 9 written comments and in his oral testimony. And really focus 10 on one broader issue. 11 You've heard testimony that, in essence, there

are three types of ways of doing this sort of work. The first way is to start off my decrypting the encrypted database and having decrypted, analyze it by whatever means one does, drawing whatever conclusions and making whatever report one wants to make based upon that. That's what's at issue here today.

But what's relevant to whether this exemption should be extended for another 3 years isn't just that question. I think one thing that's unique about this particular class, both as the exemption was granted 3 years ago and if it should be granted again for the next 3 years, is nobody disputes that the study of censorware is an incredibly important, very legitimate course of study. There is nothing silly about it. There is nothing frivolous about it. It is

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socially important. It is legally important. No one has ever disputed those contentions. Certainly David Burt never has, and I don't think that Mr. Metalitz will, though I certainly presume to be able to read his mind.

The only question here is whether the importance of being able to continue doing encryption based studies as opposed to other techniques is sufficient to justify the continuation of the exemption. So when I get into my testimony, and I realize you want to keep the opening statement short and I've spent a fair amount of time just giving you some of my background so I'll hold off on this until we get into the question period, but I do want to spend a fair amount of time focusing on the specific issue of the benefits of doing decryption study versus doing what is called either database querying or sampling versus what has been called log file analysis. And in some cases log file analysis really is nothing more than a subset of database querying or sampling. In some cases it's a little bit different.

One project we as the Censorware Project did is a little bit different. We've done them all, so I'm in a position that not many are in to speak to the benefits and detriments of all of them. And I'd like to spend the bulk of time, hopefully once we get into the questions, talking about the differences, specifically talking about the weaknesses with database querying. And as a subset of that, very much

1 talking about the weaknesses of the URL checkers, which you've 2 heard a lot about by N2H2 and some, but by no means, all of 3 the other censorware companies offer. 4 And with that, I suspect, I've talked more than 5 enough for what you want to hear as an opening statement, so I 6 will defer to Mr. Metalitz and then get to questions later. 7 MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. 8 Tyre. 9 Mr. Metalitz? 10 MR. METALITZ: Thank you very much. It's a 11 pleasure to be back here. 12 I was thinking back to the last time that I was 13 in this position before this panel, which was 3 years ago in 14 Palo Alto. And much has changed since then. We live in a 15 different world, some might say, than we did in the summer of 16 2000. 17 And on a less consequential scale, things have 18 changed in the nature of this proceeding as well. And if I 19 might, if I could just take a minute for some general 20 observations before I turn to the subject of filtering 21 software. 22 I really want to talk about three things that 23 have changed that are quite relevant to this proceeding and 24 that I hope will be reflected in the decision that ultimately 25 results from this proceeding.

1 The first change, of course, is that the 2 prohibition that we're talking about 1201(a)(1) is now in 3 force, and it wasn't three years ago. So, you know, I think 4 this proceeding can now turn to what Congress said should be 5 its main focus, which is determining whether a substantial 6 adverse impact on the availability of works for noninfringing 7 uses is actually occurring rather than focusing as was 8 inevitable in the 2000 proceeding on speculation or prediction 9 about what would occur once the prohibition went into effect. 10 So I think that the burden that the proponents 11 of exemptions must carry in this proceeding, as they did in 12 2000, they had the burden of persuading you to recommend to 13 the Librarian that an exemption be granted for a particular 14 class of works, but they also needed to come forward with 15 concrete evidence of the substantial adverse impact that is 16 actually occurring and that is caused by the presence of 17 1201(a)(1). 18 Similarly, if they challenge the interpretations 19 that you have made of the statute, whether these be procedural 20 ground rules for the proceeding or the substantive conclusions 21 that you reached in 2000, that is also a burden of persuasion 22 that they must undertake and they would need to persuade you 23 why you were wrong in some of the conclusions that you reached 24 last time. 25 The second thing that has changed is that we now have some court decisions that have really vindicated the interpretations that you recommended to the Librarian in 2000 and that he adopted them on some key aspects of Section 1201. Of course, there haven't been any court decisions directly on Section 1201(a)(1), but the decisions on other aspects of the statute have clearly established a point that is consistent with your conclusions three years ago, and that is that fair use, one of the noninfringing uses we're talking about here, does not encompass a guarantee of access to copyrighted material by a preferred method or in a preferred format. That's stated very clearly in the <u>Corley</u> decision in the Second Circuit, echoed in the ElCom decision in the District Court here in California. And I think it's quite consistent with the conclusion that you reached 3 years ago. The third change that has occurred over the last

The third change that has occurred over the last 3 years, and one that I will come back to later on today and tomorrow, is that there has been a huge expansion of availability of all kinds of works in digital formats for noninfringing uses. Really we can speak of a digital cornucopia that is now available to the American public to a much greater degree than was the case 3 years ago. And much of this is attributable to the use of formats and distribution methods that rely upon technological protection measures, and particularly upon access controls. And we've given some examples in our reply comments.

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We'll talk more about the DVD tomorrow. We'll talk about online music distribution this afternoon as well in the software field, entertainment software, business applications, digital and online delivery of text and database. The fact is that today measured against 3 years ago, we have far more availability by far more people to far more material in digital form than we did 3 years ago.

And the significance of this is really twofold.

One, your mission is to determine whether the availability of these materials for noninfringing uses has been substantially adversely affected by Section 1201(a)(1). And this includes the availability through licenses, through permitted uses and other types of noninfringing use. So if those have increased, then the availability of these works has also increased and you need to take that into account.

Second, I want to emphasize that as you recognized in your conclusions in 2000, you are really performing here not a one sided calculation, but a net calculation. And even in instances where you find some adverse impact on the availability of works for noninfringing uses, you also have to look at the degree to which technological protection measures have facilitated this use. It is a net calculation, and I think Congress was correct when it said the question here is whether on balance there has been an adverse impact on the availability for noninfringing use that is

substantial enough to justify an exemption.

So this is a question I'm going to come back to, not really as a promotion for what the 17 organizations that I represent here have done in terms of making material available to the public, but simply as a way to shed light on the balance that you need to strike in the proceeding that we're engaged in.

Well, let me turn now to the question of filtering software and just briefly summarize our position on this.

First of all, the exemption that's been proposed is verbatim the same or almost the same as the one that is in existence now. So it presents squarely the question of how you should proceed in judging whether the exemption should be recognized for an additional 3 years. And I think nothing is clearer from the legislative history and also from your prior conclusions that this is a de novo determination. The burden remains on the proponents. And the fact hat there has been an exemption in effect for the current 3 years does not weigh in the balance as to whether there should be a new exemption recognized for an additional 3 years.

I think with regard to filtering software, unlike the other exemption that we'll talk about later on today, I think at least some of the proponents of the exemption have made an effort to shoulder that burden and

tried to present to you with information to demonstrate how the exemption has operated in practice and why it is needed, why it is still needed or why it should be renewed. I think Mr. Tyre's presentation also was along that line. But I did want to underscore the de novo nature of the determination and the fact that the burden remains on the proponents to bring forward, again, concrete evidence about what is actually occurring.

Now, in the 2000 rule recommendations that was adopted by the Librarian, you essentially had an uncontested proceeding. I think the conclusion virtually states that, and there are several conclusions that were drawn there. For example, people who wanted to make fair use of the type of comment and criticism use that Mr. Tyre's talked about of these lists of websites had no alternative but to decrypt them. That there was no other legitimate way to obtain access to this information. And you also had no other evidence before you at that point, according to your conclusion, that these technological protection measures were at all use facilitating or that granting an exemption for decrypting them would decrease their availability in anyway.

I think all of those points are now very hotly contested in the proceeding before you. You have an extensive submission from several of the companies, and you had testimony April 11th. And I know Mr. Tyre will be rebutting

some of that testimony as well. My point is simply that you now have the issue joined before you, and I think you're in a position to determine whether the proponents of the exemption can carry the day. But certainly the record before you raises a question about whether you can, in fact, find out without decryption whether any given site is blocked by one of these programs. And you also have evidence, which I'm sure Mr. Tyre will comment on, that there has been a great deal of research and comment and criticism that's been undertaken of these programs by methods that do not involve circumvention of technological controls.

Now, one other factor that I think is extremely relevant here, which is what use has been made of this exemption during the period since it came into force in October of 2000 up until today, I think that as least as of the beginning of this hearing the record was quite murky about that, as I read the transcript of the April 11th hearing. It wasn't clear what the witness testifying there actually had done.

Now Mr. Tyre's testimony that describes a little bit of what he did and perhaps he will pursue that further to find out whether those acts of decryption took place before or after the exemption came into force. But as we pointed out in our reply comments, it is relevant what use is being made of this, how often it's being used, how many people are using it.

1 And I hope you can develop the record on that before you reach 2 a conclusion about this exemption. 3 Now, I'm not sure that the organizations that 4 filed our joint reply comments really have much light to shed 5 on how some of these contested issues should be resolved. But 6 I do want to just refer to three aspects of the evidence as it 7 stands now that I think are relevant. 8 First, I think you have to determine whether 9 what the proponents are seeking is the preferential or optimal 10 means of obtaining access of this information for their fair 11 use purposes or by contrast, do they have sufficient access to 12 it now, is it sufficiently available for them to carry out 13 these types of activities without circumventing? And this, of 14 course, has to be gauged in the light of the conclusion that 15 you reached in 2000 and that the courts reenforced in the 16 ensuing two years that fair use does not necessarily mean fair 17 use in the preferred or optimal format. Just noting access to 18 material in a preferred or optimal format. 19 The second issue is the scope of the adverse 20 impact. Is it de minimis or widespread? And, again, this 21 gets to the question of what actually is being done under the 22 shelter of this exemption today. 23 And the third point which I hope that the record 24 will be developed on is whatever adverse impact there is can 25 be ameliorated or even eliminated in other ways such as

1 through private agreements. And I thought there were some 2 tantalizing hints of this in the testimony you heard on April 3 11th about the potential availability of these lists to bona 4 fide researchers under agreement with the proprietors, the 5 people that compiled them and that have the copyright interest 6 in them. 7 I think it's Mr. Tyre's right that some of these 8 reports have been taken very seriously, and there may be a 9 very active interest on the part of some of these companies in 10 cooperating with researchers, which might correspondingly 11 reduce the need for any exemption in this area. 12 Now, finally, I just want to come to our main 13 concern about this exemption. And I hope I don't get too 14 deeply into the arcane and metophyiscal question that I'm sure 15 we will grapple with today and tomorrow, which is what is a 16 particular class of works in terms of the statute. I think 17 this is actually a simpler question as to whether this class 18 that you recognized in 2000 is too broad. I'm going to assume 19 for now that the class you recognized fits the criteria of the 20 statute. In other words, it describes a particular class of 21 works. 22 And I want to emphasize this point, because we 23 do live in a different world today than we lived in in the 24 year 2000. And I think our concerns about computer security

and about protection of the safety and security of our

computer networks is heightened today contrasted to where we might have been in the year 2000.

We know that filtering software that may fit the description that appears in the exemption that exists now is one of the key tools in keeping our network safe and secure.

And many of those filtering software packages may include

lists of websites that either are the sources of viruses or the source of SPAM, which is of course is a scourge that we're all having to deal with increasingly now.

In other words, that programs that really I don't think anyone in Mr. Tyre's would consider censorware may be swept within the ambit of this exception with potentially very serious consequences in terms of compromising the security and safety of computer networks.

Now, of course, there's no evidence in this record whatsoever that there has been any substantial adverse impact on the availability of copyrighted materials for noninfringing uses or that were would be any of the action of circumventing access to those types of security software lists were to be prohibited. So there's really no basis for extending or maintaining such a broad definition of this particular class of works with the breadth that would include those kinds of security programs.

And I think one thing that I hope that the panel will is, and I think Mr. Tyre and his group could probably

1 make a very important contribution here, is to more narrowly 2 focus this exemption if you conclude based on the testimony 3 that you hear and the contested issues that are before you, 4 that it is justified and that the proponents have met their 5 burden with respect to censorware, then I think the exemption 6 needs a definition of censorware. The exemption needs that in 7 order to more tightly focus it on the area where the need for 8 it has been shown. 9 And, again, because of the name of this project, 10 I'm sure Mr. Tire can provide you with a proposed definition 11 of censorware that might be useful to you and that might fit 12 better within the definition of a particular class of works 13 that Congress urged you to look at. 14 So, I will conclude there and be glad to try to 15 answer any questions you may have either about my general 16 remarks or about the filtering software exemption. Thank you. 17 MS. PETERS: Thank you. 18 Let me start the questioning, and actually you 19 asked the questions that I sort of had identified. 20 Mr. Tyre, you talked about the three ways in 21 which people try to deal with what's in the fire of 22 CyberPatrol or whatever. And you mentioned decrypting and 23 analyzing, and then reporting database inquiry log file 24 analysis. Could you tell us why the database inquiry and the 25 log file analysis is not sufficient and why the decryption

1	method is not only the preferred, but the only way that you
2	can do what you want if you can do that? And comment a little
3	bit about Mr. Metalitz' issue with regard to wouldn't special
4	agreements work?
5	MR. TYRE: Okay. I'd be perfectly glad to talk
6	about that. I think that's the main reason why I'm here today,
7	as a matter of fact. And this actually does go both to what
8	Mr. Metalitz has said today and what he has in joint reply,
9	and also what happened in the Washington testimony.
10	I'm going to break it down into segments. And
11	let me refine one thing that you just said.
12	We have never contended that the other methods
13	based upon any technique other than decryption of doing this
14	kind of work are completely inadequate. We've done studies
15	using log file analysis and database querying ourselves.
16	There's lots of things you cannot find out using those
17	methods. They are not nearly as good as decryption and
18	analysis based upon description. But we are not saying, and I
19	want the record to be clear on this, that they are useless.
20	MS. PETERS: So you think they're too limited?
21	MR. TYRE: Yes.
22	MS. PETERS: Okay.
23	MR. TYRE: Yes.
24	Now, I want to start off with database querying
25	or sampling, and I want to start even more focused on that

1 with the specific question of so-called URL checkers because 2 Mr. Burt told you and he gave screen shots in his joint reply 3 comments of the URL checkers that four censorware companies, 4 his own, N2H2, WebSense, SmartFilter and SurfControl, which is 5 what used to be CyberPatrol have. They're web interfaces. You 6 can go to them. You can type in a URL and it'll tell you it's 7 not blocked, it's blocked in this category, it's blocked in 8 that category. Great. What's the problem? 9 Problem number one: Mr. Burt used very careful 10 language to tell you about those four and no others. If you 11 want to take a look at my Exhibit 2 in your booklets, this is 12 just a little survey I did on Monday just confirming results I 13 al ready knew. 14 I checked the nine major censorware copies. 15 many of those censorware companies even offer URL checkers? 16 Exactly the four that Mr. Burt mentioned and not one more. 17 Four out of nine offer them. 18 And I should note that two of the three who 19 signed onto Mr. Burt's joint reply companies, 8e6 Technologies 20 and Be Safe Online do not offer them. So we've got nine major 21 censorware companies, five don't even have them. So let's 22 completely throw them out for purposes of talking about URL 23 checkers. That's half the industry right there. 24 Now, there are other players than just these 25 nine, but I choose the nine major players because I didn't

want to make this list too extensive. And between these nine we have most of the field covered.

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Then I want to talk specifically about one particular URL checker, that being the URL checker of WebSense. And I ask you to flip over quickly to Exhibit 3. WebSense's URL checker is different from that of all the others. Because with all the others, N2H2, SurfControl, you just go there, you type in to your heart's content, you get whatever results they give you. Not WebSense. WebSense as you can see from the form here they make you register using a real email address, you can't even use a webmail address such a yahoo.com or hotmail.com, or something like that. You also can't use an AOL.com address or an earthlink.net address, or something of those sorts because they consider those to be addresses for home users, not for serious business Internet That's an interesting assumption on their part, but that's the assumption they offer. And it's spelled out right here in this little exhibit. It's one of the reasons why it printed out.

So as long as you have a good enough email address to satisfy their criteria, then they will email you a password and if they email you the password, then and only then can you access their URL checker.

And if you look at the very bottom of page 1 of Exhibit 3 going over to page 2, you'll find their terms of

1 service. And their terms of service say, in a nutshell, you 2 can use this if you are a customer or you're seriously 3 considering becoming a customer of WebSense. 4 So the minute I clicked on that, I violated 5 their agreement. They can sue me if they want. I'm saying it 6 openly. I have no intention of ever becoming a WebSense 7 customers, but that's what I had to do to get access to their 8 URL checker. 9 Then here's the real flaw in WebSense. Let's ao 10 to Exhibit 4. It's a big exhibit, you do not have to look at 11 all pages. 12 The first URL I called up on their URL checker 13 just because it might amuse you was something called 14 www.copyright.gov/1201. And you'll be happy to know that you 15 are classified as a government site in their web checker. It 16 might have made for a good joke if you were classified as a 17 porn site, but they got this one right. 18 MR. CARSON: There's a lot of scurrilous 19 information in there. 20 MR. TYRE: Now, if you want at your leisure, you 21 can go through the next 21 pages. I don't really care. What I 22 want you to do right now, this is a test I ran going through 23 this just manually entering URLs at random. For the purposes 24 of this test I don't care whether their classification of any 25 particular website was right or wrong. What I do care about,

1 and I've replicated this experiment more than several time; 2 this was not an anomaly, is that after running 21 pages, what 3 you see in the first 21 pages of this exhibit. You get to page 4 22, and please forgive me if I have to squint a lot when I'm 5 reading things, but I don't have a whole lot of eyesight. 6 But on page 22 WebSense site look up tool. 7 "Your organization has exceeded the maximum number of lookups 8 for a single day. Please try again tomorrow. WebSense has 9 implemented a limit to ensure the use of the master database 10 for WebSense customers and prospects only. Thank you for your 11 understanding." Twenty-one a day. That's very helpful. I 12 hope the record reflects I was being highly sarcastic in 13 saying that. 14 I think we can pretty well discount WebSense URL 15 checker as a valuable research tool. So now we're down to 16 only three companies out of nine that have even potentially 17 valuable URL checkers. 18 The next exhibit, Exhibit 5, all of these were 19 done from N2H2's URL checker. These were not done to show any 20 particular problem with N2H2's URL checker. It has had 21 problems in the past. Those problems apparently do not exist 22 anymore, so I'm not going to talk about those problems. 23 I created these exhibits to illustrate in a 24 fairly tangible fashion what some of the problems with 25 database querying is. And for purposes of this, it does not

matter whether in this particular case I happened to be using
a URL checker, as I did for this exhibit, or whether I
happened to have a running copy of N2H2 and I'm doing more
extensive database querying. The problem is the same.

In the CIPA trial, CIPA being the Children's
Internet Protection Act the formal case being American Library

Internet Protection Act the formal case being American Library

Association v. United States. There was expert testimony, and
this necessarily was very rough, that there are approximately
2 billion webpages out there. That was a year ago. We don't
need an expert to sit here today and tell us that same expert
would give us a much larger number today. And it wasn't
actually 2 billion webpages, it was 2 billion indexable
webpages. Only those pages that can be found and indexed by
search engines, which is a subset of the entire web.

I could explain that if you want, but I think the figure of 2 billion by itself is big enough to make one of my points.

Then you have something like N2H2, which has a database of 4 million entries, according to David Burt. That doesn't necessarily mean that they block 4 million websites.

Those 4 million entries could block, for all we know, 7 or 8 million websites. For example, as all of the censorware companies do, they have blocks in certain of their blocking categories on the free web page services. All of them block Geocities or what used to be geocities. Now it's

1 pages. yahoo. com in at least one of their blocking categories. 2 That's only one entry in their database, but that entry in 3 their database puts a block on however many tens of thousands 4 or maybe even hundreds of thousands pages there are on 5 Geocities, as I still prefer to call it because I'm just used 6 to saying that. 7 You think about those numbers, 4 million entries 8 in the database, 2 billion webpages. Not websites, webpages. 9 How is one going to devise a statistical sampling of a 10 database query that it's going to find truly meaningful ways 11 of discovering what the problems in the database are? 12 And this next set of exhibits is intended to 13 illustrate for any database querying method, not just for N2H2 14 URL checkers, that there are problems with that can be solved 15 by decrypting, looking at the list, but that cannot be solved 16 effectively simply by database querying. 17 Now you'll see on the first page of Exhibit 5 I 18 called up the site peacefire.org to see how it was classified. 19 And it's classified not currently categorized in the N2H2 20 database. Great. Peacefire's clean. Don't have to worry 21 about it. Move on to the next domain name, right? Wrong. 22 Turn to the next page. Go to a subdirectory in 23 peacefire.org, peacefire.org/bypass. That subdirectory is 24 blocked by N2H2 as a loophole site. And I believe you heard 25 just a little bit about what a loophole site is, so I'm not

going to further burden the record with that. I just chose that one because I happened to know that it was there, not because I want to further burden the record talking about what false sites is.

So, what do you do when you build a database for purpose of doing a database inquiry? Do you do it just with domain names? Do you do with directories? Do you do it with subdirectories? How do you build that database and how do you even know what subdirectories that you are to include in the database? This is a problem.

Another example, the same problem. And I'm glad they're sitting behind me, because I wouldn't want to be talking their back. But the next page of Exhibit 3 I called up eff.org. They're clean. Not categorized. Wrong. Turn to the next page, their Blue Ribbon Campaign, which they've been running since perhaps 1993/1994 is in the world according to N2H2 a drug site. And I thought it was important that you know N2H2 thinks it's a drug site, because later today and tomorrow you're going to be hearing a lot from EEF personnel, and you really ought to know the quality and caliber, at last according to N2H2 of who you're dealing with. Who in this right mind who has ever looked at the EEF Blue Ribbon site could possibly think it's a drug site? How could one imagine searching that particular subdirectory, and yet there it is in the N2H2 database, it's a drug site. So I have a bunch of

druggies sitting behind me according to N2H2.

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Now, I told them I was going to tell a joke at their expense. I can't see behind me to see if they're laughing or they're starring at me.

Now, we turn to the next one and we get to a very interesting example. The next page in the exhibit is snarc. freeserve. co. uk. UK being the country code for the United Kingdom. That's the basic route domain. And we see that N2H2 blocks in the games category.

So suppose I want to find out how that website is blocked or it's because I happen to be the owner of that website, which I'm not, I type in the website address. I see, okay, it's games. I don't care if it's blocked in games. I only care if it's blocked in the category that a public library likely would use. So I won't do anymore searching because I'm not concerned with the games category. Once again, please turn to the next page we start going down to a subdirectory level. We've got snarc. freeserve.co.uk/ -- uh-ho censorware. And guess what. That's illegal. So depending upon where we are on that site, we have N2H2 taking the same site, categorizing it under two completely different categories. If I was just setting up random database, how would I know, particularly if I didn't have the knowledge and experience that I had, to know that gosh, they may classify part of the site one way, they may classify another part of

1 the site a different way? 2 And then I want to turn to the final example 3 where I'm going to walk you through a series of 4 pages to 4 show just how far you have to dig to find some of these. 5 This next site is danny. oz. au, AU being the 6 country code for Australia. The route domain name free bill of 7 health from N2H2. 8 Let's go down one directory to the next page, 9 danny.oz.au/freedom. Clean bill of health. No problem. 10 Let's go to the next page, down one more 11 subdirectory level, danny.oz.au/freedom/censorware. Well, 12 that censorware site's okay. No problem. 13 Let's go to the last page of the exhibit going 14 really deep into that site, 15 danny. oz. au/freedom/censorware/i filter. html. Uh-oh, we've got 16 profanity there. 17 Now, how far have we had to dig into that site 18 to find something N2H2 blocked? How could anybody in the real 19 world as opposed to in some completely theoretically world 20 even think to go down that far in the directory structure of 21 that website to look to see if there's a block or not. Maybe 22 Danny He, of the owner of this site, might think of that. But 23 I have no clue who else would think of that. 24 And if you're wondering, well, how did I know 25 this if nobody else would think of that? There was some

1 dispute about whether Seth Finkelstein had decrypted the N2H2 2 black list. I asked Seth to find me examples to prove a point 3 I wanted to make here today. He did not give me the entire 4 decrypted black list. I do not have it. I have never asked 5 it. But I specified to him what I wanted, find examples. He 6 sent me examples. 7 These examples that I just gave to you came from 8 Seth's decrypted black list which Mr. Burt claims Seth never 9 decrypted. That's how I know about these examples, and it's 10 unlikely I ever could have found them without Seth having 11 decrypted the black list and given me these examples. 12 MS. PETERS: So you're basically saying that 13 decryption is the only way to have gotten this? 14 MR. TYRE: Sure. For this purpose, yes. 15 MS. PETERS: Okay. 16 MR. TYRE: Suppose hypothetically I had a list 17 of every domain name in every top level directory, whether it 18 be the big three .com, .org, .net, whether it include the 19 sponsors TLDs whether it be yours, .gov, .mil, whether we get 20 into country codes such as a .au or a .uk; suppose I had the 21 list of every single one of those, could I write a script that 22 would feed every single one of those through N2H2 or 23 SurfControl or so forth? I personally couldn't, but I know 24 many people who could. 25 Let me very quickly say that I personally do not

1 do decryption because I do not have the technical skills for 2 it. It is a very, very skilled thing to do. And I do not have 3 those skills, but I know a lot about the results of it because 4 I've worked with people who do it. 5 But let's get back to what I was saying. I feed 6 through every single domain name in the world regardless of 7 what TLD is, it's going to give me a picture. It's not going 8 to tell me everything because it's not going to tell me 9 whether a particular site instead of being blocked at the 10 domain level is going to be blocked at a directory level or a 11 3 level below subdirectory level. It's not going to tell me 12 with that snarc. freeserve. site whether it's going to have one 13 kind of block at the route or main level and another kind of 14 block at the lower level. These are the reasons why database 15 querying is not as effective as decrypting the entre black 16 list and going through it. 17 One uses tools to go through it. One can't 18 simply read and black list or else one would go crazy. And by 19 the time one finished reading it, it would be completely out 20 of date in any event. But the only way to find blocks at this 21 level of granularity is by doing decryption. 22 Give you another example, this is an example 23 from the past but it's a good example of why database querying 24 is not good. 25 Most of the studies we do at Censorware Project

1 we look for so-called overblocking or blocks are wrong or 2 they're bad blocks. Occasionally we've done the other side 3 where we look at underblocking where they don't block what we 4 were supposed to do. We did a study with N2H2 where we did 5 both. But that's one of the few times we've done both sides of 6 it. But there's a very famous example that we did with 7 CyberPatrol. 8 A site called maplesoccer.org. It's a youth 9 soccer league in Massachusetts. You all know what youth 10 soccer leagues are. You can all pretty well imagine what would 11 be on the website of a youth soccer league. Here are the 12 teams, here are the standings, here's the schedule, here's the 13 age groups, all that. Who would think to put that into a 14 database query as part of a sampling? 15 CyberPatrol blocked it. Why did CyberPatrol 16 block it? Because it talked about teens age 13 to 15. Uh-oh, 17 that could be sexual. Could be child pornography. Could be a 18 variety of other things. It wasn't. 19 And the funny thing about that was we exposed 20 that block, CyberPatrol, as did all of the other companies, 21 went back and unblocked. Then they went back and they 22 reblocked it. We exposed the fact that they're stupid, they 23 reblocked this site. They unblocked it. Went back and 24 reblocked it. Not because they're malicious, but because they 25 do most of this by computer robots, not by human review, and

1 the computer robots are stupid. Computers are not smart for 2 this kind of work. They never have been. Some day they may 3 will be, but they surely are not today. 4 So we did that a second time. They unblocked 5 it, they reblocked it. I won't tell you exactly how many 6 times we went through this cycle, but eventually I decided to 7 have some fun with this. 8 I wrote an open letter, you know, to the 9 President of CyberPatrol: From the President of Cyberpatrol 10 to the PR Director for CyberPatrol, who was actually on one of 11 these discussion lists I was telling you about, and was very 12 active in the discussion. At that time people from all sides 13 really were talking about this. Her name was Susan Getgood. 14 And the memo said something to the effect of "Susan, they're 15 killing me. You've got to find a way that we can't keep 16 reblocking this site. Those Censorware Project guys are just 17 driving us nuts. Fix our program. Do something." 18 They kept reblocking it. They kept unblocking 19 it. Eventually they fixed the problem. And that story is not 20 just a fun little story, but it's an answer to a question that 21 was raised in the first hearing. You know that during the 22 first hearing Seth Finkelstein did have on one or two 23 occasions access to the N2H2 black list. But then N2H2 24 stopped letting him have it, not surprisingly, but they

Was it enough for him to have it once? To analyze

stopped.

1 it once, yes. Was it enough for him to determine how many 2 new mistakes they kept making, whether the mistakes are 3 isolated instances, whether they're a problem at the system 4 level? The only way you can do that is if you keep doing this 5 over and over again. 6 In the <u>Mainstream Loudoun</u> case we went through 7 probably 8 or 9 different iterations of X-Stop because it was 8 important to see not only whether in the course of discovery 9 the bad blocks that were being revealed were being unblocked, 10 which for the most part they were, but what new bad blocks 11 were being added. It's like the old Jay Leno commercial for 12 Doritos, "we make more." It's guaranteed every time 13 censorware companies add more to their black list, there's 14 going to be more mistakes on them. You have to have 15 continuous access to the list to find out what's on it. It's 16 all fine and good to know what was blocked two months ago, but 17 that doesn't tell you what's blocked today and how systemic 18 the problems are. 19 Now, that's why combining those factors 20 together, doing database querying although it has its uses, is 21 not as effective as doing decryption and having the ability to 22 do the decryption as frequently as possible. 23 MS. PETERS: I asked about private agreements, 24 and you just basically cited and said that Mr. Finkelstein

basically had the list but no longer did. Is that a comment

on what agreements might be reached that maybe you can get an agreement to get it once, but having continuous access is a problem?

MR. TYRE: The practices vary somewhat from company-to-company. But the normal practice is that you fill

company-to-company. But the normal practice is that you fill out a form, you give them your information. Anytime I've ever done this, I've used truthful information, no fictitious identity. And I believe that the same is true for Seth and other people I know who have done this. You fill out the form, they don't do any particular checking on it, you just enter your information. As soon as it's entered, you can download the 30 day trial.

The only time I've known of when that was not the case was with a product called SmartFilter when their sales person after I registered actually called me. And before he called me, he did a search on me and he saw I was a member of the Censorware Project and saw what the Censorware Project did. And he still let me have a sample. It's the only time I know of that's ever happened when a company has agreed to let someone like the various members of the Censorware Project --- I think I'll pass on defining whether we're reputable or not. That's for others to decide. Has actually let any of us have something like that with knowledge of who we are.

David Burt's testimony in Washington was very specific with a reputable lab, such as Consumer Reports or

1 something along those lines, we've talked about this within 2 N2H2, but we've not really decided. Maybe if they let us be 3 present while they do their testing, maybe if they sign a 4 nondisclosure agreement, then maybe we'd let them have the 5 information and we'd give it to them in a decrypted form. We 6 wouldn't even make them go through the trouble of figuring out 7 how to decrypt it. So if that was maybe, he was in no 8 position to say that, yes, faced with a request like that, 9 that the company would agree to that. 10 And if you're talking about folks like us, folks 11 who are not a reputable lab such as Consumer Reports, even 12 though what we do is far more in depth than what Consumer 13 Reports does, there's many maxims of jurisprudence. One of 14 those maxims of jurisprudence here in California, which is in 15 our civil code, is that the law does not require ideal acts. I 16 can tell you, that if I were to go to a censorware company 17 today or if Seth were to go to a censorware company today or 18 if certain other people were and say this is who I am, this is 19 why I want it, it would be the ultimate ideal act. They would 20 never agree. 21 MS. PETERS: So your answer is no? 22 MR. TYRE: If I remember the question, yes. 23 MS. PETERS: Can this problem be ameliorated 24 through private agreements? 25 MR. TYRE: In my opinion, no. First of all, I

1 don't think the censorware companies ever would agree. And 2 second, if part of the agreement was an DNA, then what would 3 be the point? Our purpose is to expose the flaws. 4 MS. PETERS: Okay. One last question, I don't 5 want to hog it all. Mr. Metalitz said even if the case is 6 proved, the class is too broad and the focus is on censorware 7 and can you come up with a definition. Is it possible to come 8 up with a definition for censorware that distinguishes it from 9 the broader class of filtering software that would deal with 10 security and other things? 11 MR. TYRE: Well, I'm going to turn that around a 12 little bit. And I'm doing this not just as a lawyer's trick, 13 but because from the first moment I read Mr. Metalitz' 14 comment, I had an idea of what he was talking about but I 15 wasn't sure. I've asked a lot of people, not just other 16 censorware people, but computer security people who are among 17 my client list. And no one has been able to figure out exactly 18 what is meant by what Mr. Metalitz wrote and exactly what 19 definition, if any, would satisfy his request. 20 So I'm going to suggest to this panel that the 21 burden should not be on me or any other proponent of 22 censorware of this exemption to limit the proposed exemption. 23 The burden should be on Mr. Metalitz as the one who proposed 24 this amendment or limitation, or whatever you want to call it, 25 to specify in writing that can be analyzed as opposed to being

1 just a theoretical construct exactly what it is that he does 2 or does not want. And your having indicated at the beginning 3 that there will be a chance for supplemental comments after 4 this is over, I think that's the appropriate forum to do that 5 in. I don't think it's appropriate today. 6 Again, not because I'm playing games, but 7 seriously because no one, including computer security experts 8 who are clients of mine, really understands it. I'm very 9 uncomfortable taking on the burden of trying to deal with it 10 at all before I see something more tangible from Mr. Metalitz. 11 MS. PETERS: Okay. Do you want to comment at 12 all? 13 MR. METALITZ: Yes. Sure. We have put something 14 in writing to say we think the filtering software that was 15 covered by the evidence that's been presented here, and it's 16 on page 13 of our joint reply comments. "Filtering software 17 used to prevent access to Internet sits containing material 18 deemed objectionable to children or otherwise inappropriate 19 for some segment of the public or for display in a public 20 setting." 21 Now, that may not be a very good definition, and 22 I would think that people who have the word "censorware" in 23 their name would have probably a sharper definition of what 24 kinds of material they're talking about. But the burden, of 25 course, is on the proponent throughout this proceeding and

1	this panel can't recommend an exemption unless there's
2	evidence to support it that shows a substantial adverse impact
3	on the availability of something, some copyrighted work or
4	noninfringing purposes. So I would suggest that, you know,
5	we've taken a stab at it and I'm sure Mr. Tyre can do a lot
6	better. But we just think that whatever finding is made here
7	ought to conform to the evidence and not extend much more
8	broadly to get into areas that aren't covered by the evidence.
9	MS. PETERS: We may do a question. The way the
10	supplemental come in is if we actually come up with questions
11	that we believe we need further input from. So, we'll handle
12	it that way.
13	MR. TYRE: May I quickly respond to that?
14	MS. PETERS: Yes. Sure.
15	MR. TYRE: Certainly we can provide a more
16	precise definition of censorware. I don't have one in writing
17	in front of me, but that an be done. That's not the problem.
18	The problem is dealing with the other aspects of
19	what Mr. Metalitz proposes, and that these things other than
20	what would be defined as censorware. And one of the specific
21	reasons why that's a problem, is because there's been so much
22	consolidation in the industry, the relevance industry segment,
23	that it's not surprise that you have companies such as
24	Symantec which are offering integrated products which consist
25	both of traditional censorware and of firewall protection,

antivirus protection things of that nature.

And what I'm asking for. I

And what I'm asking for, I don't know whether

I'll get it, but what I'm asking for is something from Mr.

Metalitz that tells us how we deal with something like that,
how we deal with an integrated product. And further, how we
deal with what I would call a pure censorware company such as

N2H2 not suddenly grasping onto this newly limited category
and by making a few minor changes into its database, suddenly
turning itself into a company that in addition to doing
censorware has some minor security functions, some minor virus
protection. And all of a sudden because of however this
definition may work, finds itself because of imprecise wording
or any other reasons no longer subject to an exemption,
assuming of course that there's going to be an exemption at
all.

So I'm really troubled by all of this will play out. And that's why, though I may not get my wish, I am wishing that you will put the burden on Mr. Metalitz to give us something far more concrete to consider than what has been given.

MS. PETERS: I've basically hogged the questions. So, David, how about you.

MR. CARSON: Let me just suggest to you, don't assume we're going to put a burden on you or Mr. Metalitz. But it would be in your interest to provide a more precisely

1 defined class and what you would like to see if we were to go 2 in that direction. 3 I assume you're not saying that there is a 4 reason why people should be able to have access to lists of 5 what a virus swapping software blocks? Is that true or is 6 that of interest to you? 7 MR. TYRE: Speaking for myself and for the 8 Censorware Project, that is not of interest to us. Whether it 9 would be of interest to other security researchers, I have no 10 knowledge or comment. 11 MR. CARSON: Right. But they haven't come 12 forward in any event, so that's not really before us, I don't 13 thi nk. 14 I'm not sure I've heard a precise answer to this 15 question, and I think it's perhaps an important one. Can you 16 tell us how people have since October 28, 2000 been taking 17 advantage of the exempted class for compilations of consisting 18 of websites blocks by filtering software applications? 19 MR. TYRE: That's an easy question to answer and 20 it's a difficult question to answer because there's not really 21 a whole lot that I can say about that that wasn't already said 22 in Washington. 23 MR. CARSON: Well, not a whole lot was said, 24 unfortunately, in Washington. 25 MR. TYRE: I'm quite well aware of that. I have

gone through that transcript more than once.

Mr. Burt contends that Mr. Finkelstein hasn't even done the work that he says he's done. I personally got a rather large chuckle about Mr. Band's comment about the Iraqi Information Minister. I sincerely hope that this panel does believe that Mr. Finkelstein has, in fact, done what he says he has done. And I've told you straight out that some of what I've presented to you today is based upon the work that Mr. Finkelstein has done, and that specifically decryption work of N2H2, not other work that has been done.

There really isn't a great deal that I personally know of that has been done in the last 3 years, but I think there is a couple of reasons for that. And I think there's also a quick response I want to make that's related to that to one of the remarks that Mr. Metalitz made in the beginning. And that is that I believe he has incorrectly stated what the appropriate considerations are for the Copyright Office and for the Librarian of Congress.

There's no doubt that what has or has not been done in the last 3 years is a relevant factor. You'll never hear me say otherwise. But Mr. Metalitz indicated in his opening statement today that that's the only relevant factor.

I believe that's incorrect, both from reading the statute and from reading your notice of inquiry, I believe that regardless of whether it's an exemption that never has existed or it's a

1	request to in effect renew an exemption that already has
2	requested, such as this one, the focus is the same. The focus
3	is "in/or," in either or not an "and". Either what has
4	happened before or what is likely to happen in the future.
5	MR. CARSON: Could I stop you for a second? Do
6	you dispute that, Mr. Metalitz?
7	MR. METALITZ: If I understand what Mr. Tyre is
8	saying, no I would not say that what is actually occurring now
9	is the only relevant factor. But Congress said that should be
10	the main focus of this proceeding.
11	MR. CARSON: So you don't dispute I'm sorry.
12	Go ahead.
13	MR. METALITZ: And now that the prohibition is
14	in effect, I think it's highly relevant what use is being made
15	of it.
16	MR. CARSON: But you don't dispute that at least
17	in theory, even if nothing were happening now, if we could
18	predict that it's more likely than not that in the next 3
19	years it's going to happen, it's perfectly relevant for us to
20	come up with an exemption if that's where it takes us?
21	MR. METALITZ: Yes. If it meets the criteria
22	that are in the statute and legislative history. And I think
23	you've spelled them out in the conclusion in 2000 what the
24	burden would be in that situation.
25	MR. CARSON: Okay.
I	

1 Sorry for interrupting you. I just wanted to 2 clear it up. Please go ahead with your --3 MR. TYRE: That's quite all right. It was 4 useful. 5 Now, let's get back to that. I cannot cite to 6 you any specific examples that are not already in the record. 7 I'd love to be able to, but I'm not going to make up facts 8 that don't exist. What I can tell you is that there's sort of 9 a unique dynamic that's at play here, and this was not really 10 discussed at the Washington hearing. 11 This whole exemption has many unique qualities 12 about it, not the least of which it's one of the two 13 exemptions that you granted to 2½ years ago. Most of the 14 proposed exemptions that were requested then were rejected. 15 And so this is one that at least to some extent has had the 16 opportunity to be field tested. 17 But you've heard a great deal of testimony 18 already about how hard this work is. And I'm not talking 19 about what's been said about the legal risks involved. I'm 20 talking about that this is extremely difficult work to figure 21 out how to decrypt these programs in the first place. This is 22 not work for an amateur. This is work for trained 23 professionals who focus specifically on knowledge of 24 cryptography. There aren't a whole lot of people who are 25 capable of doing this kind of work, and it's a continuing arms

race as one version of the program gets decrypted, then the censorware companies respond as you would expect them to.

They make better encryption so then you need more skill to decrypt it. It's hard work. It's time consuming work.

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I cannot say this of my own personal knowledge, but having gone through this with people who have figured out how to decrypt this - Seth being one of them, not the only one - I have pretty solid knowledge of how much is involved in doing this.

Given how hard the work is, there's another factor that comes into play here. Sure, it's true that this exemption has been on the books since October of 2000. months later or 3 months later in December 2000 CIPA was passed, the Children's Internet Protection Act. And with, I believe -- I'm not even sure if it was the day after the legislation was signed. It may have even been the day before it was signed. I don't recall, I don't care. The twin lawsuits by the American Library Association and the ACLU were filed challenging the constitutionality of CIPA. And those lawsuits were on a fairly fast track. You know they went to trial. You know they were decided. Approximately a year ago the three judge trial court found that CIPA was unconstitutional as applied to public libraries. The matter since has been argued in the Supreme Court. And at some point before you make your final rulemaking, the Supreme Court presumably will decide

that case.

I make no prediction on what that decision will be. But I think it plays an important psychological dynamic here because everyone has said on both sides - Mr. Burt said I think, I know Mr. Band said it, I know Mr. Finkelstein said it - that what does or does not happen in the CIPA case will have an impact on how this work is done in the future. And by that I mean specifically decryption work where you can get into some of the in depth things such as the loophole sites that you cannot get into simply by doing database querying or log file analysis.

The people who do this do this in their spare time. They put in an awful lot of time to do it. And there has been a feeling on the part of those people, myself included, that is it really worth investing a lot of time now when this major court case is out there and this major court case may have a huge impact on what the relative value of this work is in the future. That's a psychological issue. That may or may not resonate with you, but it's a real issue. That issue that CIPA became law and was challenged in the court within a few months of when this exemption came to effect is one of the reasons why there hasn't been a lot of this work done in the last 2½ years. But by the same token, knowing that the Supreme Court will be deciding the case within the next month or at least in theory it should be - I'm certainly

1	not going to tell them what to do - that there is a good
2	likelihood, which is the standard, that once the CIPA case is
3	decided and we know again where the landscape is that those
4	who have been in the field, those who may be interested in
5	getting into the field will resume their work.
6	MR. CARSON: I'm going to follow up on a
7	question that the Registrar asked you with respect to the
8	experience of getting access voluntarily from the censorware
9	suppliers to those lists. Have there been cases where the
10	Censorware Project or people in a similar situation have tried
11	to get access to those lists and it's been flat out refused?
12	MR. TYRE: I'm sorry. I did not hear the last
13	part.
14	MR. CARSON: Have there been cases where the
15	Censorware Project or people in similar situations have
16	requested access to lists of blocked websites and that access
17	has been refused?
18	MR. TYRE: Yes.
19	MR. CARSON: Okay. Give me some idea of the
20	nature and quantity of those attempts?
21	MR. TYRE: Well, you already have in the record
22	that N2H2 flat out turned down Seth Finkelstein once.
23	MR. CARSON: Yes, that's once.
24	MR. TYRE: Once.
25	MR. CARSON: I'm trying to get a sense of

1 quantity of the problem, the nature of the problem. 2 MR. TYRE: There was a time when I tried to get 3 one and, honestly, I'm blanking on which product it was. There 4 are so many of them, they sometimes blend together. And they 5 turned me down. 6 A lot of times you can get it the first time 7 because a lot of times you can get it the first time because 8 their system is automated. You give them legitimate 9 information, 2 minutes later you're eligible to download it, 10 you download it. It's the second time that's the problem. 11 You do it the first time, then we go out and we 12 do a report. You do it a second time, no. They'll not give it 13 to you. Sometimes there are other ways of getting a hold of it. But if you ask for it, will they give it to you? No. 14 15 MR. CARSON: And you're telling us that based 16 upon a single experience of Mr. Finkelstein and a single 17 experience by you, is that correct? 18 MR. TYRE: Two experiences plus having dealt 19 with all these companies and knowing that particularly after 20 we've done a particularly scathing reporting on them that if 21 we asked for it again, they'd just laugh at us. 22 MR. CARSON: And the two specific experiences 23 were both with a single company, N2H2, is that correct? 24 MR. TYRE: No. 25 MR. CARSON: Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Finkelstein was

with N2H2 and yours was with?
MR. TYRE: Yes. I apologize for not remembering
which mine was with. There's been a lot of consolidation in
the industry and I'm not specifically remembering what it was.
But I will state for a fact that it was not N2H2. I have never
made that request of N2H2.
So we have two instances, two companies and I'd
be willing to make a rather substantial wager that that
doesn't answer your question. But if I were to go ask the
other companies, I'd know what the answer would be.
MR. CARSON: So you're asking us to make
judgments based upon your prediction, based upon your
experi ence?
MR. TYRE: Oh, no. I know to a moral certainty
what the responses will be. I'm not asking you to
MR. CARSON: You think you've shown us two moral
MR. TYRE: I'm not asking you to take that as
evi dence.
MR. CARSON: Okay. All right. Thank you.
MS. PETERS: How about going to Steve.
MR. TEPP: Okay. Thank you.
Just sort of following on what we've already
been talking about, Mr. Tyre, when we were in Washington Mr.
Finkelstein was asked about how many people take advantage of

1 this exemption. And notwithstanding your comments about the 2 CIPA case and whatever chilling effect you think that has, you 3 made a comment about the limited number of people who have the 4 technical skills to do this given the level of detail of 5 knowledge that's required. 6 Mr. Finkelstein told us he thought about 6 7 people were using this exception. Do you think that the 8 number -- needless to say, that's an extremely small number 9 given the population of the United States. What it in your 10 estimation is the number of people who are capable and 11 interested in doing this so that, for example, if the CIPA 12 decision goes the way you and your colleagues would like what 13 should we expect to see in the next 3 years should this 14 exemption be renewed? 15 MR. TYRE: I'll give you somewhat of an 16 anecdotal example to that. I've been involved in a number of 17 the DMCA lawsuits, including the 2600 cases in Amicus and the 18 Felton case as one of the attorneys for Ed Felton and his 19 researchers at Princeton and Rice. I've done a lot of 20 speaking on DMCA. And it's reasonable to conclude that my 21 views on the DMCA do not coincide with those of Mr. Metalitz. 22 But we're not here to talk about that today. 23 What I think is absolutely fascinating is that I 24 believe there's a conference called Crypto which takes place 25 on an annual basis in Santa Barbara. It is considered by many

to be the leading conference of cryptographers in the world. 2 People come from all over the word to that conference. Of 3 course, one of the reasons why it's in late summer in Santa 4 Barbara and it's hard to find a better place to be at that 5 time of year, but still the talent that is assembled there is 6 extraordinary. That's your class of the people who could get 7 into this field if they wanted to get into this field. 8 When I was there speaking one of the persons 9 there, a nationally known expert on computer security, Matt 10 Blaise came up to me afterwards and said to me "Wow, Jim, 11 you're my hero." Not because of anything I had done because 12 of the DMCA, but because of my Censorware Project work. I 13

didn't have the heart to tell him that I wasn't the person who was actually doing the decryption. I do not have those technical skills, as I've said before. But he found, and quite a number of people at that conference, we more interested in talking with me about censorware decryption work than they were about talking with me about DMCA. Because DMCA is just lawyers and cryptographers don't want to talk to lawyers. They want to talk to people who are doing work. And I've got these cryptographers who are world famous cryptographers coming up to me and saying tell me about censorware. What can we do? How can we help? Is this something that we can get into?

Will any of them actually do it if the exemption is renewed for another 3 years? I don't know. If it is, oh, I

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1 can put together a very long list of people who I would want 2 to talk to if I wanted to expand the field of people who have 3 the appropriate skill set to learn how to do this and to get 4 involved in this. Because we could use more than those we 5 have. 6 MR. TEPP: Okay. Well, just to get a sense of 7 the value of your anecdote, how many people come to this 8 conference in Santa Barbara on average? 9 MR. TYRE: Several hundred minimum, maybe more. 10 When I did my speaking gig there we were in an auditorium that 11 I would guesstimate sat about 200. The house was packed, 12 standing room only. They hadn't come to listen to me talk 13 about censorware. They came to listen to me talk about the 14 DMCA at this particular session. But was the sole purpose of 15 that session. So there had to be at least 250 to 300 people 16 in that room, and they were maybe not from every single 17 continent on the world, but most of them. 18 MR. TEPP: Okay. Thanks. 19 One other thing in a similar sort of vein, you 20 referred earlier to how the reports that have been done almost 21 invariably result in one of the companies whose product is 22 being analyzed making corrections in line with the critique in 23 the reports. Can you give us a sense of how many reports have 24 been done in the last 3 years, or more precisely since October

29, 2000.

1 MR. TYRE: Okay. Yes. Zero. If that's precise 2 enough for you. 3 We haven't done it, in large part, for the 4 reason that I mentioned. Seth is not the only member of the 5 Censorware Project and as I've indicated he is a former 6 member, he has not been a member since before October 2000 or 7 anytime in 2000, who is capable of doing this kind of work but 8 for the reason that I mentioned that there has been a feeling 9 that given the focus on the <u>CIPA</u> case that there is maybe not 10 the energy level that there was to continue doing these kinds 11 of reports. Given the energy that's involved in them, given 12 the time consumption that's involved in them we haven't done 13 any. 14 Will that change once <u>CIPA</u> is decided and if the 15 exemption is renewed? I think it will. I believe strongly that 16 it will. But our last report, which happened to be on Mr. 17 Burt's company N2H2 was in 2000 but probably -- it was in 18 2000. I'm not certain when in 2000 it was. It may or may not 19 have been after October 2000. But with that one qualification 20 we have not done any. 21 MR. TEPP: Okay. Thank you. 22 One last question, this one for Mr. Metalitz. 23 Looking at the opposite side of the equation, the potential 24 harm done to right holders over the past 3 years and should 25 the exemption be renewed perspectively in the coming 3 years,

1 when we look at the situation that's been described you talked 2 about the burgeoning number of copyrighted works available on 3 the Internet; Mr. Tyre's talked to us about the explosion of 4 the number of sites on filtering lists and there appear to be 5 several filtering companies, it doesn't appear to be at first 6 blush to be an industry in distress. Can you comment for us 7 about what, if any, harm there might be should this exemption 8 be renewed for the coming 3 years? 9 MR. METALITZ: In terms of the health of the 10 censorware industry, I'm not sure I can add anything to what 11 Mr. Burt has submitted in his testimony. He's much more 12 knowledgeable about that than I am. I'm not sure that the 13 balance sheets of the particular companies or whether they've 14 consolidated or not is necessarily the right test. But I don't 15 have any information really that would shed much light on that 16 with regard to the censorware companies. 17 MR. TEPP: Or does it have any effect on the 17 18 entities that you're representing today? 19 MR. METALITZ: I'm not sure if any of the 20 companies that are involved here are members of any the 21 associations that I represent. To my knowledge, they are not. 22 So I don't know that it has any direct impact on them. And I 23 think I'm not really the person to ask about that. 24 MR. TEPP: Well, you're the closest we've got 25 today, so I thought I'd give it a try. Thank you.

1 MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you. 2 Rob? 3 MR. KASUNIC: Okay. I have just a couple of 4 questions, mostly for Mr. Metalitz. Mostly we haven't heard 5 him talk as much. And in the interest of time I'm going to 6 sensor myself today. 7 MR. TYRE: You can't do that. You have to speak 8 freel y. 9 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, you had mentioned 10 that this is a net calculation and we do have to look at the 11 overall balance. And in line with that last question just so 12 we're absolutely clear, if we do find any evidence of more 13 than de minimis harm that then we would looking to what the 14 adverse effect on the industry would be. And one thing we do 15 have in the record that was in N2H2's annual report was that 16 this exemption final rule will not effect the value of lists 17 of blocked websites. So that there's a statement that this 18 would have seemingly no adverse effect on the value of these 19 There's nothing else to add in terms of what harm the 20 exemption has had or is likely to have in the next 3 years? 21 MR. METALITZ: Well, I think you're using harm 22 to the industry as a shorthand for the statutory standard, 23 really, which has there been any adverse impact on the 24 availability of this copyrighted material for noninfringing 25 purposes. And I think the record shows that a lot of this

1 material is available for the noninfringing purpose that Mr. 2 Tyre wants to promote or at least a close cousin of that 3 Because the record shows that a lot of evaluations, 4 criticism and comment about these products has taken place. 5 Now, I don't say that it's possible there could 6 be more of that criticism, comment of that noninfringing use 7 that we're talking about if the exemption were extended. But 8 this really gets into the question of to what extent has the 9 exemption contributed to that availability. 10 Obviously, the health of whether the extension 11 of the exemption or the renewal of the exemption would have a 12 specific impact on the bottom line of a particular company is 13 a somewhat different question. They obviously could be 14 related, and I don't really know what significance to ascribe 15 to the statement that you just read that came from one of 16 their securities filings. That partly would have to do with 17 how diversified their business is, and I just frankly don't 18 know the answer to that question. 19 MR. KASUNIC: Okay. Well, in line with that then 20 in your reply comment you state that we should be looking at -21 - and this is a follow up on what Mr. Tepp was asking - how 22 many members of the public, how often and how frequently and 23 how much they expect to utilize this in the next 3 years. But 24 given the limits that may be placed on harm and probably the 25 very small number of people who could accomplish or make use

1 of any recommendation we make to continue the exemption, what 2 possibility of adverse effect would you foresee in the next 3 3 years that we haven't seen in the last 3 years? 4 MR. METALITZ: Well, I think you maybe -- if I 5 can suggest, you might be looking at this through the wrong 6 end of the telescope. I think the question is if the 7 exemption is allowed to come into force -- excuse me. If the 8 prohibition is allowed to come into force for these products, 9 for these works, which it has never done because the Librarian 10 issued an exemption on October 28, 2000; if the exemption 11 comes into force, will it have a substantial adverse impact on 12 the availability of this material for noninfringing uses? I 13 think that's the question that's before you. And only if you 14 find that it will have a substantial adverse impact, can you 15 justifiably extend the exemption. 16 Now, the number of people who can do it and how 17 often they do it, and what use they make of the exemption is 18 relevant because Congress said if you find that the adverse 19 impact is de minimis, then you should not recommend an 20 exemption. It doesn't necessarily mean that if only six 21 people can do it, is necessarily de minimis. But I think it's 22 a factor that you would want to take into account. 23 MR. KASUNIC: But isn't the question there 24 whether the adverse effect is causing an adverse effect on 25 noni nfri ngi ng uses?

MR. METALITZ: Yes.

MR. KASUNIC: Not on whether people if there is an exemption they will be able to accomplish it? If this is a theoretical exemption anyway in some instances, if so many people will not be able to accomplish, take advantage of the exemption because of the technological savvy that would be required to effect the exemption, can we use that technological hurdle as a barrier to finding the exemption in the next 3 years?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I think the problem with that reasoning is that it seems to say that the stronger the encryption, the lower the bar to recognizing an exemption. If you had an encryption that only two cryptographers in the world were competent to break, does that necessarily mean that the harm of recognizing an exemption be de minimis? So I don't think it really correlates necessarily with the number of people who are able to do it.

I think the focus has to be on what substantial diminution of the public's access to or the availability of this material for noninfringing uses is attributable to 1201(a)(1) as a causation element in here as well. And if in fact it only impedes a very few people from taking an action that, according to the testimony today, hasn't resulted in any reports that would fall within this category of noninfringing during the past 3 years, then I think that's a relevant issue

1 for you to look at in deciding whether the statutory standard 2 has been met. 3 MR. KASUNIC: Well, the last thing I just want 4 to clarify, I raised this in Washington but since it was in 5 your reply comment, I just wanted some clarification. 6 What authority do you believe that we have that 7 -- at one point of your reply comment you mentioned that if we 8 do find an exemption, it should be limited in some way. And 9 where do you find that we have authority either placing 10 conditions on an exemption such as requesting permission from 11 the company beforehand, how would that be possible in terms of 12 designating a particular class of work that we could fashion 13 such conditions or such limitations on the exemption? 14 MR. METALITZ: That's a big question that I'm 15 sure we'll be returning to during the day and tomorrow. I 16 think the primary way in which this exemption if you decide to 17 recognize it, ought to be limited is by shaving down the 18 category of works to which is applies so that it only applies 19 to censorware, whatever the right definition of that is and 20 I'm sure Mr. Tyre can do a better job than I can of giving you 21 one, and that it not apply to all these other types of 22 security related and other lists of websites that would appear 23 in filtering software. 24 Now the reply comment does mention this issue of 25 consent or whether there's a likelihood that access to this

information would be granted or whether there's in effect an
exhaustion requirement that someone using the exemption would
have to first ask for permission. I think that's probably
better looked at in terms of trying to decide whether there's
a basis for an exemption at all. And the testimony I heard,
and I don't know that this is correct, that basically it's
very easy for someone to get at least one free bite at this
database without going through decryption. It seems to
relevant to me and it indicates that perhaps means other than
an exemption would help to cure whatever adverse impact you
find in this area. But, obviously, that's a contested issue
before you and people's views are going to differ on it. But
I think that that's where that evaluation would best fit.
MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you.
Charlotte, do you have a few questions.
MS. DOUGLASS: I do.
MS. PETERS: Okay.
MS. DOUGLASS: I have one question here, Mr.
Tyre, and one to Mr. Metalitz.
We talked a little bit, a lot actually, about
whether or not it would make any sense to request permission
from different companies because you wouldn't be able to get
it. It seems to me that when we met in April there was talk
from Mr. Burt of probably maybe an industry wide agreement or
an industry wide consensus that there might be a possibility
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1	that they would be in a position to give you the lists. But
2	you've read the testimony as well. Is it your sense that an
3	industry wide agreement would be also as useless as asking
4	company by company. If for example, Mr. Burt represents a
5	number of say the nine big did that make any sense to you?
6	MR. TYRE: I do understand the question.
7	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Okay.
8	MR. TYRE: And with respect, I think it slightly
9	misstates what he said.
10	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
11	MR. TYRE: And I actually can't see if he's
12	sitting here behind me or not, but I almost hope that he is.
13	MS. DOUGLASS: I don't see him.
14	MR. TYRE: But first off, he make it very clear
15	that in this context he was speaking only about his own
16	company, N2H2. He was not speaking about either of the two
17	companies that joined him in the joint reply, 8e6 Technologies
18	and Be Safe Online. And he certainly was not speaking on
19	behalf of any of the various other censorware companies such
20	as WebSense, SmartFilter, SurfControl. WE've all heard the
21	list beforehand.
22	What he said, as I understand it, is that
23	they've had some internal discussions, never resolved, within
24	N2H2 that maybe if a reputable research organization such as
25	Consumer Reports came to them and maybe if they agreed to an

1 NDA, and maybe if they agreed to certain other factors, then 2 they would let them have it. 3 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. 4 MR. TYRE: There is zero chance on the face of 5 the work on this earth that regardless of how reputable I 6 might be in your eyes or in anybody else's eyes, that Mr. Burt 7 would consider me to be reputable. There is zero chance that 8 I would agree to sign an NDA. Because what's the point of it 9 if I sign an NDA? That's a nonstarter. 10 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Thank you for clarifying 11 that. 12 Now, Mr. Metalitz, if an entire community of 13 users consisted of a group, say, of about ten people all of 14 whom sought to do what was more or less clearly noninfringing 15 work and they all experienced the say problem, would you say 16 in your estimation that this ten person group is an 17 insignificant number by definition or could this be in light 18 of the importance of the indispensability of the research that 19 they're doing and the entireness of the community, could be 20 that be considered? 21 MR. METALITZ: I don't think there's any litmus 22 test or any magic number below which it's automatically de 23 minimis. I think you have to look at the type of 24 noninfringing use that they're talking about. And my 25 impression, anyway, is that they're really talking about

criticism and comment, the types of reports whether they're
formal reports or not or critiques of these various products.
And I think that output is probably what you should be looking
more than the number of people that have contributed to the
output. But, again, this type of fair use, and I'm assuming
this is fair use, like any type of fair use for purposes of
this proceeding is not necessarily the case that the goal
needs to be the preferred or optimal means of access in order
to make fair use of the material. So you have to consider
whether this is sufficiently available through other means
that don't require conduct that's covered by 1201(a)(1) in
order to justify the exemption. I don't think there's any
magic number or any per se rule that would flow from that.
MS. DOUGLASS: Sure. I was just getting at the
sort of numerical calculus.
Thank you very much.
MS. PETERS: Okay. Comment?
MR. CARSON: Yes. Just wanted to clarify
something.
I didn't mean to be unfair to you, Mr. Tyre. So
the comment I made about how you perhaps ought to think about
and get back to us with a more strict definition of what
censorware is or what it is that you want us to exempt aside
from the current one, which is this list of websites that are
blocked by filtering software. But the same goes for you, Mr.

1	Metalitz. You're the one who is proposing we narrow it down.
2	I think it would serve your interests if you come up with the
3	best definition you can come up with with what you think we
4	ought to be narrowing it down with, understanding that when
5	you're doing that you're not necessarily asking us to exempt
6	anything at all, but if we're going in that direction what is
7	it you want. We'll look at what you've both given us and
8	we'll decide whether to do anything, and if so how to narrow
9	it down, if at all.
10	MR. METALITZ: We'll certainly do that.
11	MS. PETERS: Thank you very much.
12	The first panel is concluded. We'll take a 10
13	minute break and be back starting at 11:15. We're already
14	si gni fi cantly behi nd.
15	(Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m. a recess until 11:23
16	a.m.)
17	MS. PETERS:
18	The second panel is looking at literary works,
19	mal functioning, damage, obsolete technological protection
20	measures and issues related to research and security.
21	And the panel is Brewster Kahle representing the
22	Internet Archive, Barbara Simons representing the Association
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23	of Computer Machinery, George Ziemann representing
2324	MR. ZIEMANN: I would this time say that I'm

1 MS. PETERS: Okay. All right. Fine. 2 And Steve Metalitz who was on the last panel 3 representing the Joint Reply Commenters of a large number of 4 copyright owners. 5 And we're going to go in that order. And because 6 of time difficulties, I'm going to say for the beginning round 7 -- try. I'm not saying you must. Try to restrict your 8 comments to 10 minutes in the opening round. Okay. 9 Let's start with you. 10 MR. KAHLE: Thank you for inviting us down. 11 Appreciate the opportunity to be here. 12 My name is Brewster Kahle, I'm the digital 13 librarian and Chairman of the Board of the Internet Archive. 14 It's a 501(c)(3) nonprofit library located in San Francisco. 15 We really concentrate on digital works. So the issue is about 16 preserving digital works. We're open to academics, 17 researchers, scholars and the general public. Some of our 18 collections are available over the World Wide Web, but at 19 least all of our collections are available for those that come 20 to our facilities and our libraries to do things in-house that 21 often cannot be shown over the World Wide Web. 22 All of our services are available for free. 23 There's no fee for anybody to use this. And we're open to the 24 general public. 25 We maintain a broad collection, including

1 websites, website movies, books and digitized books both, 2 musical holdings and a growing collection of software, which 3 is the subject of the conversation today. 4 Researchers come from all over the world to 5 learn about digital archiving, so we have sort of a research 6 focus in that way, but also doing the real work and people 7 come to use the collections in our facilities. 8 We're supported by foundations Sloan, Markel, 9 Kale Austin Foundation, government, Library of Congress, 10 National Science Foundation in kind donations HP, Amazon. 11 in some of the replies and back and forth, there's a little 12 sort of who are you, and so I hope that that sort of gives you 13 an i dea. 14 This is what we look like, our building in San 15 Francisco, some of the people that are working on preserving 16 the materials, and this is a fellow doing work at one of the 17 public access terminals. 18 The problem that this is all about, is basically 19 media is degrading. Formats become obsolete and the platforms 20 change. It makes our job as librarians to record our digital 21 cultural heritage extremely difficult. And we're doing our 22 best to adapt our profession, our field to be able to take the 23 materials that are not just digitized materials that are now 24 in our holdings, but also things that were born digital and

born to not necessarily last the ages. They're born for a

particular commercial exploitation and then they go into our hands. And that's the sorts of works that we mainly try to deal with.

preserving these things are really important. I got somebody last week, the staff, so what, who cares about this stuff? And I think it's critically important. Tens of thousands of people spend 20 years, so since the PC came out there's been a proliferation of commercial packaged software in games, CD-ROMs that really sort of bring software and content together and it's been a new expressive media, but also really great stuff is in. So it's not just to look at history, it's actually pretty nifty material.

We've been learning a lot about how to preserve these, and it's a fairly new field the whole digital preservation area. In fact, the Library of Congress thing is really to push this thing forward. We've found that it's critical to both copy the materials and to gain access to the materials to be able to do preservation. Without copying and creating access, even if it's in-house access for researchers, historians and scholars, we're out of luck. Many of us probably had experiences going and backing up software and thinking that we're all safe. And then when you turn back to it, it turns that it wasn't there in the first place. So we think it's important.

What I'm here to talk about two exemptions on

1 the 1201(a)(1). The first is a literary and audiovisual works 2 embodied in software whose access control systems prohibit 3 access to replicas. So that was our first major one. 4 think of it as a very narrow exemption, it's these sort of 5 software titles on a very specific project. 6 The other exemption is literary works including 7 computer programs, databases protected by access control 8 mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, 9 damage and obsolescence. This is a much broader exemption 10 which is starting to become useful in certain circumstances. 11 And so I'd like to speak on both of those areas. 12 I thought a quick sort of overview, and quick is 13 the operative word here, of some of the titles that we have 14 here. So this is Apple Writer II. If you remember floppies 15 that look like this. When was the last time you tried to read 16 a floppy like this, though? They're non-trivial. This is 17 Apple Writer 1.1. The National Archives are starting to get 18 digital materials from the White House, for instance. And if 19 we don't go and save things like Writer Apple 1.1, then we may 20 have troubles in the future. 21 DOS. It's IBM original DOS. These are some of 22 the early programs that were done by amateurs. This is an 23 interesting title because it's when the convergence of the 24 personal computer and the film industry happened; when

Ephemeral Films is a seminal title off the Voyager CD-ROM

1 collection. 2 Lotus 123 that really propelled the whole 3 personal computer. 4 Just slipping through just some of the materials 5 that we have. This is when we tried to get text on computers. 6 This is "Shogun" is one of the first trying to do books and 7 computers together. Kind of clunky, but important for people 8 seeing the progress. If we can't have access to the actual 9 software and just the packaging, that would be tragic. 10 Early Quicken. 11 VisiCalc came before 123 and was the first 12 spreadsheet program. I feel quite honored to be able to even 13 hold one of these packages into my hand. It's a sealed 14 package, never opened of VisiCalc. 15 Tetris, the original Tetris. Soviet Challenge, 16 original works. 17 Simms City, when we first started to have 18 simulation in the educational environment. Now simulation is a 19 basis of a lot of work in high school and junior high school. 20 But this work is absolutely seminal in its worth. 21 One of the questions is, is do we do in terms of 22 being able to support these and be able to use them. 23 Robocop 3 is interesting because its content is 24 a 3D immersive, but it's also got that famous dongle problem. 25 This is, I guess, the access control that was really talked

1 about a lot 3 years ago of making it so that we have bypass 2 those access controls to be able to make these available. 3 And this is sort of a chart of just 16 of these 4 titles. And what it is we're advised by our lawyers we're not 5 going to be able to save. We can save one of these 16, all the 6 rest of them have access control that make it so that as we 7 understand it we would be violating the law if we were to 8 circumvent the access controls to be able to preserve these 9 titles by making copies, which is relatively easy, and to be 10 able to access them and play them, make sure that we have them 11 in accurate form. 12 So, I find this tragic. These materials are 13 entrusted to us. These aren't easy to come by. And they're 14 rotting in our hands. 15 I'd like to hit a couple of comments that were 16 done by an esteemed colleague Steve and some of the other 17 comments and sort of try to answer a few of these. 18 First, preservation requires both copying and 19 access. If we do just one -- it's not like books. You know, it 20 used to be that you kind of put a book in a basement and go 21 back in 50 years and you'd still have a book in the basement 22 and you'd be able to read it. That's not the case with these 23 things. I mean, trying to get technology to work in the 24 current day is hard enough. Trying to get technology that 25 worked in the past is extremely difficult.

The reply seen no evidence of damage. spoke in hypothetical issues that maybe if original access controls could be circumvented that there might be problems. I think we've got concrete areas where damage is happening and I think we could move forward from that. The uses that were talked about in some of the briefs actually were done before 1201, so they were doing just fine before 1201 so why do we think that things are happening worse or better since 1201? The use is still protected under the Copyright

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law. We're regulated just like everybody else within the sort of 108 work. We are a library. So the use is protected. While we have done some copying of these materials, it's been with signed, written permission from the copyright owners. And those are a couple of the offerings that we had on our website. All the rest we have not touched. And, actually, I'm kind of scared of touching these. I don't know if we're ever going to be able to read them.

The last point is what we're trying to do is difficult. We're trying to go and resurrect these old platforms based on emulation and other mechanisms. It's nontrivial, so it's not for the light of heart. If this exemption were out there, I don't think that we're going to have a flood of hundreds of thousands of people going and doing this. by having these organizations, these libraries and archives do

1 this, it can effect hundreds of thousands in the educational 2 and research domain that are trying to learn from our past 3 without damaging the market for those. 4 So we need both of these exemptions to further 5 our chance of preserving these, the narrower class, which is 6 the software embedded type materials and circumventing that we 7 think of as critical for these sorts of materials. 8 There were arguments about actually what we need 9 these are copy controls as opposed to access controls. Well, 10 there might be copy controls, but there seem to always be 11 access controls. And as I understand the law, it's very 12 straightforward. If we circumvent the access controls, we 13 lose. It's not that it's a fair use, there's not Section 108. 14 We just lose. And that means that we cannot preserve these 15 materials, and we're about to lose PC software and games. 16 This makes no sense. Time is not on our side. 17 These things are rotting. Stanford, the Internet Archive; a 18 lot of these materials came from Stanford, the Charles Babidge 19 Institute, the Computer History Museum; we all have 20 collections that are rotting in our hands. 21 We believe we know technologically how to 22 perform our job function. What it is is we need to be allowed 23 to do our job function and preserve these materials before 24 it's too late for future generations. 25 Thank you.

1	MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you.
2	Ms. Si mons?
3	DR. SIMONS: I think that I was seated with
4	Brewster so that I would be made to feel at home. This is what
5	my desk usually looks like.
6	Good morning, Mr. Peters and distinguished
7	representatives of the Copyright Office. Thank you for the
8	opportunity to testify at this important hearing as part of
9	the Copyright Office's anticircumvention rulemaking
10	proceedi ngs.
11	I'm Barbara Simons. I co-chair USACM, the U.S.
12	Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing
13	Machi nery.
14	ACM is the leading nonprofit educational and
15	scientific computing society of nearly 75,000 computer
16	scientists, educators and other information technology
17	professionals committed to the open interchange of information
18	concerning computing and related disciplines.
19	And I should also add, ACM is also a publisher.
20	We have a large digital library which is online.
21	USACM, which I founded in 1993, serves the ACM
22	membership and community by providing policymakers, courts and
ı	
23	the public with a deeper understanding of computer and
23 24	the public with a deeper understanding of computer and Internet issues and their convergence with legislative and

American Association for the Advancement of Science, and formerly served as President of ACM and Secretary of the Council of Scientific Society Presidents. I earned my Ph.D in computer science from a school up the road there, UC Berkeley. Worked at IBM Research for many years. And have authored numerous technical papers. I have been a consulting professor at the University of California Santa Cruz and Stanford University.

Wy statement today represents the views of the USACM to underscore the importance of this rulemaking proceeding to the computing community. My statement has also been endorsed by the Computing Research Association, an association of more than 180 North American academic departments of computer science and computer engineering, industrial academic laboratories and affiliated professional societies.

substantial negative impacts on the conduct of basic research in the U.S., particularly in cryptography and other computer security areas. The section interferes with many legal, noninfringing uses of digital computing and prevent scientists and technologists from circumventing access technologies in order to recognize shortcomings in security systems, to defend patents and copyrights, to discover and fix dangerous bugs in codes and to conduct forms of desired educational activities.

The following are just a few illustrations of legitimate activities currently prohibited by Section 1201.

A financial institution receives a digital object protected by code obfuscation using means other than encryption. Employees of the firm suspect it contains a highly destructive computer virus or worm. The only way to find out if these suspicions are valid is to circumvent the obfuscation techniques to see what the code actually does. Because the code including the possible virus qualifies as an original work of authorship, the act of circumvention is prohibited.

A contractor employs software technology from a third party in a system widely used by law enforcement. In the course of use the serious flaw or bug is discovered that makes the system fail unexpectedly. The third party could be unresponsive or, worse yet, suspected of being a front for a crime organization not trusted to fix the software. Whatever the case, because the software is protected as an original work of authorship, no reverse engineering or circumvention is allowed to fix the flaw in a trusted manner.

A firm wants to test a computer system before purchasing it to ensure that it is trustworthy and secure or to check for patent and license violations in the code itself. Circumventing a technical measure without the product's producer's permission is prohibited.

1 Scientists and educators are prohibited from 2 teaching many of the standard security techniques to 3 investigate security risks because these same techniques can 4 be employed to circumvent copyright protection mechanisms. 5 A copyright owner might suspect that a user is 6 infringing his code. The only way to test his assumption is 7 to bypass the encryption scheme of a suspected work to access 8 the material. Bypassing the encryption scheme is prohibited. 9 ACM submitted a declaration in the Felton case, 10 and I'd like to quote from part of that declaration because 11 those concerns remain all too relevant. This was written in 12 2001, so some of it refers to an event which has already 13 occurred but hadn't occurred them. 14 "Research and analysis, i.e. the evaluation of 15 the strengths and weaknesses of computer systems, is essential 16 to the development of effective security both for works 17 protected by Copyright law and for information in general. 18 Such research can progress only through the open publication 19 and exchange of complete scientific results. ACM is concerned 20 that Sections 1201 through 1204 of the DMCA will have a 21 chilling effect on analysis, research and publication as the 22 results of litigation itself or of the threat or concern about 23 potential litigation. 24 ACM is also concerned that application of the 25 DMCA to the presentation of publication of scientific papers

could result in the departure from the U.S. of the information security community for conferences and publications. If conference organizers cannot afford to take the risk of publishing papers, such as the papers ACM expects to be submitted for it's November 5, 2001 workshop as described below, those conferences may be held in other countries where the risk of liability is lowered. Such a result would have a negative impact on this country's leadership in research in that area.

ACM's particularly concerned about the potential implications of the DMCA for its then upcoming November 5, 2001 workshop on security and privacy and digital rights management, the DRM workshop. Part of the description of that workshop states: "This workshop will consider technical problems facing by rights holders who seek to protect their intellectual property rights and consumers who seek to protect their privacy and to preserve access they now enjoy in traditional media under existing Copyright law."

Like many other ACM workshops, ACM plans to publish the papers accepted for the DOM Workshop as proceedings. ACM is concerned that the publication and presentation of technical papers on many of these topics, especially papers on watermarks, encryption, authentication, access control systems and threat and vulnerability assessment could raise problems under the DMCA. We are concerned that

ACM along with its conference workshop organizers and member authors will be open to the same threats and run the same risks of legal liability as will Professor Felton, his coauthors and organizers of the Information Hiding Workshop.

ACM is also likely to sponsor other conferences that may be effected by the DMCA. Virtually all conferences that discuss the security of digital information may be subject to threats under the DMCA because such conferences consider the strength and weaknesses of various technological protection measures that could be applied or are actually being applied to protect copyrighted works.

ACM has earned the reputation of choosing strong scientific papers through a peer review process without regard to political or commercial pressure. It's reputation as a leading scientific and technical organization could be substantially damaged within the scientific and technical community if it failed to publish a properly submitted and peer reviewed paper because of commercial pressure or the fear of litigation. Any restriction that the DMCA may impose upon the publication of the scientific research will keep foreign researchers from attending our conferences in the United States with a potential loss of ACM members and of revenue for membership, conference participation and publication.

We are concerned that some of our members, intentionally or not, may censor their submissions to avoid

1 potential DMCA problems. If that were to happen, the quality 2 of the ACM papers and presentations would be hurt and the 3 scientific community as a whole could suffer substantial 4 damage. 5 Beyond the possibility of DMCA problems at the 6 November DRM workshop, ACM may continue to face potential 7 problems in the future. ACM has long published papers in 8 fields addressing the circumvention of security and technical 9 protection measures. Unbiased, objective research in the 10 fields of computer and data security has always included 11 research into the weaknesses, as well as strengths of security 12 measures. ACM could adopt a policy of steering clear of 13 papers that could subject it to liability under the DMCA, but 14 that could only be done at the risk of sacrificing its mission 15 and damaging its reputation as a scientific organization. 16 In sum, as long as Sections 1201 to 1204 of the 17 DMCA could be interpreted to reach scientific and technical 18 publications, ACM and its members are concerned they will face 19 a continued risk of litigation and liability." 20 That's the end of the quote from the 21 declaration. 22 Unfortunately, the concerns ACM expressed in the 23 Felton declaration are no longer hypothetical. A few days ago 24 in preparation for this testimony I posted a note to USACM 25 requesting personal experiences from people who have had

problems with the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA. I received 3 responses, all of which are quoted below with permission.

One of the people with whom I communicated is

Dutch computer scientist Neils Ferguson. Ferguson withdrew a

paper detailing weaknesses in the HDCP content protection

system from the very ACM DRM workshop referred to in the

declaration, and instead wrote a paper entitled "Censorship in

Action, Why I Don't Publish My HDCP Results Which Is Included

In Your Packet."

email. "Since my experiences with my HDCP paper, I have stopped doing research on the security of cryptographic systems that protect copyrights. There is no point in doing research if I cannot publish my results. I've spoken to several other experienced cryptographers and many have come to a similar conclusion. Of course, this lack of research almost guarantees that the copyright protection techniques will be easy to break and that works will be pirated for years to come. We know from experience that systems designed without public review are almost always week. Without public review there is no security and without security the pirates will thrive."

A second communication was from Professor Dr.

Andreas Pfitzmann of -- I can't pronounce this -- Technische

Universität in Dresden. Professor Pfitzmann was on the program committee of the Information Hiding Workshop at which Professor Pfitzmann was supposed to have presented his paper initially. I now quote, and the English is because I think he's a German speaker, so it's a little bit not quite correct.

"I do not know how much inside knowledge you have about the Felton which started the Information Hiding Workshop which accepted that paper for a presentation where not only Felton and his coworkers, but also program committee chair Ira Moskowitz and general chair John McHugh has been threatened personally. In a later case, the employer was willing to take the legal risk. Finally it was mostly the European members of the program committee who voted to not exercise any influence whether to present or not to present that accepted paper, but to leave that decision completely to the authors. And it was the decision to let no American share the scheduled section for the Felton paper, but a European citizen, me.

For the workshop it worked out very well in the end by a lot of publicity and probably this paper got even during the workshop so many readers as no other paper. But when accepting to chair that session, which I did not know whether the paper would be presented or not, it was quite clear to me that this could mean staying in the U.S. for quite a while. Since I am working as an advisor for the German

1 government concerning privacy and security, I was quite 2 optimistic that it would work out well in any case for me 3 personally, since I expected so much help by Germany in the 4 EUS could be, but it somehow looked strange that mainly the 5 Europeans were in charge of helping to maintain basic 6 liberties, e.g., to speak about the freedom to discuss 7 research in the U.S. 8 After experiencing the threat to the Information 9 Hiding Workshop mentioned above, I would argue to exempt the 10 organizers, program committees and session chairs as well as 11 publishers assigned to the conferences and workshops. As long 12 as this is not done, we decided to avoid the U.S. for 13 Information Hiding Workshop, and I personally successfully 14 argued to hold the successor of PET 2003 not in the U.S., but 15 in Canada. 16 In addition, it caused me to argue to stay with 17 Springer Valic, a German publisher as the publisher and not 18 to switch to ACM with regard to PET 2004 as we wanted to stay 19 as far away from U.S. jurisdiction as possible." 20 The third communication was from Professor David 21 Wagner who was in the computer science department at UC 22 Berkel ey. 23 "We looked at the HDCP, a copy protection system 24 designed for us in, I am told, high definition TV sets. We 25 very quickly found it had serious security flaws. We wrote a

1 paper and submitted it to a scientific workshop. Then we 2 realized that we were running right down the same path the 3 Felton group did and, hey, we'd better be careful. 4 I then spent the next 2 months on conferring 5 with our university lawyers checking out whether it would be 6 safe to publish our paper. As it happened, we got lucky this 7 time on 2 counts. First, the university agreed to indemnify 8 those of us at Berkeley against any civil liability if we were 9 Kudos for the administration. I can't say enough good sued. 10 things about them for their support of us. 11 Of course, the DMCA also comes with felony 12 prohibitions on certain violations, and we were on our own in 13 that respect. The university can't help with this criminal 14 liability. But civil liability was probably the more likely 15 ri sk. 16 Second, we talked with the engineers at Intel 17 who designed the HDCP and they turned out to have very 18 enlightened attitude about the whole mess. They thanked us for 19 our work and told us they would not sue us. Had this in any 20 other company, though, things might have turned out 21 differently. 22 Based on these two positive signs, we felt 23 comfortable enough to publish and our paper appeared in the 24 very same ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy and Digital 25 Rights Management 2001. We were very fortunate. Nevertheless,

It was not a good experience. I spent more time talking to lawyers than I did doing the actual research. We changed the way we wrote our paper. We changed the way we interacted with our researchers before our paper was published. And we wasted a lot of time on the legal aspects.

The DMCA is troubling. After spending many hours with lawyers examining the implications of the DMCA, I personally have stopped doing work on copyright protected systems due to the legal overhead and uncertainties. For instance, the encryption research exemption doesn't cover 1201(b) activities along with all sorts of other oddities, with which I'm sure you're very familiar. I cannot in good faith ask students I advise to take on uncertain risks at this time. I consider this a perhaps caution, but not irrational response to the DMCA.

Yes, you may mention my name and all the situations at the hearing. This is public information. In fact, it was featured as a cover story in the SIAM News."

The fundamentally flawed approach of Section

1201 criminalizes multiuse technologies rather than penalizing infringing behavior. During the current rulemaking proceeding we urge that a distinction be made between circumvention for the purpose of obtaining infringing access to a work and circumventing for the purpose of developing new techniques to protect computer systems and networks against attacks,

1 negligence, malfeasance and vandalism or to advance the 2 continued innovation of software and digital computing. 3 USACM recommends that the Library of Congress 4 provide an exemption to Section 1201 that permits access to 5 and dissemination of information about computer programs and 6 databases that are protected by CTP access control mechanisms 7 in order to recognize shortcomings in security systems, to 8 defend patents and copyrights, to discover and fix dangerous 9 bugs in code and to conduct forms of desired educational 10 acti vi ti es. 11 I would like to request permission to submit 12 additional material to my testimony later. 13 And I thank you for the opportunity of appearing 14 before you today. 15 MS. PETERS: Thank you. 16 Mr. Zi emann? 17 MR. ZIEMANN: Okay. First of all, I would like 18 to read -- if I send an email to the Copyright Office, what I 19 get back on the screen says "The mission of the Copyright 20 Office is to promote creativity by administering and 21 sustaining an effective national copyright system." And yet 22 today we are here to talk about how closely we are going to 23 define the scenario at the beginning of "Fahrenheit 451." We 24 already have the music police. We might just give firemen the 25 flame throwers, because that's what is happening.

1 As a copyright owner I want him to have my 2 copyrighted material. I don't understand why anyone would not. 3 Then if so, why did they create it in the first place. 4 I would also bring up just the issue of what an 5 oxymoron the phrase "intellectual property owner" is. No one 6 owns intellectual property. They may the right to commercially 7 sell it. But once an idea is a book, that intellectual 8 property belongs to the world. E-MC² may have been Einstein's 9 theory, but we all own it now. John Lennon's "Day Tripper" 10 song, he wrote it, somebody owns the copyright. But if the 11 public didn't accept it as something that they wanted, it 12 would be worthless. It wouldn't matter. 13 And taking even just that example, a couple of 14 years ago I went to the Rock and Rock Hall of Fame and saw the 15 original lyrics to "Day Tripper." That is the copyrighted 16 work, I believe. That and the original sound master recording. 17 Not my copy of it, which I have one, is worth maybe \$5. It 18 worthless. But that piece of paper that it was originally 19 written on, even if it's in public domain now, is valuable. 20 It's worth more than any of the copies. Okay. 21 Mr. Metalitz is here to represent the 22 intellectual property owners. I would question: (a) how they 23 came into possession of so much intellectual property. They 24 certainly didn't create it all. They contractually took 25 possession of it. In the music business alone you cannot get

1 a recording contract without relinquishing copyrights. You may 2 be able to if you're powerful and have some influence and can 3 get a special contract, but talk to any of the big people. 4 They don't own their music anymore. This does nothing for the 5 creators. It does nothing to promote creativity. 6 And then the next point I would like to make is 7 that the Copyright Office is on the verge of becoming as 8 irrelevant as the record industry. Okay. I can make my own CDs 9 now and sell them. I've done it. I don't need a record 10 company to do it or to promote it. Okay. They're no longer 11 necessary. 12 I've sent in a copyright, filled it out wrong. 13 And so I have to fill it out correct again. If I don't, you 14 won't register the copyright, but you'll still put a copy in 15 the Library of Congress. So that's all I wanted in the first 16 place. And so do I even need a copyright now? And if I do 17 get a copyright, I'm going to sell it for \$1 to Leonard 18 Lessing's Creative Comments Foundation so that no one else can 19 become the intellectual property owner of my copyright. 20 I don't see how the DMCA is doing anything for 21 any creativity anywhere. And if that's what the purpose of 22 the Copyright Office is, you're certainly not promoting 23 creativity any longer. And if you don't adapt, you too will 24 become irrelevant. 25 My next question is if this gentleman decides to

1 go ahead and bypass copy protection, what are you going to do 2 to stop him? Nothing? You have no authority. 3 I would actually say that this entire hearing is 4 in a very appropriate venue. It is moot, and that's what we're 5 in the moot part. 6 And one other point that I would like to make is 7 in reference to how the DMCA is being used to twist things. 8 The record industry's big cry is how piracy is destroying 9 them. In the past 5 years the record industry, according to 10 the RIA statistics has given away enough free physical goods 11 to finance the war in Iraq. At a minimum it's \$2.5 billion 12 dollars a year. 13 The Internet came along and gave them an 14 opportunity for free promotion, and what are they doing? 15 Exactly what I believe the Assistant Treasury of Commerce --16 I've got it in my notes here, but I -- is that they're 17 creating a paper use society. Exactly what the original 18 document that I was referring to here was warned that you 19 don't want to happen. And they're creating a total monopoly 20 in the process. They're definitely antitrust if anybody would 21 even care to try to question it. 22 When I first wrote to come before you, I thought 23 that there was a purpose and I question now what difference 24 this all makes. If we want to copy books, if the world wants 25 to copy books and music, what are you going to do to stop us?

1 You're going to sue each one of us individually? Good Luck. 2 Right now to even make up what they give away in 3 free goods the record industry at the rate of \$15,000, which 4 is what they appear to be settling, would have to prosecute 5 448 successful cases a day just to break even without 6 incurring any additional court costs or attorneys fees. Not 7 going to happen. You can't stop it. 8 I think it's ridiculous that somebody has to 9 come here and argue why a library should be allowed to have 10 copied of copyrighted materials. It's ludicrous. The fact 11 that he even has to come here and ask. 12 That's all I have to say. 13 MS. PETERS: Thank you, Mr. Ziemann. 14 Mr. Metalitz. 15 MR. METALITZ: Thank you very much. 16 I'm going to talk mostly about the exemption for 17 works protected by malfunctioning, damaged or obsolete access 18 controls which several proponents, it's an existing exemption 19 that they've asked me renewed. I will mention again, as I did 20 in the first session, that of course this has to be done on a 21 de novo basis for the burden of demonstrating the need for 22 this and complying with the statutory criteria is on the 23 proponents. And there's not been very much evidence submitted 24 in this proceeding up until the time of the hearing, so we're 25 kind of playing catchup here.

1 But this really breaks down into main examples 2 that I'd like to at least briefly discuss. One is the dongle 3 situation which you've had extensive testimony from Mr. 4 Montoro from Spectrum Software and the other is the issue that 5 Mr. Kahle has raised, although he has another formula of a 6 potential exemption, but the issues raised by the Internet 7 Archi ve. 8 Let me just talk about the dongle situation. 9 Let's stipulate that dongles break sometimes. They don't 10 always work. For only work for finite period of time. Then 11 what? The question is what can the user do then? I mean, 12 there are potentially four situations, I think, and I think 13 the problem that many of our organizations have with the 14 existing exemption that we hope can be rectified if this 15 exemption is recognized again, has to do with confusion among 16 those four situations. 17 In one situation, the vendor or the copyright 18 owner or the dongle manufacturer will replace the dongle for 19 free or at a minimal cost. 20 The second situation, they will replace it but 21 at a substantial cost. 22 The third situation, the vendor or the copyright 23 owners can't be found or is unresponsive to a request. 24 And the fourth situation, the user doesn't 25 bother trying to find the copyright owner or anybody else

responsible, just goes ahead and circumvents or, I suppose, potentially goes to Mr. Montore's company.

Now, the problem is that I think as the exemption now reads all of these behaviors are equally sheltered by the exemption. All of them could fall, potentially, within the exemption even though I believe the Librarian only intended that the third situation be covered, the situation in which the vendor can't be found or is unresponsive.

In terms of the documentation of which situation is occurring, Mr. Montore submitted an 89 page document that I have taken a brief look at. And what I gathered from those documents is that there are many work arounds that are available in this situation. And some of them are made available by the copyright owner or with the authorization of the copyright owner. And it's not clear to me the extent to which there is a problem here or a substantial adverse impact on the availability of these works for noninfringing uses that isn't resolved by copyright owners themselves or by users seeking assistance that is granted either by the copyright owner or with the approval of the copyright owner. So I think the record is still sparse on that point.

Also, I think there's very little in the record about the applicability of this exemption to any works other than computer programs, even though the existing exemption

1 also covers databases and other literary works. And there's 2 nothing in the record until we get to Mr. Kahle's situation 3 about access control mechanisms other than dongles. 4 I think the bottom line is that without further 5 definition of this exemption, it's hard to see how the record 6 in this proceeding would support a conclusion by the 7 Librarian, at least at this point, that this exemption ought 8 to be recognized for an additional 3 years. 9 I think part of the problem that we see with the 10 existing exemption is a lack of definition. It depends on the 11 three adjectives that are operative here; malfunctioning, 12 damaged or obsolete. The first two are not defined and I think 13 there's a real need to have some type of objective test of 14 when either of those situation applies. 15 Now, obsolete, I'm going to get to that in a 16 little more detail when I talk about Mr. Kahle's submission, 17 but it's defined by reference to or at least there is a 18 reference in the final rule to the definition in Section 19 108(c). 20 I think it is probably more realistic to talk 21 about something that's not supported or an access control 22 technology that's not supported rather than necessarily 23 obsolete. And I think that's the thrust of the 108(c) 24 definition, although that definition has to do with formats 25 and not with access controls.

So if the problem that is demonstrated by the record is the third scenario that I posited, the one where the copyright owner or any other responsible party can't be found or isn't responsive, then it wold seem that the exemption should apply only in cases of obsolete, that is to say unsupported access controls. And that that be an additional requirement along with evidence of malfunctioning or damage as measured in some objective fashion.

submission, which I think raised a number of important questions. Some of these I believe were addressed by the Librarian in the ruling in 2000. That ruling said that the exemption that you recognize for malfunctioning, damaged or obsolete access controls would not cover situations such as those described by certain libraries who expressed the fear that they would be prevented by 1201(a)(1) from reformatting materials that are in obsolete formats. If the materials did not contain access control protections, but were merely in an obsolete format, 1201(a)(1) would not be implicated.

As I understand the situation with the Internet Archive, those two sentences describe their situation. The question is are the controls that are preventing the use or the verification of the copies that Internet Archive is able to make, are those copy controls or are those access controls?

And I think we raised that question in our submission, and

1 perhaps we can find out a little bit more about that today. 2 Because ordinarily one would expect that something that 3 produced a copy but which was nonfunctional, would be viewed 4 as a copy control not as an access control. 5 So the first question about the Internet Archive 6 submission is really whether it's within the scope of this 7 proceeding at all. 8 Then there's several different concepts of 9 obsolescence that I found in this submission that I think we 10 have to try to sort out. First, I mean in a sense a lot of 11 the content that is in those packages is obsolete in a certain 12 "The 1996 College Guide" that is referenced in the sense. 13 testimony, I can testify as the parent of a child who was 14 looking for colleges, that information is obsolete, 15 particularly the tuition levels, and no one should rely on it. 16 17 But there may be other types of product that's 18 not obsolete, and there's certainly an important niche market 19 in the entertainment software industry for Legacy games, games 20 that people want to play in the same way that they played them 21 on their Omega and their Commodore 64; they want to play them 22 on newer platforms. So this is not necessarily a category 23 that's without any commercial significance. That's one type 24 of obsolescence.

And then there's the question of an obsolete

media or an obsolete format. I think the testimony refers to the necessity to move content from a format before it degrades, such as CD-ROM, and from a medium before it becomes unintelligible and the example of PNG was given. That, I think, is the kind of obsoletness that is frustrating the Internet Archive.

And then the third thing that could be obsolete is the access control. But the submission from the Internet Archive said these access controls are not obsolete, nor are they malfunctioning and damaged and that's why they want to have a broader exemption.

So we turn to the proposal that they've made for literary works and audiovisual works that are protected by access controls, the original only access controls. And I think there's a lot of questions about whether that proposal can meet the criteria of the statute for a particular class of works. It's an extremely broad proposal. It starts with two entire categories of the categories listed in the Copyright Act, literary works and audiovisual works. It potentially encompasses a very broad range of access controlled technologies. And some of these technologies may well be in use today. The fact that an original only access control, if it is an access control, was used on VisiCalc or on Microsoft Basic and that's frustrating these preservation activities, doesn't mean that an access control also meeting that

1 description isn't in use today on a lot of much more current 2 products. And I think in many of the submissions you have from 3 the SLAA you have some examples of reasons why copyright 4 owners might use that type of access control today, such as 5 for controlling beta testing and personalized versions of 6 works and for privacy protection. 7 I think the final point I would like to raise 8 about the proposal from Internet Archive is the question of 9 whether access to these materials is available through other 10 means that would not require circumvention of the original 11 only access control if it is deemed to be an access control. 12 We've suggested a couple of these in our reply 13 comments. In some cases the content can be preserved in other 14 forms, in analog forms or through screen shots and other ways. 15 But what really struck me as I looked at the demonstration or 16 the presentation that Mr. Kahle made, was whether access to a 17 lot of these materials can't actually be obtained through 18 agreement with the copyright owner, which of course is another 19 form of noninfringing use. Obviously, this isn't going to 20 apply to everything, but I know the Microsoft Corporation is 21 still in business. I believe IBM is still in business. I think 22 Rick Prellinger, the author of the Ephemeral Film Collection I 23 know is still in business. Apple is still in business. 24 And I wonder to what extent the problems that 25 the Internet Archive is experiencing can be resolved in that

fashion and thereby reduce the necessity for any exemption in order to facilitate access for noninfringing purposes to these materials. So I hope that that is an issue that perhaps we can have some further discussion about.

remediation issues that Ms. Simons raised. Again, this is an issue that was before the Copyright Office and the Librarian in 2000. And I believe the conclusion then was that in this proceeding the Librarian had to move with particular caution when asked to redraw lines that Congress had already drawn to define a permissible exception for purposes such as encryption research and security testing. I think that advice certainly applies as well today.

Ms. Simons read into the record again the capsule descriptions that were contained in the ACM's submission in the initial comment round. And, obviously, there's a lot of questions that could be asked about those scenarios. But nearly all of them, it would seem, are addressed either by other existing exceptions to Section 1201(a)(1) that already exist in the statute or through other means, such as consent and agreement. So we could go through those, and perhaps there is more information that could be added as to where those scenarios come from and why it's perceived that Section 1201(a)(1) presents a problem in that area.

I can't really comment on the 3 email submissions that she received in the last few days regarding concerns that some researchers have about the impact of Section 1201(a)(1) on their research. Obviously, those concerns are deeply felt. I don't know what the legal basis for those concerns is, but we certainly take a look at those. But I think in the final analysis this is a situation that Congress considered at great length in the process of enacting the DMCA. It drew up a rather detailed exemption or two exemptions for security testing and for encryption research. And if those exemptions are not achieving the purpose for 12 which Congress intended, because Congress clearly intended to 13 encourage the further development of encryption research, then it may be that Congress is the forum in which that line drawing should be revisited and not this proceeding. Thank you. MS. PETERS: Thank you very much. For time's 18 sake, I'll only sake a few questions at this point and give my fellow panelists a chance. Mr. Kahle, I'm trying to understand the scope of the exemption that you're looking for and to identify exactly 22 what the problem is. The difference between the format that 23 may be obsolete and what you referred to as basically 24 embedded, I guess, computer programs that you have to get around in order to actually gain access to it.

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1 All the things that you showed us, and the 16 2 works but only one of then could be used. 3 MR. KAHLE: Ri ght. 4 MS. PETERS: Do those works all basically have 5 some embedded software that makes it so that they're no longer 6 accessible? If not, what's the problem with the 15? 7 MR. KAHLE: The problem for some of these 8 materials, I don't know, take Ephemeral Films, we can make a 9 copy of the bits that reside on this aging media, though 10 there's software embedded with the content that does certain 11 checks to make sure that, for instance, the CD-ROM is in the 12 CD-ROM player. And if you're running this on an emulator, you 13 can fake it out, circumvent particularly code around those 14 issues to sort of make it think that everything is fine. But 15 if you do not do that, it will not play. 16 These softwares are a little bit different. Let 17 me see if I can try to answer that. There's this constant 18 migration --19 MS. PETERS: I'm trying to get at the access 20 control. Just the access control 21 MR. KAHLE: The access controls are often 22 original only access controls in this era of software where it 23 requires that you have a physical floppy in a floppy drive to 24 be able to run. It's not that the bits are accessible. It's 25 that it does certain checks to make sure that you have the

1	original in your possession.
2	MS. PETERS: Okay.
3	MR. KAHLE: That's the case of some of
4	MS. PETERS: Take the 5 1/4 floppy disk.
5	MR. KAHLE: Yes.
6	MS. PETERS: You've got it, but you don't have
7	the equipment to play it? I still don't totally understand
8	what it is in that floppy that makes it nonaccessible.
9	MR. KAHLE: Okay. Sorry.
10	It's not that the floppy may not this floppy,
11	if we found an Apple II from that era and we put it in, it
12	could play.
13	MS. PETERS: Okay. Right.
14	MR. KAHLE: And that would be terrific. That
15	would be a huge step forward.
16	What we're trying to do is migrate these
17	materials onto more stable media.
18	MS. PETERS: Right.
19	MR. KAHLE: Currently that's hard drives. If we
20	were to do that, make a replica. We have the original, we
21	want to make a copy that functions the same way as an Apple II
22	running an Apple Writer program, then that whole environment
23	of the emulator of the underlying Apple personal computer as
24	well as the hard drive version of the bits that were on the
25	floppy, all have to act as if were the original.
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1	MS. PETERS: Okay. But I'm still hung up with
2	where the access control is.
3	MR. KAHLE: The access control is when the
4	software on the floppy goes and says is this floppy in the
5	floppy drive.
6	MS. PETERS: So there's a piece of code that
7	says I don't play unless I'm in a floppy player?
8	MR. KAHLE: Often. Often. In a majority of the
9	cases here, that's the case.
10	MS. PETERS: And in the others?
11	MR. KAHLE: There's a dongle that sort of checks
12	to make sure you have that.
13	MS. PETERS: Okay. A dongle.
14	MR. KAHLE: Does it have the CD. There's certain
15	things it checks certain things about the drivers. There's
16	these sort of couplings
17	MS. PETERS: Okay. Because these are really all
18	before the era when we talked about technological protection
19	measures. So these are things that were done way back when,
20	but just put in I don't know. I don't know why they were
21	put in. But they effectively now preclude getting access to
22	them, is that what you're saying?
23	MR. KAHLE: As I understand it, these measures
24	were done by software companies, and I worked for some of
25	them, were done so that people were forbidden to access the
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1	materials on the disk unless, for instance, you had a physical
2	copy or you had the right set of configurations.
3	MS. PETERS: Okay. And the same issue is with
4	regard to not to software. We're talking about software
5	mostly. But with regard to games, video games?
6	MR. KAHLE: Games are often also these sort of
7	software/hardware combinations as distinct from, say, audio
8	CDs or DVDs that have data on the disks and the sort of
9	protections and such tend to be build into the players. These
10	things are sort of this mush of content and software that
11	plays through computer programs. I'm sorry, I'll try to be
12	concrete.
13	MS. PETERS: No, that's all right. I still am
14	struggling with what it is we're trying to do. Let me just
15	switch it because maybe other people can ask what I'm
16	trying to get at more effectively.
17	Your original category was literary works and
18	audi ovi sual .
19	MR. KAHLE: Yes.
20	MS. PETERS: And what you talked about, however,
21	was software and like games, which is a much narrower
22	category. Is your focus mostly on software and games or is as
23	broad as
24	MR. KAHLE: The pieces here are sort of a
25	representation of a class of some of the types of things we're

1	dealing with. We think of these as audiovisual materials and
2	literature. They just happen to be rendered with computers.
3	You know, this is probably the best example of the sort of
4	literature. It's a
5	MS. PETERS: It was a book.
6	MR. KAHLE: book. It was a book. This is the
7	computer version of it, and here's a sort of screen shot of a
8	sort of dorky, you know, early bad colored graphics that they
9	could view in those days. But they're trying to render a book
10	on a screen. Okay. Maybe not great. But at last seminal in
11	terms of early.
12	And movies, audiovisual works as well as
13	software and games that sort of have all of these components.
14	So if I could figure out some other way, they
15	seemed, at least to a layman, qualify. They're just of the
16	computer generation.
17	MS. PETERS: Okay. I'll still struggle with my
18	questi on.
19	MR. KAHLE: Sorry.
20	MS. PETERS: Maybe I'll come back.
21	MR. KAHLE: I apol ogi ze.
22	MS. PETERS: No. It's my issue that I haven't
23	qui te fi gured out.
24	I'm going to let the rest of the panel ask
25	questions while I try to figure out.

1 MR. KAHLE: Right. 2 MR. CARSON: Okay. I'm having the same problem 3 the Registrar has on whether or not these original only access 4 controls are truly access controls. But I'm not sure I know 5 how to ask the question any better to get an answer. Maybe 6 it's our problem, not yours in terms of our not quite getting 7 what you're saying. But I'm not entirely sure we're talking 8 about an access control and I'm wondering if you can sort of 9 make the case as to how this qualifies under the statutory 10 definition of a technological measure that controls access to 11 a copyrighted work? 12 MR. KAHLE: It may be that those words mean 13 something different to a lawyer than it does a layman. 14 know, I've been reading some of this stuff and some of it's 15 pretty -- anyway. 16 MR. CARSON: Whatever you were going, you're 17 absolutely right. 18 MR. KAHLE: But these materials, the design and 19 the implementation of these measures were put in place to keep 20 people from accessing these underlying works if you had a copy 21 of them on another medium. 22 You can copy these things, you just can't access

them. You have to blow through the access protections to be able to run them. You might be able to save the bits on the floppy or the CD-ROM exactly as it was. But you can't play

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1	them in a new environment.
2	MS. PETERS: But nobody can see them and nobody
3	can hear them?
4	MR. KAHLE: Right. No researcher can even we
5	as librarians can't even find out whether we did our jobs
6	right. And I have a thorn in my side about this because we
7	were trying to in a different circumstance archive websites
8	for the Library of Congress. And we didn't go back and look if
9	we were doing it right. And we blew it. And when I find this
10	out, we do it over and over again. If we don't actually check
11	our work to make sure that the functioning real environment on
12	a migrated version and in versions that don't rely on the
13	physical media or having an Apple II; we need to move this
14	stuff forward and be able to access this stuff and be able to
15	use it and expose it to researchers or I think we'll fail. I
16	actually know we will fail.
17	MS. PETERS: Could I ask, what is it if there's
18	some kind of an exemption
19	MR. KAHLE: Yes.
20	MS. PETERS: what is that you will be able to
21	do that will in fact make it accessible?
22	MR. KAHLE: Okay. Good. What we're looking to
23	do is make a copy of the bits that are stored on these media
24	into a more stable environment, hard drives currently. And
25	then couple with other emulation software that is written
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1 independently or together to try to get that to function and 2 be able to live in the new world kind as if it were the old 3 worl d. 4 So as if you were sitting in front of an Apple 5 We want to have a replica so that we have this in the 6 physical form, we can look at the packaging. Then you can go 7 to a modern computer and go and say what would it have looked 8 like if I had this dongle and had an Atari something or other. 9 MS. PETERS: What does it take in order for you 10 to do that? In other words, you said you replicated it. You 11 got all the bits but now you can't see it and maybe you can't 12 hear it. But how do you -- what do you do to that work? What 13 are you circumventing? What are you getting around? 14 MR. KAHLE: If we are trying to take this floppy 15 from Lotus 123, we believe we know how to actually read the 16 old PC Jr. and make a verbatim sector for sector copy onto a 17 hard drive. Then we need to emulate and have software around 18 that transcription of the floppy to emulate and fake out this 19 software to make it believe that it is still inside an IBM PC 20 Jr. 21 MS. PETERS: So, but what is it circumventing? 22 It sounds like you're adding something that will make it do 23 what it could have done before. 24 MR. KAHLE: We are trying to make it do what it 25 did before by --

1	MS. PETERS: Are you taking the bits from before
2	and doing something to them?
3	MR. KAHLE: No. We're going to try to run them.
4	And by running them in this fake environment we have to
5	specifically go out after the techniques that the publishers
6	used to try to keep piracy from happening and defeat that. We
7	have to go out and find every piece and there are sorts of
8	creative things that they did in this early PC era, most of
9	which are gone now. But of jumping around and we have to
10	go and circumvent their intention to keep us from running this
11	off the original work.
12	MS. PETERS: I've got more about what you're
13	doing, but I'm still
14	MR. KAHLE: I'm sorry. I feel like I'm being
15	MR. CARSON: The problem is we have lawyers
16	speaking to librarians/technologists. And whether we can ever
17	speak the same Language
18	MR. KAHLE: I've had that problem.
19	MR. CARSON: This meeting is doomed to failure.
20	MS. PETERS: He's giving him the law.
21	MR. CARSON: The law. I'm giving the
22	definition. Hold on there for a second.
23	Okay. So we have the definition here. Section
24	1201(a).
25	DR. SIMONS: Can I make a comment while he's

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1	readi ng.	
2	MR. CARSON: Go ahead.	
3	DR. SIMONS: Because it was just suggested to me	
4	that perhaps what Brewster is trying to do, and Brewster	
5	should correct me if this wrong, is somewhat similar to trying	
6	to read what's on a DVD by bypassing the CSS encoding.	
7	MR. CARSON: Well, that was occurring to me.	
8	Yes.	
9	MS. PETERS: Right. Okay.	
10	DR. SIMONS: So that was not my original idea.	
11	It came from behind me.	
12	MR. CARSON: Just walk me through. We've got a	
13	definition in the statute of when a technological measure	
14	effectively controls access to a work. It says: "A	
15	technological measure effectively controls to a work if the	
16	measure in the ordinary course of its operation requires the	
17	application of information or a process or a treatment with	
18	the authority of the copyright owner to gain access to the	
19	work."	
20	So I gather the key question here may be does	
21	this original only access control you're talking about, is	
22	this something that is requiring the application of	
23	information or a process or a treatment to gain access to the	
24	work? And if it is, try to explain to us how that's happening.	
25	MS. SELVAGGIO: Can I can I	
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1	MR. KAHLE: Try to be my interpreter.	
2	MR. CARSON: Identify yourself for the record.	
3	MS. SELVAGGIO: Yes. Marian Selvaggio. I'm with	
4	Wilson	
5	MR. CARSON: Oh, we have a lawyer. Okay.	
6	MS. SELVAGGIO: You have a lawyer.	
7	MR. KAHLE: Help me.	
8	MS. SELVAGGIO: These programs were written so	
9	that you could only play then in a particular place.	
10	MS. PETERS: In a player. Okay.	
11	MS. SELVAGGIO: What Brewster and the Internet	
12	Archive are doing is writing code that circumvents that access	
13	control so that you can now get to it without having a player	
14	you need. That's the circumvention that they're doing.	
15	MR. CARSON: Okay.	
16	MS. PETERS: Okay.	
17	MR. CARSON: I think I get the circumvention. I	
18	just want to make sure I understand the technological measure	
19	that effectively controls access to the work is.	
20	MS. SELVAGGIO: You can't play these, you can't	
21	use them in the ordinary course of business without the proper	
22	hardware or the proper exchange of information.	
23	MR. CARSON: Okay.	
24	MS. SELVAGGIO: Because of these access controls	
25	you cannot run these as they were meant to operate unless you	
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1 have the exact code or the exact hardware that they're 2 requesting. So what Brewster is doing is circumventing that 3 access control and emulating it so that it thinks it has the 4 proper hardware or the proper software and then you can run it 5 as it was meant to be run in the ordinary course. 6 MR. CARSON: All right. Now you talked about an 7 exchange of information, and certainly when you look in the 8 statutory language we're talking about, among other things, 9 the application of information to gain access. So just 10 elaborate a little bit more what's kind of information are we 11 typically talking about that needs to be exchanged or applied 12 in order to get access to the work? 13 MR. KAHLE: As I understand it, these go in pro 14 particular memory locations to find out are they -- they try 15 running the actual disk. If you had a copy, you would go and 16 run the actual disk and try to do transactions with the 17 original CD or floppy that would be in the hard drive or go 18 and try to communicate with the dongle to go and get 19 particular information from the dongle, information that's 20 key, and does it act correctly. 21 The process, does it spin a hard drive. And if 22 you didn't have -- excuse me. If you had a floppy drive or if 23 you didn't have a floppy drive or a CD drive on these 24 computers, then the communication from the program that's 25 written on the floppy would fail.

<pre>copy it to a hard drive. It tries to communicate back with the floppy drive or the CD drive, is it there? Hello. If it comes back with no or errors, then it shuts down and you're out of luck. MS. PETERS: Okay.</pre>	
comes back with no or errors, then it shuts down and you're out of luck.	
5 out of luck.	
6 MS. PETERS: Okay.	
7 MR. CARSON: Okay.	
8 MR. ZIEMANN: May I interject to this. I'm also	
9 a computer programmer. And these things are written to prevent	
a copy from working.	
MR. KAHLE: Yes.	
MR. CARSON: Okay.	
13 MR. ZIEMANN: Specifically so that you must have	
the original in the original machine. If you make a copy of	
15 it, it's going to say no, sorry. It's a copy and it's not	
going to work.	
MR. KAHLE: And interestingly, just it	
shouldn't be interesting.	
MR. CARSON: Right.	
20 MR. KAHLE: Interestingly, a lot of these	
protections are kind of from the era of the '80s and '90s. A	
22 lot of the types of protections that people are doing now	
23 aren't these anymore.	
MS. PETERS: Right.	
MR. KAHLE: Thi ngs are changi ng. They' re doi ng	

1 these license key exchanges. We're going to have issues with 2 all of that as well. But we're sort of sitting around with a 3 bunch of this stuff and we're starting to find that these are 4 enough of issues, that we have to start working on things from 5 day one. Waiting for them to be obsolete or malfunction, 6 actually, is very scary to us. 7 I'm not sure how we're going to do on this task. 8 Stanford has 19,000 titles of this stuff and they haven't 9 started moving forward with it. But starting to be more 10 proactive, working with the manufacturers, building those 11 relationships but not -- we find when we've tried to write and 12 request information and approval from copyright holders, most 13 of them can't be found even within a year or two of these 14 things being made available. It's just practically impossible. 15 And we have studies of this, of even things from 16 the 1990s, '95, '96, '97 some from Macromedia CD-ROM 17 collection. We wrote to a bunch of the contact information and 18 we tried to find them. And we have very few responses. And we 19 also got a lot of responses from people saying "I'm not sure I 20 can give you that permission," which is sort of an interesting 21 one as well. 22 So unless we have sort of some library of 108 23 style ability to maneuver, I think we will lose a large 24 percentage if not a majority of all of these works. 25 MR. CARSON: Thank you. You just answered my

next question. So I got two for the price of one.

Mr. Metalitz, one of the things you said at page 18 of your reply comments, and this is with respect to the proposed exemption, actually the current exemption for technological measures that are failing because of damage or obsoleteness or malfunction. One of your criticisms is that that current exemption is not confined only to those instances in which the provider has demonstratively refused or failed to provide timely relief in the form of assistance to access the work.

Now, I'm trying to remember where you were 3 years ago when you were arguing with us about what a class of works was. And I think I remember where we were 3 years ago, and we decided what a class of works was. And I don't recall, certainly an element of what we decided, or an element of what you were arguing ought to be part of the definition of a class of works being referenced to what the copyright owner may or may not be willing to do for you. This sounds like it's getting pretty close to an exemption that looks more upon use and conduct as opposed to a class of works. Am I correct in that? And if so, how do you reconcile that with what I think you were telling us 3 years ago and what we certainly were saying 3 years ago?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I think you essentially in our view you essentially got it right 3 years ago in terms of

1 the definition of particular class of works. And I would agree 2 with you that it should not be defined in terms of what the 3 user and the copyright owner have done. But these exemptions 4 have to be defined in some fashion. 5 In 2000 you said well malfunctioning and 6 damaged, everybody knows what that means so we're not going to 7 define it. And obsolete you referred to Section 108(c). And 8 Section 108(c) says that a format shall be considered obsolete 9 -- now this is, you know, maybe responsive to Mr. Kahle's 10 issue -- a format shall be considered obsolete if the machine 11 or device necessary to render perceptible or work stored in 12 that format is longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably 13 available in the commercial marketplace. 14 That describes a situation in which -- I mean, I 15 don't know how you would know that unless someone asked. I 16 don't know how you would know that it's no longer available in 17 the marketplace or can't be found unless someone went to look 18 for it and wasn't able to find it. 19 What I think was behind the exemption that was 20 recognized, was not so much necessarily a concept of being 21 obsolete, but a concept of being not supported. And that 22 inevitably gets back to the question of whether there's been 23 any effort or any attempt to try to get the copyright owner to 24 support the access control. 25 So I think the solution to this problem,

perhaps, is in a clear or more definite or more specific definition of the adjectives that describe the access control that under an exemption would be allowed to be circumvented.

And to some extent those definitions may require an evaluation of criteria that have to do with what the copyright owner has done and what the user has done. I don't think that that transgresses the principles that the Librarian laid down in 2000. I think it's a clearer definition of what is the type of access control that can be circumvented.

MR. CARSON: So if, for example, and this is a very rough draft of what you maneuver see, but if for example this time around we were satisfied that in all other respects the case had been made and we were going to propose an exemption to the Librarian and we came up with an exemption along the lines of what we did last time, but we said among the conditions it would be that the access control measure is no longer supported by its maker -- very rough draft, as I said.

MR. METALITZ: Yes.

MR. CARSON: That would satisfy the concerns you were talking about, although in your comment you were talking about it in terms of whether the provider has refused or failed to provide timely release. The unsupported sort of adjective would be sufficient to deal with that phenomenon, I gather, from your point of view?

1	MR. METALITZ: Yes. I could give a rough answer
2	to your rough question. And that is I think it's a problem of
3	defining what those terms mean.
4	MR. CARSON: Yes.
5	MR. METALITZ: And that definition can include
6	something about whether it's still supported.
7	MR. CARSON: Yes. I get it.
8	MS. PETERS: If you go that way, would that
9	answer Mr. Kahle's problem.
10	MR. METALITZ: Ask him.
11	MS. PETERS: No, but that's the question.
12	MR. KAHLE: No.
13	MS. PETERS: No? If in fact this is not
14	supported by the original manufacturer so therefore there's an
15	exemption, what more do you need?
16	MS. SELVAGGIO: Well, it depends on what you
17	mean by not supported. If he has the right floppy disk to run
18	this, would that be considered still be supported? You're not
19	migrating the media, you're not moving the data. It's still
20	supported because you can still put it in and run it.
21	MR. KAHLE: Let me take also a different crack
22	at it.
23	Trying to do this work is actually kind of
24	tough. I mean, trying to get this stuff to work even the first
25	time is hard. Kind of having your computer and all,
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1 everything sort of set up. I mean, we had it this morning. 2 It's not like putting a DVD in a DVD player. All right. A 3 lot of this stuff seems to be sort of pirated around that sort 4 of world view. That's not what we're dealing with. 5 We're dealing with a lot of different working 6 pieces that we have to get all emulated to work right again. 7 It's extremely helpful if we have as much time as we can and 8 the programmers are sort of part of the program. IF they're 9 available, how do we go and emulate your new Atari, whatever 10 it is, your game console with the right sets of pieces? 11 If we have to wait for all of the pieces to be 12 not supported, does that mean that it's already too late? 13 There's another characteristic as I understand 14 it in this exemption that causes problems. It's when the 15 access controls start to become obsolete but the underlying --16 the access controls might be perfectly operating fine. 17 we've lost the rest of the media or we've lost abilities to 18 read certain sectors of the drives -- of the media. And the 19 whole thing starts to fade. 20 So the idea of putting a time thing, sort of 21 push it off into the future and wait until it's obsolete and 22 then whose going to care quite so much; in this digital realm 23 especially in things that involve the interactions of lots of 24 different computing components, I fear we will just lose a lot 25 more. And when we start to deal with Internet style software,

1 and we've got to start on it immediately because it's got 2 client server pieces -- but that's not the subject today. 3 Three years from now we'll come back and we'll have a lot more 4 to say about supporting those materials. These are where we 5 have concrete examples and we would like to start to emulate 6 and deal with Windows 98 software, Windows 2000 software, 7 McIntosh software of different forms, even those are still 8 currently being sold by the manufacturer. 9 MS. PETERS: Mr. Kasunic? 10 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, on page 41 of your 11 reply comment, and this goes to the question of what kind of 12 control are we talking about here, you said that it was less 13 than clear whether this is was an access or a copy control and 14 said that: "A technology which allows copying but which 15 renders the resulting copies less than fully functional should 16 be classified in DMCA terms as a copy control subject to 17 1201(b) not an access control." 18 So after listening to the description that we 19 heard here, can you make our lives a lot easier and tell us 20 that that's not within the scope of Section 1201 and that he's 21 free to circumvent without an exemption? 22 MR. METALITZ: Well, I'm not sure I could make 23 life easier, but I am struck by what my colleague here said 24 that the real purpose of these was to prevent someone from 25 making -- at the time, was to prevent someone from making a

		126
1	copy	
2	MR. ZIEMANN: That would work.	
3	MR. METALITZ: and presumably that would	
4	work. And presumably that would I may be wrong about this,	
5	maybe Mr. Kahle can set me set. Presumably that would mean	
6	even a copy that would work in that a original floppy drive.	
7	So it isn't a question of emulating the hardware. It's a	
8	question of the copy not being functional.	
9	In other words, if back in 1985 I had made a	
10	copy of that 5 1/4 inch floppy disk and put it into the same	
11	machine that I was trying to run the original on, would it	
12	work or would it not work? If it would not work, it seems as	
13	though it's a copy control.	
14	MR. ZIEMANN: On the McIntosh software the first	
15	thing that was there was something that you needed an extra	
16	piece of software to access and it was called the bozo flag.	
17	And if you checked the box and somebody copied it, it just	
18	didn't work.	
19	MR. METALITZ: Even in the same machine then?	
20	MR. ZIEMANN: Even in the same machine.	
21	MR. KAHLE: Well, than the well, even, there	
22	might be copy protections, but that's as I understand it not	
23	the subject. Actually it's the access protections that we're	
24	having troubles with.	

We can copy of lot of these materials. It's the

do the copy protections, if we blow the access protections as I understand, bad things happen. And I'm not exactly sure, George, how to answer your question of who they happen from, but these guys say don't do it. So we need to blow the access protections. We have to circumvent the access protections to be able to do our job. Yes, there may be copy protections that we have to deal with as well, but as I understand it, that as not as much of an issue that we have to deal with. MR. KASUNIC: Well, even if this was initially lintended to be a copy control, once you've reproduced that and in terms of getting access to that reproduction, wouldn't 1201(a)(1) apply then? Of you could not get access to that reproduction of the work, would there be a Section 1201(a)(1) issue? MR. METALITZ: Well, don't just take my word for this. His would what the Copyright Office said 3 years ago. MR. ZIEMANN: What do they know? MR. METALITZ: To the extent that technological protections prevented the library from converting the format, those protections would seem to be copy controls, the act of circumvention of which is not prohibited by Section 1201. Now, I think in the questioning that Mr. Carson	_ []	
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circumvention of which is not prohibited by Section 1201.	22	protections prevented the library from converting the format,
	23	those protections would seem to be copy controls, the act of
25 Now I think in the questioning that Mr. Carson	24	circumvention of which is not prohibited by Section 1201.
20 Now, I think in the questioning that wil. carson	or	Now I think in the questioning that Mr. Carson

had of Mr. Kahle, I think I can see -- I understand better now how this can also potentially be described as an access control by looking at that definition of access control mechanism. My concern would go toward how bounded this description is of an original -- well, it's called an original only control which, again, to me sounds like what the court said it was in 1988, a copy control. But leaving that phrase aside, I guess I wonder what is the difference between this type of access control that requires checking to see that it's running in the right machine and a lot of access controls that are used today, some of the other techniques that Mr. Kahle talked about, that are used to make sure that the program is being run, perhaps, in the machine to which it was dedicated at the time of registration or to a machine within a certain network. So, for example, it's accessible by anyone using a computer within a particular university network but not by somebody else outside the university system.

A lot of techniques are being used now to make sure that you can't have access to a particular work unless it's done in a machine that has certain characteristics. And part of what I was hearing in the description of the controls here also fit that criteria. So I guess I am somewhat uncomfortable with describing this as an access control until I had a better understanding of how this can be distinguished, this 1980s and early '90s technology, can be distinguished

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from what is being used today in an access control environment.

MR. KASUNIC: Well then isn't it reasonable to understand the Internet Archive's concern since there is -it's very unclear whether this might be or might not be an access control, then their concern is legitimate in a need for an exemption if we can't -- if the potential for violation for doing what they're doing is there?

MR. METALITZ: Well, I'm not saying that their concern is legitimate. I do think there's an argument to be made that much of what is impeding their activities is a copy control and not an access control. But maybe I don't understand enough about how this technology works to come to any definitive conclusion on it.

extent -- I mean, I hear what Mr. Kahle said that in many cases these copyright owners can't be found. But on the other hand, when he shows us the 16 greatest hits and most of them are from companies that are, you know, still actively being traded on Nasdaq and presumably are accessible, to request -- well, I don't whether he's got responses from them or not. But to see the many -- there seems to be many other ways to ensure the availability of these materials for noninfringing uses. And again, I'm assuming that his uses are noninfringing under 108 that don't require circumvention of an access

1 control in a way that also could effect both, as he indicated, 2 products that are still currently in the market and 3 techniques, access control techniques that are being used for 4 many different purposes. 5 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Kahle, do you have a response 6 to that in terms of whether it is easy to get permission or 7 are there other ways of accomplishing your ends? 8 MR. KAHLE: We have found anecdotal that even if 9 these companies exist, that they may not have the original 10 source code versions that don't have the access controls as 11 part of them such a way that they would be able to donate them 12 That often -- if you go and show this to Lotus, to a library. 13 they go, "Wow. Cool. Great. We'd love -- can we have one 14 back for our library." Because back in that day of -- this is 15 1982, we were in different building. They don't have this 16 stuff. The publishers aren't librarians. They're out to make a 17 buck. And they're required to, based on how corporate law 18 works. So even if they're around, it's often extremely 19 di ffi cul t. 20 There's anecdotal. The requests that we have 21 sent out, and this is a study, show that very few, even the 22 emails on these -- or the physical addresses working. So 23 maybe they've moved. But it starts to become fairly difficult. 24 So I think even if we were -- we were just 25 looking for permission, much less help from these guys on

being able to do these things.

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I think the publishers will do publishing

activities, the libraries should do library activities. And

MR. KASUNIC: I just have one other question, and it's changing gears a bit, in terms of the statutory exemptions in line with research and encryption for security research. And also the privacy exemption.

protection 108 helps us stay out of their way commercially.

And, Mr. Metalitz, you've made the statement about proceeding that we did also make, and I've asked a recommendation about proceeding cautiously where there is congressional exemptions. But it seems, and correct me if I'm wrong, Professor Simons, but this adequately -- or do these congressional exemptions adequately fit computer software? For instance, in the subsection, I guess it's (g) dealing with security -- or (j), excuse me, dealing with security testing does not specifically mention computer programs. And so we'll leave that term completely out of that subsection. And there also seem to be some potential holes, anyway, in terms of privacy research. For instance, one thing that's come up in our comments is spyware, trying to get privacy information that in subsection (i) there is the requirement that there be conspicuous notice on the spyware before you can circumvent to see what it's doing. Are these statutory exemptions too narrow for the present circumstances?

1 DR. SIMONS: Thank you for asking me that 2 questi on. 3 It's our view that essentially all of the 4 statutory exemptions that would apply to computer scientists 5 are too narrow. If you look at the security exemption J, it 6 says with the authorization of the owner or operator of such a 7 computer. So that's -- so you first need the authorization in 8 order to do the security research to begin with. 9 So if you happen to be using a program where you 10 -- I mean, if you think about the impact on just computer 11 security in general, I think it's really quite serious. I 12 personally find it somewhat ironic that at a time when we are 13 so concerned about security in general in this country that we 14 have legislation that is hampering security R&D, not only to 15 do the investigation to see how secure software might be, but 16 also to disseminate information when you find vulnerabilities. 17 One of the people I quoted referred to the fact 18 that when this research isn't done, that the pirates will 19 prevai I. 20 I understand that piracy, a term I don't 21 particularly like, but infringing behavior is of concern to 22 owners of intellectual property. But there are many other 23 issues that we need to be worried about. In particular, we 24 need to worry about the security of the information 25 infrastructure. And to the extent that it's insecure, which it

1 is seriously insecure, and to the extent that we are hampered 2 from investigating some of these insecurities and from 3 revealing them, not only does it make this country -- I mean, 4 it makes this country more insecure and it also ironically has 5 a negative impact on the very people who pushed for this 6 legislation to begin with because then they will find 7 themselves using protection mechanisms that they may not even 8 know are insecure because nobody can tell them. But the bad 9 guys will know, right? Some of these things are really 10 extremely fragile. 11 So another way of looking at some of these 12 exemptions because they are so weak, what this bill basically 13 does is it protects weak forms of protection. And it just 14 seems to me that that's not in anybody's interest. 15 I don't know if I answered all your questions. 16 As far as the privacy goes, of course again if there is 17 spyware or some other invasive type of software, sometimes you 18 can't know it's there without looking. And if you're not 19 allowed to look, then you can't find out. 20 MR. KASUNIC: Mr. Metalitz, do you have any --21 MR. METALITZ: Well, I think in general the 22 issues that you raise about the scope of the existing 23 statutory exemptions are issues that are best addressed to 24 Congress that wrote these exemptions and, obviously, has the 25 authority to change them and in light of changing

1 circumstances. 2 The job of this proceeding is somewhat 3 different. And I think the need to demonstrate the reduced 4 availability -- or the adverse impact on the availability of 5 materials for noninfringing uses is the touchstone of this 6 proceeding which may not be the same thing. 7 On 1201(i), I'm not sure that I understood the 8 question that you were raising, but it does -- it actually 9 rather closely tracks the spyware concern that at least one of 10 the submitters in the initial round raised. It basically deals 11 with the undisclosed surreptitious collection of identifiable 12 information. And it allows you to circumvent an access 13 control that does that under those circumstances. 14 DR. SIMONS: But how do you know if it does it 15 without circumventing it? 16 MR. METALITZ: How do you know if it does it? 17 DR. SIMONS: How do you know that it does this 18 without circumventing it? 19 MR. METALITZ: Well, you have to have some way, 20 some evidence or some reason to believe that personal 21 identifiable information is being collected. 22 DR. SIMONS: Right. But suppose you're wrong? 23 MR. METALITZ: It doesn't necessarily mean you 24 have to circumvent in order to find that out.

MR. KASUNIC: But if you're wrong, you're in

1 violation, right? 2 DR. SIMONS: Right. 3 MR. METALITZ: In other words, if you think it 4 does collect personal identifiable information and it turns 5 out that it doesn't collect personally identifiable 6 information is your act of circumvention a violation? The act 7 of circumvention is really dedicated to identifying and 8 disabling the capability. So you're saying if the capability 9 doesn't exist, does that not come within the category of 10 identifying it because it's a nil situ and you haven't 11 identified it? I don't know the answer to that question. 12 MS. PETERS: Charlotte? 13 MS. DOUGLASS: Yes. For Mr. Kahle. It seems 14 tome that there's a little bit of a disconnect between your 15 objectives, which is to protect things for a 100,000 years and 16 this proceeding which is just for 3 years, maybe recurring, 17 but this proceeding. Because it just seems like you are 18 interested in maybe protecting things that may break down, 19 protecting things that essentially are in need of archiving. 20 I'm going a long way around. But I'm having a difficult time 21 also seeing that this is really access protection. 22 What do you want from the Copyright Office? I 23 mean would you be happy if we said this is a copy control and 24 go home? I mean, it's just not clear that it's access

control.

1 MR. KAHLE: I'm sorry. Gosh, that's tragic. 2 You know, lay people. Okay. 3 Let me try to answer your preamble before--4 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. 5 MR. KAHLE: So why are we so concerned with the 6 next 3 years when we've got sort of a longer term time frame 7 that we're really trying to deal with? The urgency comes, and 8 this stuff's rotting now. If we don't do our preservation 9 now, we don't get another chance. And I fear that, you know, 10 this stuff's already gone. So, the urgency here for us in the 11 preservation is we've got to act now and please don't put it 12 off another 3 years. Because these floppies are now 20 years 13 old. And they're starting to go. And anecdotal it takes 6 14 floppies to find out that doesn't have a read error. This 15 comes out of the gaming community. So anecdotal I think so 16 that's the urgency. 17 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. 18 MR. KAHLE: Does that help? 19 MS. DOUGLASS: Yes, it does. I was looking at 20 first effect. 21 MR. KAHLE: Okay. Then real issue that a copy 22 control or access control, what do I want from the Copyright 23 Office? If you think like librarians are conservative folks, 24 and we are, go and ask some of the lawyers that advise us and 25 these guys, especially when the lawyers are working

1 universities, they go and see endowment. Endowment and they 2 divide endowment by \$10,000 each potential infringement, 3 right. And the answer is often no. 4 We need things to be fairly straightforward for 5 us to be able to do our jobs. And if there's murkiness, we're 6 not a risk taking group. But we're a little desperate at the 7 moment because we're seeing the stuff evaporate. But as a 8 group, Stanford -- you know -- so. That's the -- what do I 9 want from the Copyright Office? 10 I was told by our lawyers, these high priced 11 folks that are --12 MS. SELVAGGIO: This was pro bono. 13 MR. KAHLE: Yes. Another way of looking at it, 14 say thank you. Is tens of thousands of dollars has been put 15 forward by a number of organizations, including these guys, 16 to be able to get here. I don't know how long we can sustain 17 this. I'm not sure how long the premier law firm in Silicon 18 Valley is going to do this stuff pro bono for a library. 19 So we have to try to lighten things up a little 20 bit in terms of how hard this stuff is to do. 21 But what do we want? I'm told that even if you 22 guys don't say "Hey, that's copy protection, you're just fine. 23 Go nuts, go through it." That if the first time that we think 24 we're blowing an access protection, and these things are 25 designed to stop access, we're liable. And no matter what you

I mean, it might help us. You know, Judge, here we have say. -- Charlotte going and say, hey, we're kosher. But that means we'll have to find that out in a court of law. And just the threat of litigation on this stuff is chilling. We just end up with people spending a lot of time with lawyers. So what I'd really like it to make it clear cut. And we're attempting with this verbiage to be actually fairly narrow. I realize that's a fighting term that you sort of hit the ping back and say, "Oh it's broad, it's narrow." The idea is to try to make it so it doesn't cover DVDs and CDs and things. It's the kind of stuff that's got software all wrapped into it. And it's something that's kind of a nice aspect of this, is it's so hard to do the job that we're setting out to do, that it's not like any script kitty is going to go off and blow access protections and post stuff because of this DMCA exemption.

This is going to be adopted by institutions that can employ the programmers. Because we can't distribute, as I understand, the things that we discover on how to circumvent access protections. We have to employ these people within our own organization and we have to then do it on our own materials for in-house use of these materials because of Section 108, because we can't without agreement, have things available. And that's a bunch of "ifs." And I think that that brings it down to be, hopefully, narrow enough that you can grant us if it's got a software access control that we're

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1	allowed to circumvent that.
2	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Thank you.
3	I'm sorry.
4	MR. KAHLE: That's what we want.
5	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay.
6	MR. KAHLE: Just to do our job.
7	MS. DOUGLASS: I have to make a little bit
8	clearer, however
9	MS. PETERS: Thank you.
10	MS. DOUGLASS: Oh, I'm sorry.
11	MR. ZIEMANN: There's something you may not
12	realize that takes this to the next step is that in the
13	interest of digital rights management, many of the software
14	companies are intentionally attempting to make some things be
15	obsolete. And an example that I have right here is McIntosh
16	tech manual that my wife, who is a teacher, bought for the
17	purpose of keeping the computers at the school running. But if
18	you put this in a McIntosh, even though it is McIntosh tech
19	manuals that has OS/X in it, it will not recognize that it
20	even exists. But if you go backwards to one previous
21	operating system, it works fine.
22	And so Apple has on its own for some reason
23	decided it doesn't want this particular CD to play.
24	MS. DOUGLASS: On the new generation?
25	MR. ZIEMANN: Yes. OS/X. If I give this to him
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1	and he puts it in his machine, it will not see it. And I can
2	say that without ever having touched his machine.
3	MS. DOUGLASS: Well, there's an area of 108
4	MR. ZIEMANN: But is that copy protection or is
5	have they made new software that prevents the access?
6	MS. DOUGLASS: Well, if it prevents access the
7	way it says access protection is defined in 1201, then we'd
8	have to say it's access protection. But I don't think we've
9	gotten to that point yet.
10	But if I can go back just a little bit to
11	MR. ZIEMANN: I just needed to make that point.
12	MS. DOUGLASS: Mr. Kahle. You said
13	broad/narrow, broad/narrow, you know, potato/potato. But it
14	really does seem like we have a broad category, I hate to say,
15	if we're talking about all literary works and all audiovisual
16	works unless it's paired down somewhat.
17	MR. KAHLE: That has software better than
18	software. There's a lot of materials that have separate data
19	from the software. CDs, DVDs, VCR tapes. Those are not what
20	we're talking about. We're talking about this sort of it's
21	the CD-ROM generation, which I'm tragic report a major
22	manufacturer decided because of the copyright vagaries, they
22 23	manufacturer decided because of the copyright vagaries, they decided to destroy their collection of 10,000 CD-ROMs rather

1	not 1201 issue, as I understand it. It is we've got to
2	make it easier. And you can help greatly, but it's just for
3	this complicated multipiece computer dongles, game players,
4	joy stick, running over the Internet; all these sorts of odd
5	ball now becoming fairly massive cultural items, those aspects
6	of our cultural heritage are in danger. And if there's
7	someway of restricting it that's what we're trying to do.
8	MS. DOUGLASS: I understand.
9	I think I have a question of Mr well, Ms.
10	Simons. With 2 Ms?
11	DR. SI MONS: One.
12	MS. DOUGLASS: Oh, okay. I'm sorry. Okay. You
13	note substantial negative impacts on basic research, and you
14	give a number of examples. Are those actual examples or are
15	they hypothetical examples? And if they're hypothetical, do
16	you have any information about the likelihood of those
17	actually occurring?
18	DR. SIMONS: Well, the three quotes I read to
19	you were actual.
20	MS. DOUGLASS: The last the ones that you
21	read to us today?
22	DR. SI MONS: Yes.
23	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. I was thinking of the ones
24	in your statement.
25	DR. SIMONS: Those are hypothetical. But they
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1 were mainly to illustrate the kinds of -- the kinds of 2 scenarios where you would like for people to be able to do 3 something which they are prohibited from doing under the DMCA. 4 MS. DOUGLASS: I see. Thank you. 5 And I think I have one question for your, Mr. 6 Metalitz. Actually, this question might have been answered, 7 but you can just say asked and answered. 8 You say that this exemption if it was proved 9 that -- I'm now talking about malfunctioning and dongles. 10 Should be conditioned on meeting objective verifiable 11 criteria. How can we do this? This is what Congress had in 12 mind when it specified a class of works? In other words, how 13 can we write all that in and we're really needing to talk 14 about Congress says give us a class of works. 15 MR. METALITZ: I think you can do it consistent 16 with the guidelines that you laid out in 2000, which dealt 17 with a class of works but also made an effort to describe a 18 certain type of access control that was being circumvented. 19 My concern is that that description is too open ended. 20 for example, it doesn't address the question of who determines 21 whether is -- or by what criteria one determines that 22 something is malfunctioning or damaged. And then on the 23 obsolete question, which may perhaps be more accurately 24 unsupported, that also -- you had a cross reference in there 25 to Section 108, but to me that indicates that you felt it was

acceptable to limit the types of access controls that could be
circumvented by reference to whether they were available in
the marketplace.
So, I guess my suggestion here I think is
compatible with what you decided in 2000 and would simply
provide greater clarity, greater definition if you determined
that based on the evidence in this proceeding
MS. DOUGLASS: Right.
MR. METALITZ: that an exemption is
necessary.
MS. DOUGLASS: Thank you, Mr. Metalitz.
MS. PETERS: Steve?
MR. TEPP: Thank you.
Dr. Simons, you had mentioned earlier your
assertion or your belief that none of the exemptions to
Section 1201 are sufficient to do what you and others in your
organization want to do. I want to focus specifically on
encryption research, and that 1201(g). And ask you if you can
give us some specifics about what it is you want to do that
you can't do under 1201(g)?
DR. SIMONS: All right. Well, just as a general
philosophical comment, we were we got involved with the
phirosophical comment, we were we got rivorved with the
DMCA was being debated in Congress, but later in the show. By

1 about the fact that there were no encryption research at all, 2 and started -- and that's how we found out and started pushing 3 for that. And we also talked about security, and I think we 4 may have had something to do with the fact that there's a 5 security exemption in there. 6 I should add that we don't lobby. We were 7 raising the technical issues. We weren't saying how people 8 should vote on the legislation. 9 But as a philosophical view of this as a 10 computer scientist, I was watching this whole process as 11 various carve outs were being discussed by Congress. And it 12 made me quite uncomfortable because -- I mean, I started 13 taking computer science in 1970. Things have changed a lot 14 since my first programming course. And to try to make -- to 15 try to say -- everything is illegal except for this and this 16 and this means that there is probably going to be other things 17 that come along which you weren't thinking about when you said 18 except for this, except for this. And that's, in fact, what 19 has happened. 20 I truly believe that Congress did not intend to 21 pass a law which would jeopardize computer security R&D in 22 this country, but that's in fact what they have done. 23 Now, getting back to the encryption area. 24 of the problems here -- well, backtracking a little bit before 25 I answer your question directly. Computer science and

1 computing is still a new field. And there are a lot of people 2 who are working in it in various levels. Some of them don't 3 have credentials. Some of them are young kids who don't have 4 credentials. Some of them who have barely graduated from high 5 school, let alone -- so they have no credentials. But some of 6 these kids are really sharp and they really understand these 7 things. And you can imagine that in some cases they might 8 break some sort of encryption scheme. 9 Now, someone that doesn't even have a college 10 degree certainly doesn't qualify under these definitions. 11 Because, as I understand it -- let's see, where is it? They 12 talk about the person who does this and my understanding is 13 that in general it's supposed to someone who is an encryption 14 person doing encryption research. I'm looking, trying to see 15 if I can find this in real time. 16 So when Ed Felton, for example, was threatened 17 under the DMCA, I mean he's pretty close -- I mean, he's 18 actually not an encryption researcher, he's a security guy. 19 But you could say stuff -- but he knows some encryption stuff. 20 I mean, the very fact that somebody whose a Princeton 21 professor was threatened has an incredibly chilling impact. 22 And so then you go on down the line to this kid somewhere who 23 maybe broke some weak encryption scheme and is he or she going 24 to be considered an encryption researcher? I don't think so. 25 I mean, that's one of the concerns is that by

1 saying what's -- by saying everything is disallowed except for 2 such and such, and such you leave out a lot. And when you're 3 talking about technology, in particular, you leave out a lot. 4 And in fact, even when you're trying to define the technology 5 I think you get into trouble. 6 Just going back to the beginning where -- to 7 1201 where you they talk about effectively circumventing, what 8 does "effective" mean? I had a lot of trouble with that phrase 9 "effectively circumventing." To me it doesn't take into 10 account whatsoever how strong something is, how good something 11 is, how hard it is to break. I don't know, for example, if 12 somebody had an encryption scheme that was what I call a 13 "cereal box" encryption scheme where you replace one letter by 14 another. Do you remember? I don't know if you remember 15 those. I'm old enough to remember those. 16 MR. KAHLE: Decoder ring. 17 DR. SIMONS: Yes. Now, one of the reasons that 18 this was a challenge to kids is that it was pretty easy to 19 break, right? Now, if somebody produced a document which was 20 protected by such a scheme and somebody else showed the key, 21 is that in violation of the DMCA? I honestly don't know. 22 And I think when you get to that level of 23 uncertainty, it has an incredibly chilling effect. 24 Now, I know it's not up to you to change the way 25 this law was written, so I'm really just sort of ranking, I

suppose, about the kinds of issues that we've been confronted
with. And to the extent that you could help us by broadening
these exceptions or making them as all encompassing as
possible, that would be very useful.
I mean, I still think there's a fundamental
flaw. Instead of saying we want to outlaw infringing behavior,
we're saying we are outlawing technologies except. And when
you get to those excepts when you're dealing with
technologies, you run into trouble.
I'm not sure if I've answered your question.
MR. TEPP: Well, you have and you've actually
provided a good seque to my next question.
DR. SI MONS: Okay. Good.
MR. TEPP: Because I think what you said is
fair, that some of your concerns appear to go beyond the scope
of what this rulemaking is.
DR. SIMONS: I understand, yes.
MR. TEPP: And certainly have respect for your
views, and they're important issues, but in trying to focus on
exactly what
DR. SIMONS: Of course.
MR. TEPP: Congress has instructed us to do,
when I heard your three examples that you described in your
opening statement they were all concerned with distributing
the results of research, sending out papers, giving lectures,

1 that sort of thing. That struck me as not something that 2 falls within the act of circumvention, 1201(a)(1), which is 3 what this rulemaking is about, but more likely into 4 1201(a)(2). And I wanted to give you the chance to tell me I'm 5 wrong. And if so, why. Or if not, tell me exactly what it is 6 within 1201(a)(1) that this rulemaking is about that you're 7 asking of us and why. 8 DR. SIMONS: Well, people said they're not doing 9 research anymore in these areas? That's 1201(a)(1). The 10 doing of the research is 1201(1)(1). Now, it's true that I 11 think most scientists like to have their work known and 12 acknowledged, and even praised when possible. And so -- and 13 there's definitely a lot of ego in what people do and that's 14 why they do want to publish. But the fact is that the actual 15 work is not being done. And as a result, the systems and all 16 the software that should be being tested is not being tested. 17 I mean, you can imagine for example a scenario 18 in which somebody did the 1201(a)(1) type of work and

I mean, you can imagine for example a scenario in which somebody did the 1201(a)(1) type of work and discovered some sort of major flaw. Now, the dissemination of that information might be illegal under another part of the DMCA. But the fact that there's a flaw, saying that there's a flaw not be illegal, right? I mean to simply say that there is a flaw without explaining what it is should be, as I understand it, legal. So if -- you know, to the extent that we all want to make our computer infrastructure, the whole

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1 information infrastructure more secure and to the extent that 2 we want to encourage people to testings for vulnerabilities 3 and to expose problems and to warn people of problems, then I 4 think that it is relevant. 5 I mean, I also would like to see more broadening 6 of the exemptions. But even being able to warn people that 7 there are problems, I think would fall into this. And I think 8 in the case of the people who wrote me, that their frustration 9 comes -- is related to that. Because as scientists they 10 assume, of course, it's not sufficient to someone, you've got 11 to prove it. But there's this middle step of warning which is 12 also not available to us now. 13 Is that answering --14 MR. TEPP: Well, it's another step towards what 15 I'm looking for. What you're describing is a set of people 16 who are fairly well known in the field, so that's not a 17 problem at least for this part of the discussion. And they 18 find something. Oh, my gosh, there's something terribly 19 wrong. And I don't disagree with your analysis that they could 20 say I found a flaw. When they say what it is, that's a 21 different question. 22 DR. SI MONS: So. 23 MR. TEPP: So they say, you know, the 24 hypothetical is a well-known researcher does the research, 25 finds the flaw, announces that they found a flaw. The

1	proprietor of the software involved is informed. He says oh
2	my gosh, thank you so much. And the flaw is fixed.
3	DR. SI MONS: Yes.
4	MR. TEPP: That sounds like it probably could
5	fall into a 1201(g) situation. Well, it seems like that
6	could. DO you think
7	DR. SIMONS: Well, (g) is encryption, right? I
8	mean, there are all kinds of other flaws that have nothing to
9	do with encryption.
10	MR. TEPP: Okay. So that is what what are
11	you asking us for? That's what I'm trying to get to.
12	DR. SIMONS: What am I asking you for? Well,
13	this is where I could use I would like to have you.
14	I guess what I'm saying is that we need whatever
15	help you can provide us to make it easier for us to do our
16	jobs, to make it easier for the computer security and
17	encryption communities to do what they had been doing before
18	the DMCA was passed. To make sure that people that
19	researchers at UC Berkeley, for example, don't have to spend
20	more time talking to lawyers than doing the actual research.
21	I don't know how you can do that. I was hoping
22	that I would come and show you the problems and you would tell
23	me how you could do it. But that's, I'm sure, not
24	appropri ate.
25	As an example, Sun just to give you an
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example of what I think is a good kind of situation.

Sun Microsystems has a policy where if people find flaws in their software, they give them \$100 or something. And they encourage. And they figure that that makes their software more secure. That's a very enlightened position and it means that people can go and do reverse engineering of various aspects of Sun software and not have to worry about being dragged into court. But other companies don't necessarily have that approach. And as a result, I think, sometimes their software is less secure because they don't get this positive input from the community. By the way, many of whom are not computer scientists with a capital C capital S.

So I don't know to what extent you have the ability to even go back to Congress and make suggestions to them as to things that could be changed or should be changed.

But we have a real problem.

I'll just tell you a little anecdotal story. I was on the Hill last year with a couple of people from -- the two people who are in our office, the USACM office. And we went into a cafeteria in the House for a snack. And the tables were occupied so we asked this woman if we could sit next to her, and she said yes.

And we started talking. She was there to lobby for some sort of medical thing. But we were talking. It turned

1	out she was involved with the committees that were doing the
2	negotiations on the DMCA, like I think between the House and
3	Senate, you know, when they were doing the negotiations. And I
4	suddenly had this insight. I said "Did they delay the
5	implementation of the anticircumvention and anti-dissemination
6	provisions until 2000 because of the Y2K problem?" And she
7	said yes.
8	I didn't get her name. I'm kicking myself. I
9	did have witnesses, but that was what she said. That they knew
10	about Y2K. And either the people who knew about it thought
11	that this was a unique problem that would never reoccur, or
12	they didn't care.
13	I'd like to think that they thought it was
14	unique, but we as computer scientists know that it's far from
15	unique and that these kinds of problems are constantly
16	reoccurring. And to the extent that you cannot do some of the
17	sorts of reverse engineering and circumvention that was done
18	to solve the Y2K problem because of the DMCA, we are at
19	greater risk.
20	And probably didn't answer your question. I'm
21	sorry.
22	MR. TEPP: Well, we're not computer scientists
23	even with a small C and small S. And so given that there is a
24	burden that has to be met in order to demonstrate a need for
25	any new exception that we're being asked to recommend to the

1	Librarian, it makes our job nearly impossible if the
2	proponents of the exceptions can't articulate an exception for
3	us to consider.
4	MR. KAHLE: May I suggest?
5	DR. SI MONS: Yes.
6	MR. KAHLE: Would it be acceptable if the ACM
7	were to submit within one week potential 3 days 2 days.
8	MR. CARSON: It's too late, folks. We're way
9	past the point of proposing exemptions. But you've got one in
10	writing. It's in front of us.
11	DR. SIMONS: I beg your pardon?
12	MR. CARSON: You've proposed an exemption to us
13	in writing. It is in front of us.
14	DR. SI MONS: Yes.
15	MS. PETERS: We need to actually end this panel.
16	We're way past.
17	We have to be out of this room at 5:00. That's
18	a given. So we're going to take a 45 minute break and we'll
19	start again at 2:15. Thank you.
20	(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m. the meeting was
21	adjourned until 2:15 p.m.)
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6	A-F-T-E-R-N-0-0-N S-E-S-S-I-0-N
7	2: 20 p. m.
8	MS. PETERS: The panel is here, and since all the
9	witnesses are here, let's start. This afternoon we're going
10	to be focusing on sound recordings and musical works that are
11	on copy-protected CD's. And the witnesses are from the
12	Electronic Frontier Foundation, Gwen Hinz, and Ren Bucholz,
13	and from IP Justice, Robin Gross. And then the other side,
14	Steve Marks from the Recording Industry Association of
15	America, and Mark Belinsky, Macrovision.
16	So let's start with EFF, however you want to
17	divide it up between you.
18	MS. HINZE: On behalf of the Electronic Frontier
19	Foundation, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to
20	testify at today's hearing in support of the exemption the EFF
21	has proposed.
22	My name is Gwen Hinze, I am the staff attorney
23	at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and I'm here today
24	assisted by Ren Bucholz, our staff activist.

EFF has requested an exemption for sound

1 recordings released on audio CD's that are protected by 2 technological protection measures that malfunctioned, so as to 3 prevent access on certain playback devices. 4 The proposed exemption would allow consumers to 5 play music that they have legitimately acquired without fear 6 of legal liability under Section 1201. The exemption is 7 effectively identical in scope to the second exemption that 8 was granted by the library in 2000 for literary works that are 9 subject to access control measures that prevent access due to 10 mal function, or damage or obsolescence. 11 The idiosyncratic and varying nature of the 12 recorded malfunctions of various copy-protected CD's, working 13 on some PC's and not other operating systems, suggests that 14 the copy control technological protection measures were 15 intended to prevent unauthorized reproduction but were not 16 designed to prevent playback of music. 17 However, irrespective of the intent of these 18 measures, the practical effect of these malfunctioning copy 19 protection controls has been to prevent consumers from 20 accessing protected music. 21 The inability to access or play the music is due 22 to a technological protection measure failing to work in the 23 way that it was intended to work. 24 MS. DOUGLASS: I must ask that you try to speak 25 up a little. I can see people are moving forward in the back.

1 MS. HINZE: Thank you, thank you. EFF is 2 seeking a narrow exemption that would permit consumers to take 3 the steps necessary to play music that they have legitimately 4 purchased on the consumer playback devices they own. This is 5 clearly a non-infringing use. Playback is a private 6 performance and does not implicate any of the exclusive rights 7 granted to copyright owners under Section 106 of the copyright 8 statute. 9 The proposed exemption that we are seeking is 10 narrow. It is limited to restoring playability and would not 11 authorize copying of affected music. 12 I'd like to spend the bulk of my opening 13 statement addressing some of the points that are being made in 14 opposition to our exemption by, amongst other people, the 15 Joint Commenters, represented this afternoon by Mr. Marks. 16 In the Joint Reply Comments filed with the 17 copyright office, the Recording Industry Association of 18 America, and the various other commenters, have opposed this 19 exemption on three main grounds. 20 First, they have argued that the proposed 21 exemption is outside the scope of this rulemaking process 22 because the copy protection technology issue is not a 23 technological protection measure that effectively controls 24 access to a protective work under Title 17 for the purposes of 25 Section 1201(a)(1) and as per our discussion this morning,

1201(a)(3)(b)of the copyright statute.

EFF does not dispute this. As we noted in the comments filed in December 2002, based on the information that we had that is publicly available about the nature and the operation of these measures it does not appear that they require application of information, a process, or a treatment with the authority of a copyright owner to play when they play.

And when they don't play, it doesn't appear to be a matter of a failure to apply a particular process information or treatment in order to make that malfunction correct. The blocking of access here is due to the malfunctioning copy protection controls, and it appears to be unintentional.

However, as demonstrated by the legal debate over the status of the content scrambling system in relation to DVD's over the last five years, a technological protection measure can control both access to, and use or copying of a protected work.

There is uncertainty within the legal community as to whether malfunctioning copy control technological protection measures that inadvertently prevent playback of CD content should be characterized as effective access control measures for the purposes of Section 1201(a)(3)(b). The legal uncertainty here is exacerbated by the lack of public

1 information by exactly how these technologies work. 2 In the meantime, however, consumers are, if they 3 find that they have purchased copy protection CD's that do not 4 play in their playback devices, are left in a legal no-man's-5 Whether or not a malfunctioning copy protection measure 6 is deemed to fall within the technical definition of 7 effectively controlling access in Section 1201(a)(3)(b), the 8 end result is exactly the same thing for consumers. 9 Where the copy protection technology 10 malfunctions, it often blocks access completely and consumers 11 are simply unable to play music that they have lawfully 12 acqui red. 13 However, given the doubt that surrounds the 14 scope of application of Section 1201(a)(1), consumers can't be 15 sure whether they're breaking the law and potentially putting 16 themselves at risk of significant liability legally if they 17 try to circumvent the malfunctioning copy protection 18 technology to make the CD play. 19 If the Register were to clarify in its 20 rulemaking that malfunctioning copy controls are not access 21 controls for the purposes of Section 1201, then EFF agrees 22 that the proposed exemption would not be required. 23 However, in the absence of a clear statement 24 about the scope of Section 1201, or an exemption, there's no 25 guidance for consumers or predictability as to what behavior

is lawful when they're trying to make a very common noninfringing use of music they've purchased.

There is, in addition, a flow-on effect, a consequent chilling effect on manufacturers and software vendors who might otherwise develop devices or software drivers, the current drives, and current CD ROM and DVD players that would be capable of playing these non-raybook (phonetic) audio CD's. For instance, in the absence of a clear statement or a clear exemption, Apple may be less inclined to release a software update that would permit MAC users, a particularly affected group, to play these types of disks on their computer CD ROM drives.

The second main argument that our clients have made is that EFF has not met its burden of proof on these issues. It hasn't met the burden of showing how amounting to a substantial adverse impact. In particular, the Joint Commenters complain that we have not provided evidence of the number of copy-protected CD's currently in circulation in the United States, or evidence as to the frequency of actual failures of these disks on particular types of devices. I have several comments in response.

First, it is not clear at all what is necessary to meet the standard of proof of substantial adverse impact for this category. However, EFF does not agree with the direct commenters' assertion that this requires us to provide

1 exhaustive figures for the number of copy-protected CD's 2 released in the United States. And the failure rate of that 3 technology in particular, devices. 4 If the Copyright Register in the Librarium were 5 to endorse that standard as the standard for substantial 6 adverse impact, we believe it would raise serious issues about 7 the equity of this proceeding and the ability of consumers to 8 participate meaningfully in this process. It would certainly 9 threaten to undermine Congress's intent to create a fail-safe 10 mechanism for consumers, non-infringing users. 11 The reason I say this is for these reasons: 12 First of all, consumers' experience of identifying a copy-13 protected CD is much like playing a game of battleship. 14 Since copy-protected CD's are often not labeled, 15 consumers do not know whether any CD they purchase is copy-16 protected or not until they insert it into their computer CD 17 ROM drive or their car CD MP3 player, or their DVD player, and 18 then experience a malfunction. 19 In this case, in this present exemption, the 20 only parties in a position to obtain comprehensive information 21 as to the number of copy-protected CD's that have been 22 released in the United States are those opposing the 23 exemption, including the RIAA and its member labels. 24 However, they have chosen not to disclose that 25 information in response to the information that the EFF has

1 provi ded. Even though it could presumably be used to prove 2 that the exemption is unwarranted, if the number of copy-3 protected CD's actually in circulation is diminimus, as they 4 have suggested. 5 It's also difficult to provide information as to 6 the frequency and type of malfunction of these copy protection 7 measures on particular types of devices. As the 48 consumer 8 comments that were filed with the copyright office in this 9 proceeding illustrate, the range of failures that people 10 experience vary dramatically. In some cases, people are able 11 to play one particular song for a small segment, or not play 12 anything at all. In some cases, people experience a complete 13 operations system crash. It happened to my colleague and has 14 been reported to be the case in a number of the comments filed 15 in this proceeding. 16 Given the variation amongst the different types 17 of responses, and the fact that it seems to be a matter of 18 operating system to operating system, drive by drive, it's a 19 very difficult thing to predict or to qualitatively assess 20 what the frequency or type of failure is. 21 More importantly, EFF considers that the 22 information that's currently on the record is sufficient to 23 establish current substantial evidence impact. 24 At a qualitative level, there is a substantial 25 evidence impact on the consumer. Consumers use a non-

1 infringing use of lawfully acquired material when copy 2 protection technology malfunctions, and they are entirely 3 prevented from playing back something they've lawfully 4 acquired. The nature of the harm experienced here is absolute 5 if there is no playback. It's not merely an inconvenience. 6 The customer receives nothing, no benefit for their bargain. 7 Qualitatively speaking, evidence on the record 8 indicates that a number of copy-protected CD's have currently 9 been released in the United States. EFF identified titles of 10 four copy-protected CD's that had been verified as copy-11 protected in our December 2002 comments. However, based on 12 news reports and consumers' experiences, the actual number of 13 affected titles may be much higher. 14 News reports indicate that covert trials of 15 unlabeled copy-protected CD's have been taking place in the 16 United States since 2001. My colleague, Ren, is currently 17 showing a slide with excerpts from these news reports. 18 In July 2001, Macrovision reportedly made a test 19 release in the United States, including one title that had 20 sold almost 100,000 units. This followed a report in May 21 2001, which quoted Mark Tokayer, the CEO of Macrovision 22 partner, TTR Audio, as stating that Macrovision and a major or 23 several major record labels had released copy-protected CD's 24 in California. In February 2002, technology company Midbar, 25 which is now owned by Macrovision, announced that it had

1 released 10 million CD's in the United States and Europe. 2 last month, Macrovision announced its technology had been used 3 on over 100 million CD's worldwide, including in the United 4 States. 5 The record industry has unofficially 6 acknowledged the existence of two copy-protected CD's in the 7 U.S. market. Yet we know from firsthand experience that this 8 is incomplete. One of (indistinguishable) staffers purchased 9 a CD by the group The Donners, only to discover that it was 10 copy-protected. 11 This disk has not been acknowledged by Atlantic 12 Records as being copy-protected, but if you look very, very 13 closely, you can see a tiny, tiny, tiny logo down at bottom 14 here, which appears to be a copy protection logo. It's on the 15 actual packaging, not on the disk itself. 16 The disk itself actually says that it will play 17 on various computer formats, including MAC OS players. 18 point of fact, it wasn't able to be played at all on MAC OS 19 drive in question, which is why this this eager staffer worked 20 (indistinguishable) It was copy-protected and found the out. 21 I ogo. 22 This seems to match the experience of hundreds 23 of consumers in online fora (sic) who have identified what 24 appear to be copy-protected CD's who have experienced and 25 identified these as being CD's that are not capable of playing

on various devices.

It's fair to assume that these experiences and those of the 48 consumer commenters who filed comments in this proceeding indicate that the number of copy-protected CD's in the U.S. market may actually be much higher than has been officially acknowledged by the record industry, and that the number of these disks will increase in the next three years.

The increasing copy volumes-- increasing volumes of copy-protected releases will have a substantial and adverse impact on consumers' ability to make non-infringing uses of their works within the next three years.

First, record label and technology company statements indicate that there are a significant number of copy-protected CD's who will be released in the United States this year.

Second, because of the move towards more modern, multi-format disk players as primary playback devices, such as DVD's, MP3's, CDR's, combined and X-Box game consoles, combined multi-format playback devices of these types have much more vulnerability to the current copy protection technologies because the technologies appear to work by exploiting differences between audio CD players and these types of multi-format players as discussed in the report that cited in (indistinguishable) comments, a research paper by Princeton researcher, John Alexander Halderman. And as

1 (indistinguishable) said the comments point out there has been 2 a squished move by consumers to adopt multi-format playback 3 devices such as combined DVD and MP3 CD players. MSNBC 4 reported last year that sales of standalone regular CD players 5 were down 48.1% last year. 6 Ren is showing slides with excerpts from news 7 reports about the expected influx of millions of copy-8 protected CD's into the U.S. market in coming months. 9 In late March 2003, these reports indicated that 10 the BMG subsidiary, Arista records, would be releasing 11 SunnComm protected CD's in the United States later this year. 12 In November 2002 the L.A. Times reported EMI 13 recorded music Vice President, David Munns, as saying that the 14 2002 holiday season would be, as you can see, would be the 15 last holiday season without wide-spread use of copy protection 16 technology on new releases. 17 And technology company SunnComm has stated that 18 it has already installed anti-copying gear in a 19 Bertlesmann subsidiary, North Carolina CD manufacturing 20 plant, and that a sizable proportion of this 21 subsidiary's releases will be copy-protected by the end 22 of 2003. 23 The third main argument made by our opponents is 24 that this exemption is premised on an incorrect assumption 25 that consumers are entitled to play copy-protected music on

1 any device capable of using CD's as a data storage format. 2 On page 19 of the joint comments, our opponents 3 have argued that "neither the copyright act nor the DMCA was 4 ever intended to require or to confer upon uses a rash of 5 complete compatibility amongst all devices in our media." 6 That was a quote from those comments. 7 They then claim that the existence of playback 8 devices that can play copy-protected music removes any need 9 for this exemption. I'd like to make several comments in 10 response to that. 11 First, I'd like to emphasize that the nature of 12 the exemptions sought here is for non-infringing use of 13 lawfully -- of playing lawfully acquired sound recordings. 14 Private performance is not one of the rights given to 15 copyright holders under Section 106 of the copyright act. 16 Our opponents argument about compatibility 17 precedes on the assumption that copyright owners are entitled 18 to control playback. Only users play it-- only users play 19 (indistinguishable) device. 20 However, there's nothing in the legislative 21 history of the DMCA that indicates that Congress intended to 22 grant additional rights to copyright artists, 23 (indistinguishable) mostly stated in Section 106. 24 EFF would submit that any opposition to this 25 exemption, which is premised incorrectly on copyright

owners, claim to control rights beyond what's listed in Section 106, should be treated with caution.

The second, contrary to our opponents claim, what is sought here is not a right of complete compatibility for all devices and all media. Instead, the requested exemption would allow consumers to make a non-infringing use of media they've lawfully acquired on devices they currently own. And that they would reasonably be expected -- would be able to play that media based on 15 years' experience -- of over 15 years' experience of the audio CD format. After all, what we're talking about here is consumers putting CD's into

It's certainly true that Congress did not intend to mandate manufacturers to design devices to detect and respond to technological protection measures that were implemented by copyright owners. That's reflected in 1201 C3.

devices that have previously played CD's, not putting them

into toasters.

However, nothing in the Congressional Record indicates that Congress intended to grant copyright owners the right to control consumers non-infringing private performance of lawfully acquired content on devices they already own. The existence of some players that can play these disks is not a sufficient reason for the client to grant this exemption.

Consumers seeking to make non-infringing uses of

1 works they've lawfully acquired should not be put to the 2 expense of having to purchase an additional player to play 3 protected music. And as I previously noted, the stock of 4 players which can actually play these types of disks is 5 diminishing as consumers are moving towards more modern multi-6 format players, DVD's, MP3's, CD's, X-Box game consoles. 7 Before the existence of alternative players that 8 consumers can currently purchase, but may not be up to easily 9 acquire in three years' time, as these devices are phased out, 10 doesn't protect consumers' ability to make non-infringing uses 11 of these works within the next three-year period. 12 Finally, in considering the balance of harms 13 involved in granting this exception, I'd like to emphasize 14 that the exemption does not increase the risk of widespread 15 copyright infringement. 16 First, the exemption is limited to non-17 infringing playback of protected music. Second, as Section 18 1201(a)(1)(d) makes clear, any exemption that is granted by 19 the Library of Congress extends only to non-infringing 20 behavior. The exemption would allow consumers to take steps 21 to restore playability, but would not authorize otherwise 22 infringing reproduction. If any consumer were to step beyond 23 the bounds of the exemption, and, for instance, make an 24 unauthorized reproduction of distribution of a work on a 25 protected music CD, copyright owners would continue to have

1 the right to bring an action for infringement, and would 2 continue to have the full set of rights apparently available 3 to them under copyright law. 4 Finally, I'd just like to address one point that 5 was made in the comments of Mr. Metalitz this morning, when he 6 provided his summary of the factors that the copyright office 7 had to take into account. He suggested that in the context of 8 the copyright office's mission, the copyright office had to 9 consider the availability for use of works in the class, as 10 identified, and he made a statement to the effect that we have 11 a digital cornucopia of it if you look at the situation in 12 2003 as compared to the situation in 2000. 13 We have a rich variety, more works, more 14 different types of works available. And that this is 15 primarily due to the use of technological protection measures 16 backed by the legal sanctions of Section 1201. 17 I'd just like to comment on that in relation to 18 this particular class of CD's and note that -- sound 19 recordings, and note that that's just not true with music. 20 Music has been around in many forms for many years, and the 21 availability of music does not actually have anything to do 22 with the technological protection measures that have only 23 started to be used on what looked like CD's in the last two 24 years. 25 In fact, the music format that we know as the CD

1 has been around in existence for over 15 years. And so, to 2 the extent that the copyright office wants to take into 3 account the consideration about the user facilitation or the 4 availability of facilitation on any particular technological 5 protection measures, I would urge the copyright office to take 6 into account that that is not actually accurate or not an 7 appropriate factor for consideration in respect of this class 8 of works. Thank you. 9 MS. PETERS: Miss Gross? 10 MS. GROSS: Good afternoon. IP Justice welcomes 11 this opportunity to testify to the US copyright on this about 12 the adverse impacts users are experiencing in their ability to 13 enjoy CD's and other sound recordings in non-infringing ways. 14 The cause of this adverse impact is the technological 15 restriction measures currently being applied, with increasing 16 regularity, to CD's by the record industry. 17 The magnitude of this harm warrants the 18 declaration by the U.S. copyright office that the exemptions 19 proposed by IP Justice in its submitted comments. Before 20 speaking to the substantive reasons for our proposed 21 exemptions, IP Justice wishes to highlight four important 22 procedural issues in relation to this rulemaking. 23 First, the Librarians' responsibility in this 24 rule-making is to users and not copyright owners. In the 25 first rulemaking in 2000, the Librarian gave undue deference

1 to the interests of copyright owners. By doing so, the 2 Librarian duplicated Congress's deference to the interest of 3 copyright owners when Congress first enacted the anti-4 circumvention measures in 1998. 5 The role of the copyright office in this 6 proceeding is not to determine that technological restrictions 7 benefit the public, but to look for ways in which the public 8 is harmed by them, and act to preserve the public's rights 9 under traditional copyright. 10 Congress introduced the anti-circumvention 11 measures to encourage copyright owners to make their works 12 available digitally. Or in the words of the last rulemaking, 13 "The measures are designed to be use facilitating." The 14 responsibility of the Librarian in this rulemaking is not to 15 repeat Congress's analysis, but to protect users and ensure 16 access, not availability of protected works such as CD's. 17 Second, the structure of this rulemaking, as 18 interpreted by the Librarian, effectively precludes it from 19 achieving its purpose. The Librarian insists that exemptions 20 be defined according to class of work. Adequate protection of 21 users' rights requires that exemptions be drafted with 22 reference to the type of user and circumstances of use. 23 For example, if a person listens to a CD at 24 home, they're not infringing the copyright owners' public 25 performance right. But when they play the CD in a

discotheque, they might be. As scholars and civil

libertarians have noted, architecture is policy and the

structure of this proceeding makes it extremely difficult to

obtain consumer protections.

Third, the Librarian has set an impossibly high evidentiary standard, given the nature of the harm it is supposed to protect against. The Librarian requires evidence of substantial harm or likelihood of harm but without any guidance as to how to meet these thresholds.

The adverse effects experienced by users are likely, of their very nature, to be individual, and personal, difficult to measure and quantify. This does not detract from the existence of such harm. It does mean that the Librarian should accept, as sufficient evidence, news reports and principal analysis of likely harm which take into account the interaction of the anti-circumvention measures with the limitations and exceptions for users, under traditional copyright principles.

Fourth, IP Justice urges the copyright office to be mindful in conducting this second rulemaking of two important facts. Firstly, the first rulemaking was conducted when the prohibition on access circumvention had not yet taken effect. Three years later, the trend of digital lock-up is more apparent. Thus, the extent of the impact on users must be greater because the anti-circumvention measures are broader

than copyright.

The second important factor is that the impact of any exemption will necessarily be limited. This is something which the Librarian failed to take in account in the first rulemaking. Acts of circumvention and access controls are, by their nature, inherently non-commercial and personal. Anyone who seeks to take advantage of an exempted act of access circumvention, must be highly, technically, literate.

granted, a person still cannot acquire a circumvention device or service from a third party nor make it available to someone else because to do so would infringe the anti-trafficking prohibitions of Section 1201. This means that only a limited number of people are likely to be able to avail themselves of any exemptions. Thus the impact on the copyright owner of any exemption will be substantially limited.

Turning now to our substantive comments in support of our proposed exemptions for copy-protected CD and other sound recordings, IP Justice would like to make two comments.

First, CD copy protection often serves

functionally also, as access restriction technology. The

technology restricts the ability of users to play a CD in

certain types of technology, for example, a PC. This is a

clear interference with access but CD owners are forbidden

1 from bypassing the access control technology. 2 Users are unable to simply enjoy a CD in the 3 privacy of their own home, office, or car, on the platform of 4 their choosing. Instead, the copyright owner dictates the 5 user's personal experience of music, something well beyond the 6 ambit of Section 106 in the copyright act. 7 The focus on Section 106 is on public uses of 8 music and intellectual property. That which falls outside of 9 the public sphere, the private enjoyment of music, should 10 likewise fall outside the reach of the copyright owner's 11 control. CD copy protection permits copyright owners to usurp 12 the user's private performance right through the use of these 13 technological access controls that double as use in copy 14 controls. 15 The DMCA distinguishes between circumventing 16 access controls and circumventing copy controls. It allows 17 circumvention of copy controls in order to engage in fair use. 18 19 In passing the DMCA, Congress clearly intended 20 the public to continue to enjoy their right to circumvent copy 21 controls on sound recordings for lawful purposes. 22 So while in theory, consumers continue to enjoy 23 their right to circumvent copy controls to make fair use or to 24 engage in other lawful uses of sound recordings, the law still

forbids bypassing access technology. And since it's not

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1 possible to bypass the copy controls without also bypassing 2 access controls with these dual use technologies, consumers 3 are prevented from exercising the right to bypass the copy 4 controls on sound recordings in order to make the lawful use 5 of their music. 6 Secondly, CD copy protection chills innovative 7 personal uses of music. Digital technology empowers people to 8 access their music collection in unprecedented new ways 9 without being a pirate. Purchasers of CD's can space shift or 10 play shift their music from one device to another, for 11 example, to their MP3 player, to go jogging or their home or 12 their car office. 13 CD copy protection technology prevents this from 14 occurring. It treats all users as copyright infringers. 15 trend of legitimate music purchasers being unable to access 16 copy-protected CD's is well established and will only 17 continue. 18 Surely, the hundreds of comments supplied by 19 individuals complaining of this surreptitious practice during 20 these proceedings established this substantial harm. 21 IP Justice urges the copyright office, mindful 22 of the limitations of this rulemaking and its duty to users, 23 to declare proposed exemptions, enabling the lawful enjoyment 24 of music and restoring consumer freedoms. Thank you. 25 MS. PETERS: Thank you. Mr. Marks?

1 MR. MARKS: Good afternoon. My name is Steven 2 Marks and I'm senior vice president of Business and Legal 3 Affairs for the Recording Industry Association of America. 4 Thank you for the opportunity today to present the views of 5 the RIAA concerning the exemptions that have been proposed by 6 EFF, Public Knowledge, and IP Justice. 7 The proponents case for these exemptions boils 8 down to complaints of a few people that appear to stem from 9 technical incompatibilities, not access controls, relating to 10 a very few number of sound recordings. 11 These complaints do not support the exemption 12 that they request. The proponents themselves admit that their 13 complaints are not based on technical protection measures that 14 are access controls, thereby taking their claims outside the 15 scope of this proceeding. 16 The proponents have failed to present sufficient 17 evidence to support an exemption, even under the most lenient 18 of evidentiary burdens, let alone the extraordinary 19 circumstances that are required here. And the proposed 20 exemption is overbroad. 21 But before addressing these in detail, let me 22 first say a few words about the use of technical protection 23 measures by record companies. 24 Record companies are focused on providing access 25 to their music in as many ways as possible. They are in the

1 business of selling music, regardless of platform or delivery 2 channel, and are making music available in more formats than 3 ever before. Record companies would like to do this in a way 4 that is not susceptible to easy copying and widespread 5 distribution of further copies. 6 In light of the piracy that has devastated the 7 industry in recent years, through cutbacks in artist rosters, 8 lay-offs, retail store closings, some would say that CD copy 9 controls are necessary to ensure that the industry continue to 10 invest in new artists and continue to bring music to 11 consumers. This is consistent with Congressional intent of 12 the DMCA, to encourage copyright owners to continue to invest 13 in creative works. 14 Record companies understand, however, that 15 success depends upon their ability to make consumers happy and 16 to distribute recordings widely. They realize that locking up 17 content is not a solution. 18 CD copy protection technology is evolving 19 quickly and one can only speculate how market forces and 20 technological developments will affect the actual application 21 of technical protection measures to CD's. 22 The register of the Librarian should not, on the 23 basis of this speculation, grant an exemption that would deter 24 innovation and thwart efforts to control piracy, but should 25 instead allow the marketplace to work for the coming triennial

peri od.

Let me go through the individual reasons why the

-- substantively, why the exemptions should be denied. The

first is that the proponents simply failed to state a claim

for an exemption. The complaint, EFF's complaint, for

example, is about the purported malfunction of copy controls,

not access controls.

Indeed, EFF states that it does not believe that the technology that is the subject of the proposed exemption, quote, "effectively controls access to a work." Having denied an element of the case it is required to prove, EFF's claim should be rejected.

EFF proposes an exemption for copy-protected CD's that malfunction to prevent access, but the malfunction of a copy control does not convert it to an access control.

Moreover, EFF has presented no evidence that the copy control indeed malfunctioned.

IP Justice has requested an exemption for copying to different platforms or different devices. Aside from the fact that there is no right of access on all devices, as I will explain a little bit later, this proposed exemption is again about copying, not access, and therefore is outside the scope of the proceeding.

The proponents have also failed to identify the technologies with particularity, and to establish that they

1 have had or are likely to have substantial adverse effects on 2 use of a properly defined class of works. Instead, they have 3 asked for an exceptionally broad exemption, covering an entire 4 category of works identified in Section 102A of the copyright 5 act. They have also improperly included a broad swath of 6 diverse technical protection measures. 7 The Librarian should resist this invitation to 8 extrapolate alleged problems with some technologies to all 9 current and future technologies. 10 The proponent's exemption is also misguided in 11 that it is predicated on the assumption that users, or 12 consumers, have an unqualified right to access works on any 13 device of their choosing. The copyright office has found that 14 no such right exists, and that diminimus or isolated problems 15 or mere inconveniences do not justify an exemption. There is 16 nothing in the DMCA or the fair use doctrine that's intended 17 to ensure access to every work in every format. 18 Ensuring access on every device is simply not 19 the purpose of this rulemaking, either. The ability to make 20 non-infringing uses, even if not in the preferred or optimal 21 format, is sufficient to satisfy the statutory factor of the 22 availability for use of copyrighted works. 23 Let me take a minute to talk about the evidence 24 itself, of adverse effect, that has been presented by the 25 They have failed both to meet their burden that proponents.

1 today there is an adverse impact or that there is likely to be 2 one in the future. Focusing on the present, there have been 3 125,000 albums released in the last three years. 125,000, and 4 only nine have been released in the U.S. that have technical 5 protection measures. 6 Seven of those were by Universal Music Group, 7 all of them were prominently labeled. There were toll free 8 customer help telephone numbers and web sites. And the 9 complaints of those CD's, according to Universal, were from 10 less than one tenth of one percent of the CD's that were sold. 11 This is generally consistent with complaints about CD's that 12 are released that have no technical protection measures. 13 So that's seven of the nine. Another one was by 14 Music City Records. The tracks on that CD were made available 15 for downloading. 16 And then the final one was by a company called 17 Metropolis. There the CD was imported from Germany, was not a 18 U.S. release. It was an import from Germany. And 19 subsequently, Metropolis made a U.S. release without the 20 technical protection measures. 21 The reply comments identify 45 titles in those 22 Of these 45, 28 were not released in the U.S. with 23 copy or access controls. Four were not even CD's. Five were 24 foreign releases. Five were two vague for us to gather 25 evidence to determine which category they might fall in, and

181 1 only three of them contained any kind of technical protection 2 measure. 3 The complaints appear to simply be the result of 4 technical incompatibilities. Despite the sophistication of CD 5 technology, not every disk will play in every machine. That 6 may be regrettable, but it's certainly not the basis for an 7 exemption pursuant to this proceeding. 8 The proponent's have not alleged the problems 9 complained of were even commonplace for those CD's. As 10 mentioned on some of the ones that were sold by Universal, the 11 complaints were less than one tenth of one percent. The 12 incompatibilities or the defects could be from defects in 13 manufacturing, which are clearly not the basis of an 14 exemption. And there's generally no evidence that's been 15 presented that the problems with any of these CD's is any 16 greater than on CD's generally, without any such technical 17 protection measures. 18 The proponent's have also failed to establish 19 that there is likely to be a substantial adverse effect on 20 non-infringing uses. An exemption based on anticipated 21 adverse impact can be only in extraordinary circumstances, 22 where the evidence supporting the exemptions highly specific, 23 strong, and persuasive.

NEAL R. GROSS
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

impacts are more likely than not. Speculation, conjecture

They have failed to establish that adverse

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1 about new releases, are simply inefficient. 2 For example, EFF stated that no record company 3 had renounced technical protection measures. They have 4 presented quotes today, but it is speculation that any of the 5 technologies that may be used -- and we don't know what 6 technologies will be used -- how those technologies will work 7 at all. And again, those were based on copy controls, not 8 access controls, all of the statements. 9 Finally, the speculative allegations of harm are 10 vastly outweighed by the harm that would result from the 11 exemption. The recording industry has been devastated by 12 piracy, which has and will increasingly have an adverse effect 13 on the industry and diminish the ability of the industry to 14 develop new artists and produce new creative works. 15 An exemption of the extraordinary breadth sought 16 by the proponents could forestall the development of technical 17 protection measures for music, and preclude use of technology 18 to fight piracy. 19 As the office has recognized, exemptions are to 20 be made only in exceptional cases. And we believe the 21 proponents here have failed to meet that burden. 22 There were a couple of things that were 23

There were a couple of things that were mentioned additionally this morning that I'd like to respond to. Just picking up with some of the comments of IP Justice first.

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1 There is nothing, so far as we can tell, that 2 places a burden on the Librarian to seek out and favor 3 consumers in this proceeding. This proceeding was set up as a 4 fail-safe and the language from the manager's report and other 5 language specifically says that exemption should be found only 6 in extraordinary circumstances. 7 And therefore, the burdens that exist from the 8 last proceeding, you know, should exist, and we would say are 9 the right interpretation and are not a matter of favoring one 10 side over the other, but merely applying the letter of the 11 I aw. 12 I think the only other thing I would say on the 13 substantive comments that were raised with regard to copy 14 controls is again, that the statements about interference are 15 purely speculative at this point. There have only been nine 16 releases in the U.S. to date, to the extent that other 17 releases will be made in the future with some technical 18 protection measures, mainly copy controls, which again, are 19 not the subject of this proceeding. 20 It's simply theoretical, at this point, to say 21 that those copy controls somehow prevent access, even assuming 22 that that would be a proper jurisdiction for this proceeding. 23 There simply has been no showing that more likely than not, 24 that these types of non-infringement uses will exist. 25 I think I'll leave the rest of the comments for

1 (i ndi sti ngui shabl e). 2 MS. PETERS: Okay, thank you. Mr. Belinsky? 3 MR. BELINSKY: Thank you. Good afternoon. My 4 name is Mark Belinsky and I'm the senior vice president of the 5 music technology division of Macrovision Corporation. I'd 6 like to thank you and the copyright office for the opportunity 7 to be here today, and I'd also like to express my appreciation 8 from Macrovision as a company, being able to provide input to 9 these rulemaking proceedings, both today as well as tomorrow 10 as well, where our president, Bill Krepick, will be present. 11 From our perspective as a supplier of copy 12 protection and digital rights management technology to the 13 content industries: that is; film entertainment, software, 14 and music for more than 20 years; we think that more than 15 anything else, these hearings and indeed, the DMCA itself, are 16 about creating and maintaining a balance between the interests 17 of content creators and the users or consumers of that 18 content. 19 This is admittedly not a lawyer's perspective, 20 but more of a practical perspective, having been an honest 21 middleman between content providers and consumers for more 22 than 20 years. 23 As we enter the 21st century, to us, it becomes 24 very clear that the economic vitality of the U.S., our

country, is heavily dependent on knowledge, information, and

information technology industries.

According to a recent study that I think was quoted in one of the comments submitted for these hearings, the copyright industries alone in the U.S. generated \$535 billion of GDP and that excludes many other IP centric industries.

And when you look at the percentage of our citizenry that earns their living by creating, manufacturing, or distributing knowledge and information products and services, and also when you consider the investments required to create and distribute that knowledge and information, you can quickly come to the conclusion that the content creators' ability to get paid for their creative works is not only important but, indeed, fundamental to their very existence.

And by implication, we think fundamental to maintaining the high standard of living that we currently enjoy here in the U.S. as compared to many other countries.

Turning a bit more specifically to the topic of music copy protection and DRM, I think it's by now common knowledge, even to ordinary consumers, that recording artists and the music industry are suffering greatly from unauthorized reproduction and sharing of copyrighted music files.

I can't help but recall Johnny Cash's September 1997 testimony to the U.S. Congress when he and I both gave testimony for the Commerce Committee's DMCA hearings, about

how he was already personally experiencing this phenomenon, and that was more than five years ago.

I also think it's quite interesting to note that consumers today accept that when they buy "Shrek" or "Sweet Home Alabama" on DVD, or when they buy Madden Football from Electronic Arts, they don't have the ability to make copies for their friends.

We believe that the same assumption should apply to the latest music releases from Eminem, Avril Levine, or Madonna. Whether you measure the music industry's problem based on the overall declining music industry revenues, the thousands of jobs lost at record companies earlier this year, the bankruptcies of several music retailers, the decline in an average top selling album from 20 million units to 10 million units, or upon the number of music tracks available on file sharing services, like Rockster and Morpheus, it's pretty clear that the balance I described just a few moments ago has shifted to the point where content creators are not able, at least in the music industry, to reap the benefits of their creative works.

In fact, in the court of public opinion, it could be argued that many consumers believe copyrighted music is free for the asking or free for the taking. And from our perspective, this is precisely the kind of meltdown scenario that justifies policy initiatives, where government

1 establishes rules of engagement so an industry can continue to 2 provide valuable products and services to consumers, not to 3 mention provide employment to hundreds of thousands of people 4 in the process. 5 Juxtaposing the importance of the content 6 industries to the U.S. economy, with the growth and 7 development of the Internet as a distribution medium, we think 8 it becomes even more important to keep copyright laws strong, 9 and to take a narrow view and a very cautious view on granting 10 exemptions. 11 As has been pointed out in some of the 12 submissions leading up to this hearing, the music industry 13 has, over the past couple of years, begun deploying 14 technological prevention measures in connection with certain 15 of their sound recordings released on CD's, generally known as 16 copy-protected CD's. 17 The objective of these deployments, including 18 the CD's that are protected using Macrovision's technology, 19 has been to inhibit the unauthorized copying and file sharing 20 of music files, which has become almost commonplace over the 21 past several months, while at the same time maintaining 22 consumers' ability to listen to music on their CD players and 23 personal computers. 24 Up to this point, the general approach has been 25 to provide two versions of each music track on each CD, one of

which plays on hi-fi's, car stereos, and other garden variety CD players, and the other of which plays on personal computers.

Within the past few weeks, just within the past few weeks, Macrovision has announced a partnership with Microsoft which will enable the music industry to configure the second of these versions, the second session track, in music industry terminology, to allow consumers not only to listen to the music on their PC, but to rip the music to their computer's hard disk several times, and then to burn CD's and/or export the music to portable devices made by companies like Sonic Blue, Creative Labs, Compaq, Thompson, and others. Some of these very devices that one of the other folks just described as you might use to go jogging. We expect to see the first of these expanded capabilities CD's in the market in the fall of this year.

Because of our long history providing

commercially viable transparent copy protection and DRM

technologies to content toners, we at Macrovision believe we

have a rather unique perspective on how technological

prevention measures can be used to create healthy ecosystems

that serve, over the long term, the legitimate interests of

creators and consumers alike.

In reflecting on the 20 years we've been in the business, in particular supplying the film entertainment

industry with copy protection, and the ten-plus years we've been providing technological protection measures to the software industry, we believe quite strongly that the music industry is deploying technologies from Macrovision, but from others as well, which will over time recreate the balance between the interests of content creators and consumers.

In so doing, we believe that this will ensure that great music continues to be available to consumers and that great musicians and their marketing, distribution, and delivery partners are rewarded for their creative works and/or financial investments.

We also believe, in the context of these rulemaking proceedings, that decisions about exemptions to the prohibitions against circumvention should be made taking into account the big picture and with a long-term perspective.

As is the case we think in domains outside (indistinguishable) property and copyright protection, the policy path of least resistance in the short term rarely provides the best long term solution. And if we can agree that we're ultimately talking in a small part maybe, about the economic vitality of the whole U.S. economy, I think we can and will see our way clear to making, or perhaps avoiding, exemption decisions which ensure that the music industry can thrive over the coming decades, however it morphs, to the benefit of not only the industry, but the consumers as well.

1 During the Q and A session, I look forward to 2 answering any questions you might have that I can address, and 3 thanks again for the opportunity to be a part of these 4 heari ngs. 5 MS. PETERS: Thank you. I'll start by asking 6 two questions and then passing it on. These are for EFF. 7 Just want to make sure that I -- what you're saying. Are you 8 saying that if, in fact, you buy a CD, and it doesn't play on 9 a particular device, then you are taking the position that 10 that is malfunction of an access control? 11 MS. HINZE: Actually, our position is a little 12 bit more nuanced. We're taking the position that this is 13 actually a (indistinguishable), it's an access issue. But we 14 have actually stated in our comments that we don't -- we have 15 taken the position that, in terms of the technical definition 16 of effectively controlling accesses --17 MS. PETERS: You say it isn't? 18 MS. HINZE: Right. We do understand what that 19 definition says, and we're not taking the position that these 20 protection measures satisfy that definition. 21 But what we are saying is that the net effect, 22 from the point of view of a consumer, is that this is an 23 A consumer has purchased -- lawfully purchased access i ssue. 24 media, and is trying to play it and merely play it on a device 25 that has previously played this type of CD, and is making a

1 non-infringement use of the work. We think that is an access 2 issue, first and foremost, not a copy control issue. 3 My second point is that there is some legal 4 uncertainty in the legal community about whether or not 5 something that controls incidentally, controls access, even if 6 its primary purpose was intended to be a copy control, 7 actually falls within the prohibition in 1201(a)(1). So to 8 the extent there's uncertainty, there's a chilling effect, and 9 the chilling effect is quite large on consumers. 10 Consumers are the people who have purchased the 11 CD's and who want to make a lawful, non-infringing use of 12 their works, but they're not sure because of the scope of --13 they're not sure whether the scope of 1201(a)(1) will prevent 14 them from taking any measures to restore playability. 15 MS. PETERS: Let me just -- let me ask you, Ms. 16 Do you agree with what she just said? Gross. 17 MS. GROSS: Yes. 18 MS. PETERS: So that is your position too? 19 MS. GROSS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I was 20 writing something down. Could you please ask me what it is 21 I'm supposed to be agreeing or disagreeing with? 22 MS. PETERS: What I really was, which I didn't 23 pick up all the nuances, what I had said, which I've just been 24 told is not accurate, and I was checking out to see if you 25 agreed it was not accurate or you had a different position,

1	was that when was it true that whenever someone bought a CD
2	that basically had a copy control on it but was put in a
3	certain playback device such that it wouldn't play, that that
4	was considered a malfunctioning access control?
5	MS. GROSS: I think it's even broader than that.
6	I think it's designed not to play in particular devices.
7	There was a report last September on CNN about a Celine Dion
8	CD that is designed to crash your computer if you try to play
9	it. So if you want to call that a malfunction, that's fine,
10	but I think it is designed to malfunction in that case.
11	MS. PETERS: But it was really whether or not it
12	was an access control.
13	MS. GROSS: It's absolutely an access control.
14	It is an access control that may double as a copy protection,
15	but it does both goals. It has both functions of denying
16	access and denying copying. So you could talk about it as
17	either one.
18	MS. PETERS: Now, let me go back to EFF. Based
19	on what you said, what extent does labeling Mr. Marks
20	basically pointed out that seven, seven Universal copy-
21	protected CD's that were limited with regard to where they
22	could be played. To what extent dos the label respond to your
23	concern for consumers?
24	MS. HINZE: The first thing I'd like to say is
25	that if the experience that EFF has had in using or trying to
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1 use some of the label copy-protected CD's is anything to go 2 by, it is direct evidence. We have tried this on a number of 3 different systems. 4 The labeling isn't, in fact, accurate. It's 5 certainly -- for instance, if I take the example of the 6 Madonna CD here, it's a very small logo. I'd be happy to pass 7 this around for the copyright office panel to have a closer 8 But it doesn't actually indicate the presence of copy 9 protection. I It's a little logo. It doesn't actually say, 10 "copy-protected." 11 So, for instance, from the point of view of a 12 consumer who purchases one of these, unless you actually know 13 that that symbol means "copy-protected", you're going to be in 14 the position, as a consumer, of having bought this, and having 15 opened the packaging from Tower or wherever you've bought it, 16 and not knowing that that's a copy-protected CD. So I would 17 say that labeling is part of -- obviously part of the issue 18 here, but the effectiveness of the labeling and what the 19 labeling says is obviously an important point. 20 My second point on, I guess on a more 21 fundamental level, is that I actually don't think that, by 22 itself, labeling will address the nature of the harm that EFF 23 is attempting to cover by requesting the exemption we've 24 sought. 25 Even if something is labeled as copy-protected,

1	and even if the labeling were accurate, which I think it
2	hasn't been to date, then there's still a situation where a
3	consumer cannot actually play something that they have
4	lawfully purchased. And
5	MS. PETERS: But if the labeling were clear,
6	that it wouldn't work on their playback device?
7	MS. HINZE: I think then it might we'd have
8	to look at that a little more closely. I think that if that
9	were the case, I know as a specific statement about what
10	things that people can play it on, and what things they can't
11	play it on, then to the extent that consumers would not be put
12	on notice. That part of the harm would be dealt with.
13	I guess the other part of the harm in a more
14	metaphysical level that wouldn't be dealt with, is if there
15	if there's no other format
16	for a consumer to access that particular work on.
17	MS. PETERS: I agree with that. Let's go back
18	to you, Mr. Marks, and labeling. Universal put out seven.
19	You said they were labels. They got less than one tenth of
20	one percent with regard to having any complaints or issues.
21	Is what's on that record what the label is that the label
22	that's used by Universal?
23	MR. MARKS: Well, I don't believe that's a U.S.
24	rel ease.
25	MS. PETERS: Oh.
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1	MR. MARKS: Our understanding from Warner is
2	that the Madonna CD was not released in the U.S. with copy
3	protection. It's a foreign release.
4	MR. BUCHOLZ: It was purchased in the east
5	village of New York City.
6	MR. MARKS: Well, (indistinguishable) you know,
7	could have been imported.
8	MR. BUCHOLZ: Absolutely.
9	MR. MARKS: That doesn't mean it's a U.S.
10	rel ease. So
11	MS. PETERS: Well, maybe you could tell us.
12	MR. MARKS: I'm not familiar with that
13	particular label.
14	MS. PETERS: Well, but you could tell us, do you
15	know what the label is that's on the Universal releases?
16	MR. MARKS: I can try and see if I have the
17	Universal one. I think that different countries use different
18	I abel s.
19	MS. PETERS: You don't have to even that.
20	Just what's the general gist of what people say when
21	MR. MARKS: Here is one that's a Universal
22	release that's pretty prominent. Let's see that. That's the
23	size of it.
24	MS. PETERS: Okay.
25	MR. MARKS: Okay? It says,
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1	"This CD is protected against unauthorized
2	copying. It is designed to play in standard audio CD players
3	and in computers running a Windows operating system. However,
4	playback problems may be experienced. If you experience
5	playback problems, return this disk for a refund."
6	And there's no standard for labeling.
7	MS. PETERS: But there are I mean, there are
8	two bills that are pending before Congress that would deal
9	with labeling.
10	MR. MARKS: Right. And I think the labeling is
11	not the issue here. I mean the issue here, again, is access
12	controls and
13	MS. PETERS: I agree; I agree. My let me go
14	back over to this from (indistinguishable). Is your position
15	that a consumer basically has a right to buy a CD and play it
16	on any device?
17	MS. GROSS: Yes, that is my position, that if
18	they buy a CD, they do have a right to access that CD on
19	whatever device they choose. That is a different statement
20	from saying copyright holders must ensure access. That
21	copyright holders must make sure that they can provide for
22	entrap-ability.
23	MS. PETERS: Where do they get this right?
24	MS. GROSS: Because they have purchased it.
25	They own it. It is their property. It's pretty elementary.

1	When you buy something, it is yours to do with as you wish as
2	long as you don't violate the other provisions of the
3	copyri ght.
4	MS. PETERS: But here, you're actually making a
5	copy. Right? In order
6	MS. GROSS: What do you mean?
7	MS. PETERS: If you buy it in one format and it
8	doesn't play on what you want, in order to play it, don't you
9	have to make a copy?
10	MS. GROSS: I'm not sure that you would have to.
11	You would put it in your homemade CD player and I don't know
12	that it would make a copy. It might just play it.
13	MS. PETERS: (Indistinguishable) where you
14	thought the consumer had a right to do anything to make it
15	pl ay?
16	MS. GROSS: I assume
17	MS. PETERS: Like with regard to videos, if it's
18	in a PAL format or CCAM format, you really do have to make
19	another copy. But maybe over here they don't. Right.
20	MS. GROSS: But even if they did make even if
21	they did have to make that copy in order to make that, in
22	order to play it, they're still within their rights. I mean
23	we have a right to make a personal use copy of something if we
24	need to in order to access that material.
25	MS. PETERS: Where does this come from?
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1	MS. GROSS: Fair use. Personal use.	
2	MS. PETERS: Great. So that's your	
3	i nterpretati on?	
4	MS. GROSS: That is my interpretation,	
5	absol utel y.	
6	MS. PETERS: Yes?	
7	MS. HINZE: I'd like to just make a comment if I	
8	may.	
9	MS. PETERS: Sure.	
10	MS. HINZE: Two things. One, I'd like to answer	
11	one particular way that you might be able to, for instance,	
12	restore the playability of one of these CD's. In EFF's	
13	comments, in our detailed comments we submitted in December,	
14	we attached a paper by, as I said, Princeton researcher John	
15	Alexander Halderman. That's a quite a technical paper from a	
16	computer scientist, and he actually has conducted a series of	
17	tests on three different types of copy-protected CD's.	
18	He talks about two mechanisms that might be used	
19	in order he actually did some of this work as part of the	
20	task of researching on what particular drives and what	
21	particular operating systems, Windows 95 or Windows 98 Windows	
22	2000	
23	MS. PETERS: Um-hmm.	
24	MS. GROSS: and what particular CD ROM drive	
25	things would fail. In order to make some of the multi-section	
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1 disks actually function, he did some testing with two -- with 2 one particular type of mechanism. He put masking tape, as I 3 understand it, to cover the second section on the disk so that 4 the CD player was able to read the table of contents on the 5 second section and play the material. 6 Again, the paper is actually quite informative 7 about the nature of this technology such that information was 8 available. And what one of the things that comes out of the 9 paper is that how copy protection works on any given CD player 10 or any playback device is specific to each particular playback 11 devi ce. 12 So, in response to earlier question about 13 labeling, I guess I would like to point out that it would be 14 extremely difficult, based on my understanding of what is in 15 that paper from a technical point of view, to actually be able 16 to specify on what devices something will not play. 17 So while you say this -- this instance, this is 18 instructive, but Madonna's CD includes a statement that this 19 will actually play on MAC O/S, MAC operating system, and on 20 Windows players. The reason it was discovered to be copy-21 protected was because it didn't play on the MAC player. 22 So to the extent that labeling may go some of 23 the way to addressing consumer awareness of the particular 24 issue, there are technical limits, set limitations about what 25 a label can actually say to put consumers fully on notice of

1	the harm that they are about to experience.
2	MS. PETERS: Okay. I actually went to labeling
3	because one of the comments suggested narrowing the category,
4	if in fact, it would not be you couldn't circumvent, if, in
5	fact, there was a clear statement with regard to what it would
6	and wouldn't play on. That's what I based it. I apologize.
7	I will read this. It was not attached to my copy.
8	MS. HINZE: The other thing I'd like to do is
9	point out in terms of another popular way of, as I understand
10	it, that people have been restoring the playability of these
11	disks where they don't play, is by using a felt tip marker. A
12	felt tip marker and masking tape
13	MS. PETERS: Yes, yes. They work well.
14	MS. HINZE: Apparently, they work quite well and
15	they wouldn't, of course, violate the
16	MR. BUCHOLZ: The tools provision.
17	MS. HINZE: The tools provision in 1201(a)(2).
18	So there are ways available to consumers to restore
19	playability such that circumvention would not necessarily
20	such that consumers could do that without violating one of the
21	other provisions in the DMCA.
22	MS. GROSS: Could I just follow up quickly, also
23	with another indication that consumers have a right to listen
24	to the CD that they purchased, which is very clear in the
25	copyright act that the control over the performance by the
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1 copyright holders is with respect to the public performance. 2 The private performance, when I'm at home, and I 3 want to play it on whatever device that I choose, that is 4 explicitly outside of their control. It is not a public 5 performance. It is a private performance. It is reserved for 6 the individual. 7 MS. PETERS: Yes. 8 MR. MARKS: Could I make a few comments? 9 MS. PETERS: Yes. 10 MR. MARKS: Picking up with the last one, I 11 think there's a fundamental difference between what is 12 actionable as an infringement and what is a right of the 13 consumer. And as our comments that we filed cited several 14 legal opinions, saying clearly that the law is not that there 15 is a right of a consumer to play on whatever device they want. 16 I can't buy a CD, for example, and put it into a cassette 17 player. I mean, that's akin --18 It's really the same issue. I think that -- you 19 know, that one thing that is dangerous, and I think also 20 inappropriate, is to talk generally about copy protection as 21 though it is all the same. 22 It is not. There are different technologies. 23 There's been different technologies that have been used to 24 date, there are going to be different technologies that will 25 be used in the future. And that, I think, is one of the

1 infirmities of the proposal on, from the EFF, and IP Justice, 2 is that there -- it does not specify any particular technology 3 that is an access control. 4 Even setting aside the, "it's a copy control, 5 not an access control," even assuming we could get by that 6 issue, it just broadly sedates all CD copy control, and that 7 is what is so potentially harmful going forward of the 8 exemption, because far from the chilling effect that was cited 9 by EFF and IP Justice, the chilling effect will indeed be on 10 the ability of record labels and technology companies to 11 provide for what they deem to be appropriate and workable copy 12 protection in the future, so that they can make available, you 13 know, works on a going forward basis and, you know, fulfill 14 the intent of Congress passing DMCA to continue to make music 15 avai I abl e. 16 MS. PETERS: Okay. Thank you. 17 MR. CARSON: Mr. Marks, let's go back to the 18 first comment you made about there being no consumer right to 19 play a CD, for example, on any device they want to. Let's 20 look at it another way. 21 Let's say there is a CD that has an access 22 control on it that prevents you from playing it on a personal 23 computer, just for example. Let's say Ms. Gross takes it and 24 try to figures out how to make it play on her personal

computer, even though the intent of the copyright owner was

1	that it shouldn't play on that personal computer. When she
2	does that, is she engaging in an act of infringement?
3	MR. MARKS: I think it is a she's
4	circumventing under 1201(a). MR. CARSON: Okay.
5	Yeah, I think that's probably true but that wasn't the
6	question. Is she engaging in an act of infringement?
7	MR. MARKS: Is she engaging in an act of
8	infringement by accessing? I think that the I think it's a
9	1201 issue, and probably not an infringement issue.
10	MR. CARSON: She's making a non-infringing use
11	of the work itself?
12	MR. MARKS: Right.
13	MR. CARSON: Okay.
14	MR. MARKS: Because it's an access, not a copy
15	or a distribution or something.
16	MR. CARSON: Right. So in that case, the
17	technological measure that restricts her access to the work,
18	is in fact adversely affecting her ability to make an non-
19	infringing use of the work, is that correct?
20	MR. MARKS: It may I don't know whether it's
21	an adverse impact.
22	MR. CARSON: She can't do it. she can't make the
23	non-i nfri ngi ng use.
24	MR. MARKS: She may be able to make a non-
25	infringing use by getting the music in another form.
	I control of the second of the

2 non-infringing use she is trying to make, what	o the particular
	your accepting
is a non-infringing use, she has been adversel	y affected in
4 her ability to do that by virtue of the prohib	ition on
5 circumvention.	
6 MR. MARKS: I'm just I'm n	ot sure I don't
7 think that that's the test.	
8 MR. CARSON: Maybe it isn't. I	m just asking the
9 question and we'll figure what it means later	on. I just want
10 to know.	
11 MR. MARKS: You know, I'm i	t's a
hypothetical, I'm not sure, as I just haven't	thought about it
in those terms because I don't think that's th	ne test that
governs out (indistinguishable).	
15 MR. CARSON: Okay, we'll think	about it and you
can get back to us on that one. You know, one	e thing I'm not
can get back to us on that one. You know, one entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that	•
	in some cases
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that	in some cases with the intent
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that record companies are, in fact, marketing CD's	in some cases with the intent
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that record companies are, in fact, marketing CD's that those CD's cannot be played on certain ki	in some cases with the intent nds of devices
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that record companies are, in fact, marketing CD's that those CD's cannot be played on certain ki that consumers do use to play CD's on?	in some cases with the intent nds of devices ou just repeat?
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that record companies are, in fact, marketing CD's that those CD's cannot be played on certain ki that consumers do use to play CD's on? MR. MARKS: I'm sorry, could you MR. CARSON: Yeah. Is it your	in some cases with the intent nds of devices ou just repeat? understanding that
entirely clear on. Is it your testimony that record companies are, in fact, marketing CD's that those CD's cannot be played on certain ki that consumers do use to play CD's on? MR. MARKS: I'm sorry, could you MR. CARSON: Yeah. Is it your	in some cases with the intent nds of devices ou just repeat? understanding that marketing some

1	MR. MARKS: Not my understanding. They I
2	think that from the label, for example, that I just read, it
3	said it may not play. I don't know whether that's the
4	equivalent of an intent that it not play. I do think that, in
5	the future, there may be so-called hybrid disks that have
6	different sessions. One session is playable on one type of
7	device, and another session is playable on another type of
8	devi ce.
9	MR. CARSON: Is it that you truly don't know
10	whether that's the intent, or is it that, in fact, it's not
11	the intent, but it may be an unintended side effect. Do you
12	know the answer to that, or is it just you don't know?
13	MR. MARKS: That what's the unintended side
14	effect?
15	MR. CARSON: That it can't play on certain
16	devi ces.
17	MR. MARKS: It well, you know, again, it's
18	I'm not sure unintended side effect as a result of a problem
19	with the well that's being used is a problem with the machine
20	that's being used, not necessarily a problem with the copy
21	control. Again, this is copy control, not access control, but
22	
23	MR. CARSON: Um-hmm.
24	MR. MARKS: but what EFF and IP Justice have
25	done is just presume that there was a malfunction of the copy

1	control, even setting aside the copy control access control
2	issue. Yet there isn't any proof that that's the case, that
3	there is a malfunction. And that's what makes this very
4	different from the dongle exemption last time around. I mean
5	not only was that specifically an access control, but it was
6	specifically a malfunction.
7	Here, there's no evidence at all that it's a
8	malfunction. It may just be of that technical
9	protection measure. It may just be a technical
10	incompatibility between, you know, the well in that
11	machine, or the operating system on that machine and
12	the disk.
13	MR. CARSON: Okay. So I gather you can't say
14	whether any record companies are actually marketing CD's that
15	they intend not be played on certain devices. You just don't
16	know the answer to that?
17	MR. MARKS: I don't know the answer to that
18	right now.
19	MR. CARSON: Okay. And that (indistinguishable)
20	the information you can get back to us?
21	MR. MARKS: Yeah.
22	MR. CARSON: Okay, I think I've got my two
23	questions, at least some of (indistinguishable).
24	MS. HINZE: Might I just
25	MS. PETERS: Did you want
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1 MR. CARSON: Oh, I'm sorry, someone wanted to 2 respond to that, yeah. 3 MS. HINZE: I wouldn't mind responding to that 4 now before we go onto other areas. 5 MS. PETERS: Yeah. Sure. 6 MS. HINZE: What I've just heard 7 is a statement that seems a little inconsistent. On the one 8 hand, I've heard that a problem with playback -- I've heard a 9 disconnect between intent and malfunction, and what I would 10 like to say is it seems to us, as untrained technologists and 11 you're paying all the trained technologists who wrote the 12 paper that I have cited in our comments, that these 13 mal functions were unintended. 14 And in any event, they are malfunctions purely 15 because what is happening at the time when a disk is not 16 playing, in many cases, for instance, in the case of a multi-17 section CD what is happening is that there are two formats of 18 content on a disk. One is a protective format, and one's an 19 unprotected format. And the error, if you were to put it in 20 those terms, that the user, consumer experiences when 21 something doesn't play is a substitution error. 22 There has been a problem with substituting 23 cleanly the material that was intended to be -- apparently 24 intended to be substituted in place of the unprotected 25 material. That looks like a malfunction. I can't think of

any other reason why.

For instance, it would be the case that you would see a disk that plays on one type of device, meaning a Windows 2000 machine, and similar type of computer running a Windows 98 operating system, would experience a malfunction.

To the extent that there's that much variation between the nature of the errors that have been experienced on a drive by drive basis, and an operating by system by operating system basis. It -- common sense would seem to dictate that it is not the intent of the copyright owner, in that particular situation, to prevent the music from playing in some format.

And what is happening is a malfunction of the technology.

Now I'm not technologically enough aware to know particularly where in the chain of playback or table of contents areas or just whether it's an area being introduced into the sub-channel data with -- channel pay sub-data. I think that's -- that little detail is something that the copyright office might be able to glean from reading the papers that I've referenced.

And I would also draw the copyright office's attention to the table that's annexed to that, which gives a listing of the types of particular drives and the particular operating systems that the tests were done on. And it becomes apparent when you look at that, the unintended nature of the malfunctioning, and the reason that's malfunctioning because

it's a very inconsistent pattern of non-display of material or non-playback of material.

MR. MARKS: I think my point was just that the malfunction -- you can't make the leap that it is the technology that is malfunctioning, that the technical protection measure that is malfunctioning. It could be due to an incompatibility. And you know, so that was really just my point.

You know, the question is whether is there a malfunction in the TPM? Not clear that there is. There is no evidence that there is. It may be. It may be functioning entirely properly as an entire different reason that there is playback difficulty. I mean this is one of the -- this also gets back to the point of, you know, the danger of talking generally when there are different technologies out there.

Some of the technologies that may have been addressed in an article may no longer be used. They may have been used on one disk. Out of 125,000 that were released, there were only nine. It may have been used one time on one of those nine disks and may never be used again.

Clearly, you know, that nine out of 125,000 or that use of that one technology, you know, can't rise to the level of an exemption under the, you know, in this proceeding. And in terms of the future, it's speculative as to what technologies will be used and how those technologies actually

1	work. And therefore, there's simply no way for the burden of
2	it's more likely than not for an adverse impact to result.
3	There's just simply no way for that to be met.
4	MS. HINZE: I'd also be happy to address that
5	now but I appreciate that this is the prerogative for the
6	copyright office to direct questions.
7	MR. CARSON: We've got time here.
8	MS. PETERS: We've got time, yes.
9	MS. HINZE: I've heard so far that proof that
10	sounds to me like we have a clear statement of agreement on
11	the grounds that there are copy-protected CD's that are
12	currently in existence in the United States. The first time,
13	I might add, I've now heard that there are, in fact, nine
14	titles that have been released in the United States so I'm
15	happy to have some quantification at long last. I think the
16	relevant point from a point of view of assessing the nature of
17	the harm here is twofold.
18	First, it's not just the fact that there are
19	nine titles that have copy protection, it's the number of the
20	titles, the number of units of those titles that are in
21	distribution that would give a better sense of the qualitative
22	I'm sorry the quantitative harm that may be experienced
23	by consumers.
24	I'd also like to point out that to the extent
25	that there are copy-protected CD's in the United States that
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are not U.S. releases, whatever that means, such as the Donner CD. And I've also got a CD that I, myself, came across that has copy protection on it. Yes, it's labeled, but it doesn't play, and it's not a Universal release to the extent that there are a number of other non-U.S. released copy-protected CD's out there.

I would hesitate to limit myself to believing that the only number of copy-protected CD's in the United States are "X" number of units times nine titles. If my experience is anything to go by, and I think it's direct, firsthand experience, the number of copy-protected CD's currently in the United States is actually larger than I think we're getting a glimpse of this afternoon.

The second thing I'd like to point out in terms of an assessment of harm is the nature of the harm for the consumer. The consumer has lawfully acquired this particular packaging, and this particular plastic device, and has an enormity of expectation that they're going to be able to play something that they have played on a CD player, their car, MP3 CD player before, that they previously played it on a DVD player, none of which have any capability for reproducing. So there's no sense in which the consumer is -- the case varies -- if she was intending to get a benefit by trying to make a copy. All they're attempting to do, when they're trying to play this type of material, is play it. And they have a good

(indistinguishable) expectation for expecting that this will actually play in their devices.

What we're asking for is a limited exemption for a playback, and it's quite an appropriate thing for consumers

a playback, and it's quite an appropriate thing for consumers to expect that they will be able to play this type of plastic disk, whether it's a CD in a (indistinguishable) format or not, for the purposes of audio standards. They had a reasonable expectation that they ought be able to play it based on their 20 years of using CD's.

It's not the case where a consumer is putting a CD into any toaster or a cassette player. The actual real situation is someone putting something into a device where they can reasonably expect that there will be playback.

MR. MARKS: I have a couple of quick ones. On the quantitative issue, you know, the only thing that I can give you quantitatively was what Universal told us about some of the nine releases, and that was less than one tenth of one percent in complaints, so I would say that there really is no quantitative evidence.

And the evidence that was presented in terms of all these other disks above the nine, you know, again, there were 45 that were referenced in the replies, and only three of the 45 had any kind of technical protection measure. And then finally, just to get back to the very first point, which I think is still the most important point, and that is these are

copy controls, not access controls and therefore, outside the
scope of this proceeding.
MR. CARSON: Isn't it good enough for you? He's
saying the copy control, not access control.
MS. HINZE: Well
MR. CARSON: Does he have to say anything more.
MR. MARKS: No, what I'm saying is that the
allegation is
MS. GROSS: (Indistinguishable) for trying to
access it, so that sounds like an access control issue.
MR. MARKS: The technical no, you just I
thought before, in response to the question, I've got it in
my notes it's an access issue. We would agree it's not a
access technical protection measure. I'm not here to say that
any particular technology is a copy control versus something
else. All I'm saying is that the proponents have said
themselves that they're copy controls, and that's
MS. GROSS: In addition to being access control.
We're saying they're both.
MS. HINZE: I think there is actually a
di fference.
MS. PETERS: There's a difference of opinion;
ri ght.
MR. CARSON: There is a difference, right. It
means different things to different people.

1	MS. HINZE: But I guess I would like to ask if
2	the RIAA would be prepared to make a statement to the effect
3	that these, for all intents and purposes, will be considered
4	copy protection, access measures are only copy protection
5	technological protection measures, and if we perhaps were to
6	get a statement from the RIAA, if they would be happy to let
7	us know that they won't take legal action against the
8	consumers for a violation of 1201(a)(1).
9	Then, you know, I think as I said in my opening
10	statement and if that was made clear in it's submission, we
11	would be prepared to be happy to go home at that point.
12	The point from the consumer point of view is
13	that it's not so clear cut. And to the extent there's a
14	chilling effect on consumers, what are consumers supposed to
15	do? They've bought a CD, they're not sure what they can do
16	with it. They've (indistinguishable) but they can't play it.
17	Are they breaking 1201(a)(1)(indistinguishable)?
18	MR. MARKS: I'm sure they could play it in their
19	audio CD player. There's no question about that.
50	MS. HINZE: And what about
21	MR. MARKS: As much as I would love to give you
22	that assurance, I just can't. And the reason for that is that
23	we don't you know, we're not here to evaluate certain
24	technologies, and most certain technologies is, you know, is
25	addressed as part of the exemptions.

1 MS. PETERS: She's just leaped on) the fact that 2 you said copy. 3 MR. CARSON: (Indistinguishable) go 4 ahead. 5 MR. BELINSKY: Yeah, thanks. I'd just like to 6 add something on the general notion of formats. And that is 7 that I think we're starting to enter a period where there will 8 be -- forget copy protection and access controls just for a 9 second. 10 There will be multiple formats that physically 11 look exactly like the CD that you saw over there. There's 12 already the super audio CD, there's the DVD audio, there's 13 going to be DVD 9, there's DVD blue laser. In the electronic 14 world, there's the WMA format from Microsoft, there's MP3, 15 Apple's new service uses AAC. 16 And I think that, juxtaposed with the broader 17 availability and broader capabilities for consumers to get 18 access to copyrighted works, I think over the next -- from 19 where we sit, technologists perspective -- over the next three 20 to five years, there will be a multiplicity of data and 21 content formats that will, just as more content is coming 22 available, it will, I think, render the notion that any 23 physical item that is five inches in diameter can be plugged 24 into any particular player. 25 That notion is not going hold true for the next

1	three to five years, I think. And that, to me, is just what
2	you see when you go into a period of rapid technological
3	innovation, is you have a format differences and file size
4	differences, etcetera, and then eventually things shake out
5	again in the next period of stability, like we've just been
6	through a period of stability in the CD format, let's say, for
7	the last 15 years, where a CD is a CD is a CD. Now things are
8	starting to morph again, and that is ultimately to consumers'
9	benefit, but there's some thrashing that goes along, goes
10	around in the interim period.
11	MR. CARSON: Let's pause here on that then. Are
12	you talking purely about an abundance of new and different,
13	and sometimes incompatible formats?
14	MR. BELINSKY: Yes.
15	MR. CARSON: Or in connection with that, will
15 16	MR. CARSON: Or in connection with that, will there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow
16	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow
16 17	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow some of those that will prevent something that is a new
16 17 18	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow some of those that will prevent something that is a new format, for example, from being accessed on the standard CD
16 17 18 19	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow some of those that will prevent something that is a new format, for example, from being accessed on the standard CD player?
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow some of those that will prevent something that is a new format, for example, from being accessed on the standard CD player? MR. BELINSKY: My comment was solely related to the fact that new formats are going to proliferate. MR. CARSON: So you're not you're not
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	there sometimes be technological protection measures to allow some of those that will prevent something that is a new format, for example, from being accessed on the standard CD player? MR. BELINSKY: My comment was solely related to the fact that new formats are going to proliferate. MR. CARSON: So you're not you're not foreseeing that on top of that, there will be any kind of

1	MR. BELINSKY: Not necessarily, no. I mean, from
2	where we sit, we don't make those decisions. So you know,
3	it's
4	MR. CARSON: You're not part of the process
5	(i ndi sti ngui shabl e).
6	MR. BELINSKY: (Indistinguishable) decides,
7	what business rules, policies, etcetera.
8	MR. MARKS: And I would just go back to one of
9	the first statements I made, which is that record companies
10	want to sell music and they don't want to lock up their
11	content, they want to provide access. Otherwise, they don't
12	have a business because there are certain consumer
13	expectations and you want to sell something that the
14	consumer's going to be happy with.
15	MS. PETERS: Okay, what about Steve?
16	MR. TEPP: Thank you. Mr. Belinsky, you
17	mentioned in your opening statement, the second session, and
18	we've had a little discussion of that previous panel
19	discussing related issues back in Washington. I'm still a
20	little confused as to what functionality the second section
21	gives consumers. So, can you help me out by telling me what
22	can a consumer do with the second section that they can't do
23	with the first section?
24	MR. BELINSKY: Okay. The second section is in a
25	format and has extra information as part of it that

1 essentially allows the consumer to play the music on a PC. So 2 when you put a CD into a personal computer and you listen to 3 the music, you're listening to the music from the quote, 4 unquote, second section files. 5 MR. TEPP: Yeah. 6 MR. BELINSKY: So it's, it's what gives a copy-7 protected CD the ability to play music on a personal computer. 8 It's just that it's another aspect of the overall technology 9 used to produce a copy-protected CD that inhibits copying and 10 file sharing and by the same token, allows the consumer to 11 listen to the music on personal computers as compared to 12 garden variety CD players, like stereo systems, boom boxes, 13 you know, CD Walkman's, that sort of thing. 14 MR. TEPP: Thank you. So let me jump back to 15 this side and say, do you -- Mr. Belinsky says even when the 16 first section is protected, you've got the second section, you 17 can play on your PC. Does that solve your problem or do you 18 have some disagreement with the way he's described the 19 real i ty? 20 MS. HINZE: What I understand is actually 21 happening when people are experiencing playback errors is that 22 substitution is not actually taking place. 23 So for whatever reason, whether you call it a 24 technical incompatibility or a malfunctioning and copy 25 protection, technological protection measure -- I'll leave

1 that issue to one side -- the point is that that substitution 2 is not actually happening. 3 That may have been the intent on the designers 4 to copy protection technology, but where it doesn't playback, 5 what is happening is that for whatever reason, consumers are 6 not actually getting access to that second section. And the 7 exemption that EFF has sought would allow consumers to do 8 that, whether it be by -- for instance, I don't want to 9 speculate as to what consumers might be able to do -- but for 10 instance, consumers might be able to do exactly that and get 11 access to the second section where the particular copy 12 protection technology fails on their particular consumer 13 playback device by, for instance, using a felt tip marker or 14 some other way of restoring the playability. 15 MR. MARKS: Mr. Tepp? 16 MR. TEPP: Please. 17 MR. MARKS: The thing that may help clear up the 18 confusion on this is that, I think what Mr. Belinsky is 19 talking about in terms of disks that may have two sections may 20 not be the same thing as David holding up those audio disks 21 that may only have one section on them. So they're two 22 different products, potentially, that I think is causing some 23 of the confusion. 24 MR. TEPP: Okay. All right. Thank you both. 25 MS. HINZE: Just to That does clear it up for me.

1 clarify, my comments were respective of a multi-section disk, 2 and when I -- as I said, that consumers may be able to access 3 to first section on that disk, the one that they would not --4 otherwise not be able to see for reasons of malfunction. I 5 was actually specifically addressing, as I understand it, the 6 type of Macrovision copy protection technology that involves 7 multi-section format, apparently CD's. 8 MR. TEPP: Okay, thank you. So let me come back 9 to this side for a minute, and it sounds like, from the 10 description you've given at least with regard to the dual 11 section disks that there is an intent to let consumers play 12 the music on any device they choose. 13 MR. BELINSKY: Absolutely. 14 MR. TEPP: Within reason, not toasters. If 15 that's the case, what harm would there be in letting them deal 16 with some sort of technical issues that arise 17 (indistinguishable) those qualified as 1201(a)(1) violations 18 we can't seem to get agreement on today, but what harm arises 19 to your industry if there's an exemption that makes it clear 20 they're allowed to do what it sounds like you were willing to 21 let them do in the first place? 22 MR. BELINSKY: I think, from our perspective, 23 looking across multiple content industries and being a 24 technology supplier, it opens up the door for folks to do that 25 on a large scale and then content becomes available on the

1 Internet at no charge. And it has the long term result of 2 damaging, if not decimating, not only the music industry, but 3 the movie industry, the software industry, the pharmaceuticals 4 industry. 5 If an ecosystem can't be created, and I think to 6 create it requires some assistance, particularly in today's 7 technological age, from government, then you could end up 8 doing substantial damage to every creator's ability to profit 9 from their creation and then the investment cycle falls apart 10 and you don't get nearly as good a music video, prescription 11 drugs, semi-conductors, as you're currently getting today, or 12 you attenuate the progression of those developments. That's 13 what's -- that would be our perspective. 14 MR. MARKS: I think the harm is also that what 15 we're talking about and the nature of the question by itself 16 is something hypothetical, something in the future, something 17 that's speculative. There's been no evidence presented that 18 there's been anything more than the diminimus problems with 19 certain technologies, and the proposed exemption is for 20 something much broader that would encompass all technologies 21 that have so-called copy protection, technical protection 22 measures. 23 And I think the harm to the industry is that by 24 doing that, you are stifling the ability potentially to use

appropriate technical protection measures, technical

1	protection measures that Congress, you know, envisioned, and
2	encouraged, as result of the DMCA. Because it's we're not
3	talking about a you know, any specific technology here that
4	is actually causing harm, it just doesn't exist in this
5	record, and therefore, you know, having an exemption that
6	covered all potential technologies is problematic and harmful,
7	and that would interfere with the ability to actually
8	institute certain types of technical protection measures
9	because we don't know today how they will work.
10	MR. TEPP: Okay, did you have one last question?
11	I'm sorry, go ahead.
12	MS. HINZE: I thought it might be appropriate to
13	respond while we're on this topic. I wanted to make two
14	poi nts.
15	First, the first one is to address the statement
16	that we've sought a really broad exemption, and that it would
17	cover a whole range of technologies. Actually, our exemption
18	is quite narrow, in that I want to point out a couple of
19	features.
20	Our exemption only covers copy-protected CD's
21	that malfunction and prevent access. To the extent that they
22	work and they work now, or in the future, whatever the
23	technologies are, then they would not be caught by the scope
24	of our exemption. Our exemption, as I said, will only catch
25	things that are malfunctioning. So I would actually

223 1 characterize it as a narrow, not a broad exemption. 2 Secondly, incidentally point out that the 3 statement that we have not provided any information about the 4 technologies at issue is perhaps a little bit of a 5 mischaracterization of the comments that EFF filed in 6 December. 7 EFF listed the four types of copy protection 8 that we are aware about from publicly available information 9 that it's currently being used, Macrovision made available to 10 that timeless or separate entity, SunnComm and TTR. We've 11 also mentioned Sony's K2 audio system. We have made best 12 endeavors to obtain information about each of those 13 technologies. (Indistinguishable) in the case of with 14 Macrovision, SunnComm's media clock, and as I said, the Sony 15 K2 audio system. 16 There is very little available information about 17 that, as I'm sure Mr. Belinsky could point out, a number of 18 these technologies are subject to trade secret protection, and

There is very little available information about that, as I'm sure Mr. Belinsky could point out, a number of these technologies are subject to trade secret protection, and it is difficult, from a consumer point of view, to actually get a clear statement about how the technologies work on any technical data that might be available. Consumers have to rely on testing along the lines of that done by Mr. Halderman in the paper I've referenced.

Finally, I'd just like to make one point when we're on the topic, since it's received so much comment so

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1	far. And that is this: The particular copy protection
2	measures that are being used at the moment are, if we are to
3	take the words of the record executives and the technology
4	companies, they are designed to keep honest people honest.
5	They are designed to stop casual copying. They have no impact
6	as far as anyone can tell on large scale commercial copying.
7	so to the extent that one person was able to
8	obtain the content on one copy-protected CD and put it on a
9	PIP Network, for instance, this exemption will have no impact
10	on that. That is already currently happening, and the fact
11	that consumers might have the ability to restore playability
12	to, on disks they currently have purchased which don't have
13	playability, that is a completely separate scenario for what
14	is currently happening and the impact that it would likely
15	have on the existing world of PIP technology and networks.
16	MS. PETERS: Could I note that this side of the
17	table is wanting to say something or is it just facial
18	expressi on?
19	MR. MARKS: Well, I I'm just not sure what
20	malfunction means in this context. I mean, you know, again,
21	the scope of this proceeding is access controls that, you
22	know, have a substantial impact on what are different uses.
23	And you know, not withstanding the assertion of
24	IP Justice, it certainly sounds and reads, when you read the
25	documents, like what they are talking about are copy controls,
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1 not access controls. And again, there's no evidence that's 2 been presented at all that even those are malfunctioning. 3 So it's just a very different situation even if 4 you could get over that first hurdle, then the dongle 5 exemption from last time. 6 MS. PETERS: I think we understand your 7 different positions. 8 MR. TEPP: Well, let me just sort of pick up a 9 point Ms. Hinze just made and ask you to respond if you care 10 to, and that's my last question. 11 Has there been any correlation between the level 12 of piracy of unprotected CD's and protected CD's? Because Mr. 13 Belinsky made the argument that lay people use an exemption 14 for this purpose is going to facilitate pier to pier, or 15 piracy re-appear. Pier networks and all sorts of problems, 16 Ms. Hinze says, "No, actually that's not the case." We have 17 some basis for historical analysis. Do you have any 18 information? 19 MR. BELINSKY: Only from the video industry and 20 the reason only from the video industry is we've done tri-21 annual consumer copying studies for the last 15 years on a 22 nationwide basis, across the U.S., 1008 households generalize 23 (indistinguishable) the U.S. population in general, etcetera, 24 stati sti cal I y. 25 And what we've found over the last 15 years,

1 given that copy protection appeared at the dawn of the VHS 2 format, in about 1985, is that each successive study showed 3 lower and lower consumer copying attempts and lower and lower 4 rates of piracy. And/or -- yeah, piracy and unauthorized 5 sharing of video. 6 And what we attribute that to is kind of a 7 conditioning effect over a number of years on the part of 8 consumers that it isn't okay to buy one copy of The Lion King 9 at Blockbuster video and make 14 copies for your neighbors. 10 In the music industry, it's just way too soon to tell. Copy 11 protection in any scale has only been with us probably for the 12 past year to maybe 18 months. 13 And the vast majority of music CD's still are 14 not copy-protected, despite our success in achieving 100 15 million CD's, the total annual production of music CD's is way 16 north of a billion, almost two billion on a worldwide basis. 17 So, unfortunately, there isn't the data set to 18 really have any data that would suggest what's happening right 19 The only data we have is that if you do take the long 20 view, over time, you end up with a balance between consumers 21 getting great content at great prices, and creators being paid 22 for their investment in their creative works, so 23 unfortunately, nothing to report on the music industry in 24 particular right now. 25 MR. MARKS: I would agree with that. I

1	think that I certainly am not aware of any information. I
2	think it's precisely because you really only have nine disks
3	that have been in the market for you know, a certain period of
4	time. It's very hard to draw any conclusions. I haven't
5	heard any specific data or any conclusions from there. The
6	100 million that Mr. Belinsky was referencing is a worldwide,
7	not a U.S. number you know, in terms of music.
8	MR. BELINSKY: That's virtually all outside of
9	the U.S.
10	MR. MARKS: Yeah, that sounds right.
11	MR. BELINSKY: And up to this point.
12	MR. TEPP: Okay, thank you.
13	MS. DOUGLASS: Ms. Hinze, it seems like you've
14	been talking about a number of frustrations and I need to
15	(indistinguishable) when people put their CD's into the CD
16	player and it doesn't work. I'm trying to get to the adverse
17	effect not necessarily substantial adverse effect, I'm
18	trying to get to adverse effect, you know.
19	From what I hear, is there are only nine titles,
20	like in number of multiplied by however many there are, of, in
21	the industry, of that nine titles. But it seems like everyone
22	wants to see, hear a little bit more in terms of adverse
23	effect.
24	For example, your reply number 59 says that, "He
25	had problems" "a problem trying to play his CD in a

1 particular" -- maybe it was a PC. It was a PC, and he said, 2 "Well, it took me a lot of time, but I eventually downloaded a 3 program and indeed I was able to play it." 4 So that concept in my mind at first effect 5 (indistinguishable) or are we saying this is just an 6 inconvenience? It took him a long time, but he did finally 7 get it. So, you know, you gave four titles that had some 8 problems but I'm not too sure if it adds up to adverse effect 9 in my mind. 10 MS. HINZE: So what I understand you to be 11 asking is, a statement about what the harm is, and whether it 12 may or may not rise to a substantial adverse? 13 MS. DOUGLASS: Yes, yes. 14 MS. HINZE: Right. I think there are various 15 aspects of that question. I think there is some genuine 16 disagreement amongst maybe this side of the room and that side 17 of the room about the number of copy-protected CD's that 18 currently exist in the United States, whether they be U.S. 19 releases or otherwise, so I think that EFF's position would be 20 that there are a number of copy-protected CD's in the United 21 States. Statement one; that's the current position. 22 Statement two; in the future, there will be --23 if we can go by the indications of the record industry 24 (indistinguishable) statements and by technology company 25 statements, there will be, as early as this year, on Arista

1 and BMG releases, there will be copy protection. Then the 2 question is, is it likely to malfunction? 3 Well, that's an interesting question. It seems 4 to be that there are -- you are looking at reply comments that 5 have been filed by consumers in, 48 consumers in this 6 particular proceeding, you have the experience that has been 7 documented elsewhere, people on the Internet who have 8 complained about problems with playback. 9 The nature of the harm is qualitatively 10 significant. If you were one of the people for who the 11 particular CD you have purchased does not play, it doesn't 12 So it's an -- it might be an all or a nothing thing, pl ay. 13 but I think part of the problem in assessing the nature and 14 the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the harm here, 15 is that the harm varies. And from my point of view, the harm 16 varies because it's an unintended malfunctioning. 17 But the point is, it's still a malfunctioning, 18 and where it malfunctions to the extent that someone can't 19 play music that they've purchased, they get nothing. They've 20 paid for their particular disk, and they have an expectation 21 that something that they have previously been able to play 22 CD's on will play the CD and yet they receive nothing. 23 So I would say for the people who are within the 24 scope of that class, that's a fairly fundamental harm. 25 They've experienced no benefit from the bargain they've made

1	to purchase the CD.
2	MS. DOUGLASS: Within the scope of that class?
3	MS. HINZE: Within the scope.
4	MS. DOUGLASS: We're 49, but there's another
5	one besides the at least one more in addition to the 48.
6	But on one side I see, you know, 49 problems, and on the other
7	side I hear one tenth of one percent. So, you know, how do I
8	reconcile those?
9	MS. HINZE: Why, I'd like to make two apparently
10	inconsistent statements, but let me say this. The number of
11	comments that have been filed by consumers with the copyright
12	office in this proceeding is evidence. Direct evidence of
13	harm to consumers non-infringing uses. I think that's clear.
14	The fact that there are 48 or 49 comments is not necessarily
15	indicative of the level of harm that's out there.
16	So in terms of a comparison, on one side of the
17	table we have our belief that there are a number of these CD's
18	in existence in the United States. On the other side of the
19	table, you're comparing a statement from an industry
20	perspective, with an industry representative who has the
21	ability to get a industry-wide feedback on the number of
22	complaints they've received.
23	I guess on this side of the table, as much as I
24	would like to be the spokesperson or as much as any of us here
25	would like to be the spokesperson for the entire American
J	ı

1 consumer populace, we're not. 2 And in terms of the feedback that consumers have 3 given to the copyright office in support of the exemption 4 we're seeking here, I guess I would like to point out part of 5 the reason we suspect why the copyright office received 6 comments when it did was because EFF asked people on the its 7 mailing list if they had experienced these problems to write 8 to the copyright office. 9 We are a organization that has a membership of 10 about 9,000 people, and our mailing list actually goes to 11 about 30,000 people. That's a small part of the American 12 population. I would hasten to say that a larger proportion of 13 people probably don't even know that this proceeding is taking 14 place, and that the level of harm that is experienced out 15 there in the population is probably far greater then the 16 number of comments you've received with respect. 17 So, if in terms of apples and oranges, I think 18 it would be fair to say that the consumer experience is not 19 necessarily -- should not be regarded based on, just on the 20 information that's been submitted to the office in terms of a 21 numerical number of comments. 22 MS. DOUGLASS: I'll grant you that. Thank you. 23 MS. GROSS: Can I just follow up on that?

Mr. Belinsky wants to say

MS. DOUGLASS:

something, too. Can --

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1 MS. GROSS: Okay. I just wanted to say that you 2 know, it's an interesting argument about is it nine titles? 3 Is it more than nine titles? What's the exact number of 4 comments received in the harm? 5 It seems to me that this is -- should really be 6 a principled argument, a principled analysis. That it is the 7 principle of the idea that when you buy a CD, you have the 8 right to play it. I mean, you know, what gives me the right 9 to throw this book in the air? Why own it? 10 The same things with the CD, what gives me the 11 right to listen to the CD? I own it, that's the right, so 12 it's the principle. It's not the number of titles that are 13 released, it's the legal principle here. 14 MS. DOUGLASS: Mr. Belinsky? 15 MR. BELINSKY: I just wanted to add one 16 observation, again from our perspective as being in the copy 17 protection business for quite a number of years. There is the 18 notion of the frustrated copier effect that we've seen over 19 and over again in video and in entertainment software, where 20 the existence of copy protection on a video cassette or a DVD, 21 or a CD ROM game brings consumers, quote unquote, complaints, 22 that are consumer complaints arise by virtue of the consumer 23 not being able to make a -- an extra copy, when heretofore, 24 before the existence of copy protection, he could. 25 So from the perspective of assuming there's a

1 goal to try and measure how many complaints or how many 2 situations are arising, I think that we would suggest you need 3 to be somewhat careful when you look at the total volume of 4 input that you're getting because our experience, not so much 5 in music again, because it's so new from a timeline 6 perspective, but in video and in games, a substantial number 7 of the "returns" that came back to Blockbuster video or the 8 video game store were from consumers who were upset that they 9 could not make a copy, not that they could not play their 10 video or run their computer games. So just another data point 11 from the historical perspective. 12 MS. DOUGLASS: So you're saying that consumers 13 are mad and they just sent to the copyright office all these 14 problems they were having because they didn't really agree 15 with copy protection in the first place? 16 MR. BELINSKY: I'm not suggesting what the 17 consumers who talked, who communicated with the copyright 18 office were saying, but I am saying that we have very direct 19 evidence over the years that consumers have come back to 20 retail stores and said "This product doesn't work." When 21 indeed, what it turned out was, they couldn't make a copy and 22 they were upset about that. 23 MS. DOUGLASS: 0kay. 24 MR. BELINSKY: Because they thought that it was 25 their right to make a copy.

1	MS. DOUGLASS: So this product doesn't work
2	then translated into
3	MR. BELINSKY: Because of copy protection.
4	MS. DOUGLASS: this product doesn't work like
5	it did before, or like I expected it to work.
6	MR. BELINSKY: Yeah, exactly. Yeah, and before
7	I could make extra copies, and now I can't, so it must not
8	work right anymore.
9	MS. DOUGLASS: I see, okay. I just think I
10	have one Oh, I'm sorry.
11	MR. MARKS: I would just like to make a couple
12	of comments. I do think, though that what you can take away
13	from the 48 comments is that from the 48, only three of them
14	addressed CD's that had been released in the U.S. that had
15	some kind of technological protection measure.
16	So I don't know whether the other reasons are
17	attributable to some of the things Mr. Belinsky said, but the
18	only record evidence here is essentially that 48. And there's
19	only three of the 45 titles that were discussed there that
20	that are actually U.S. released and are recordings that have
21	technological protection measures. And you know, aside from
22	that, I think whatever you might speculate about how many
23	people might complain or might not, I mean, this is a
24	proceeding that has to go by the record evidence and
25	(indistinguishable) the evidence that we can present is the
	1

1 .08 percent. You know, the evidence that's been presented by 2 the proponents is 48 complaints that detailed 45 CD's, only 3 three of which you know, fit within the scope of this 4 proceedi ng. 5 The second point that the EFF made that I wanted 6 to respond to about how there will be more. There may be 7 more, but we don't know what technology is going to be used, 8 and we don't know and shouldn't presume that things won't be 9 able to be played back. It is entirely speculative in that 10 regard. 11 Third point, somebody buys something. The 12 conclusion that they get nothing, not clear that that's really 13 the case. A number of things could be returned. Universal 14 had help lines, web sites that held so that people eventually 15 could have a place of -- I don't think we can draw the 16 conclusion that just 'cause you bought something and on your 17 first try or second try it didn't work, that you ended up with 18 zero value for the money that you spent. 19 And finally, with regard to Ms. Gross' comment 20 about you know, let's look at the principle, I think the 21 principle she enunciated is just wrong, as a matter of law. 22 And you know, that that legal forwarding is cited in there, 23 our papers, I don't know (indistinguishable). 24 MS. DOUGLASS: Okay, just one clarification. 25 The three titles were -- that you mentioned. Is it possible

1	that some of those that were copy-protected; is it possible
2	that some of those could have been non-U.S. copy-protected?
3	MR. MARKS: There were five foreign releases
4	that I found. So it's possible that some of them had taken
5	the logical protection (indistinguishable) that weren't
6	released in the U.S.
7	MS. DOUGLASS: Okay. Thank you. Okay?
8	MS. PETERS: Now you brought with your long list
9	of questions.
10	MR. KASUNIC: I have so many, I may be putting
11	some of these in writing later, but let's just start with
12	first, Mr. Marks. You mentioned that it's not clear whether
13	the technological protection measures are malfunctioning, or
14	whether this is some other kind of technical problem. Isn't
15	it are most prior to copy-protected CD's, understanding
16	the technology right, or essential Redbook CD's, most that
17	were put on the market for audio emphasis.
18	MR. MARKS: (Indistinguishable)
19	MR. KASUNIC: Okay, so if it wouldn't it be
20	one way to make determinations if a Redbook CD worked on these
21	devices, and a any kind of copy-protected CD did not work
22	on the device, wouldn't it be pretty safe to assume that the
23	problem was a result of the technological protection measure
24	rather than the consumer's technology, or operating system,
25	there was some kind of glitch in the way the media, the

1 technological protection measure put on the media work? 2 MR. MARKS: I'm not sure that that is a safe 3 assumption, because, based on the number of complaints that we 4 know about, it was essentially the same number that you would 5 get from the release of standard Redbook audio. 6 So, you know, there's no clear indication that 7 the technical protection measure was the result of the 8 problems anymore than it could've been a manufacturing defect 9 or something else, because there was not -- it was consistent 10 with what you normally have in terms of a disk that may not be 11 able to play for any variety of reasons. 12 MR. KASUNIC: But then, isn't there an important 13 difference in this situation that these are protected by law 14 in terms of making any -- there was full of the problems that 15 people may have had with the Redbook audio, they couldn't make 16 them work. And they wouldn't have any violation of the law. 17 MR. MARKS: I'm not sure I understand the 18 questi on. 19 MR. KASUNIC: Well, the traditional Redbook CD's 20 didn't have any technological protection they used on them, so 21 if there was some kind of a malfunction on them, people could 22 do whatever they needed to do to get them to play on their 23 particular operating system. If they needed to tweak it in 24 some way in order to get it to play, they could do that, 25 right, without violating Section 1201,

1	because there weren't any technological protection
2	measures on the Redbook CD's prior to these nine that
3	are on the market.
4	MR. MARKS: Well, if I I guess what I was
5	saying is that they may be able to do that here because it
6	they may not be able to make them play, they may not have to
7	circumvent an access control.
8	MR. KASUNIC: Okay, well then let's go to that.
9	Now, I you mentioned that Congress envisioned use of
10	technological protection measures on copyrighted works to
11	enable and facilitate these being distributed. But didn't
12	Congress also envision and encourage use of technological
13	protection measures that had that making a distinction
14	between what type of technological protection measure was
15	being used? Didn't Congress envision that you would know if
16	it was a copy protection measure or an access protection
17	measure? And it seems to me here, the way we're talking about
18	this, no one's willing take a position on what is actually out
19	there.
20	So, it's virtually a situation of hide the ball.
21	No one knows what kind of technological protection measure is
21 22	No one knows what kind of technological protection measure is on any given works anymore.
22	on any given works anymore.

1 burden of proof lies with the proponents, so we're not saying 2 hide the ball, we're just simply responding according to the 3 burdens and prima facie cases that have been set forth by the 4 Librarian in these types of proceedings. 5 MR. KASUNIC: Wait, but this isn't a court of 6 law where the burden of proof is the same. We have to look in 7 terms of, in the broad sense of whether an exemption should be 8 issued, and that exemption would be technologically neutral 9 and would apply to all kind of technological protection 10 measures on the particular class of work. 11 So if it is unclear, then there seems like there 12 may be some sense of potential harm here. Do you know for 13 particular technologies -- we have some particular types of 14 technologies that were in the market, maybe we 15 (indistinguishable) then if there's another question about the 16 future, but when we're talking about the (indistinguishable) 17 as a data shield, for instance, or a media code version 1, or 18 a Sunny's Key to Audio, or in any one of those, can you tell 19 me whether it's a copy protection or a access protection 20 measure? 21 MR. MARKS: You know, Mr. Belinsky may be in a 22 better position than I am because I just am not a technology 23 person and don't know the specifics of those technologies. I 24 think the point is that when you're proposing an exemption, 25 you do have a burden there, and whether this is a court of law

1	or not, it's a prima facie case that has to be made out, and
2	that included in that is to demonstrate that there is an
3	access control and that access control is problematic for some
4	reason, or causing a malfunction for (indistinguishable) rely
5	on the download type exemption or something
6	(i ndi sti ngui shabl e).
7	MR. KASUNIC: Well, let's assume they've
8	satisfied me, and I think that they've passed the burden in
9	terms of showing that this is an access control. Is there
10	anything that you can offer on the other side that when I'm
11	balancing now, that will lead me to believe otherwise?
12	MR. MARKS: Sitting here, I try, I cannot. I
13	would say, however, that even if you assume that, they have
14	not proven a case that there's adverse impact. It is a
15	diminimus impact. 125,000 disks, only nine of which that have
16	been that includes (indistinguishable) technological
17	protection measure, even if you assume it's access.
18	There's no proof that its been, that there's a
19	malfunction in the access protection measure. There's just no
20	record even on that. But there's certainly no substantial
21	adverse impact under the tests that have been set forth in the
22	evidence that's been presented.
23	MR. KASUNIC: Well, that leads me to my next
24	question. Which is we have a situation where there's we
25	have at least 48 established 48 or so, established

1 complaints of problems -- identified problems with CD's 2 currently, so, in terms of actual harm of something, where 3 people aren't getting what they want, at least, there is some 4 record? 5 MR. MARKS: Again, that could be just a 6 manufacturing defect. The fact that somebody comes in and 7 files something and says, "I've had trouble playing this 8 disk," may have nothing to do with -- there's no nexus. 9 MR. KASUNIC: Well, there are certain CD's, at 10 least, where there seem to have been recurring problems on 11 them, so in terms of proof, (indistinguishable) disk, not all 12 of them, anyway, are just random problems, but there are 13 recurring problems that appear to be recurring in some of 14 those comments. 15 MR. MARKS: I'm not sure what of the three 16 actually occur or not. 17 MR. KASUNIC: But beyond that, isn't safe to 18 assume that although this is obviously for a legitimate 19 purpose, (indistinguishable) controlling massive unauthorized 20 file trading, that these are being put into the market, won't 21 these protection efforts invariably continue to cause problems 22 on many legacy systems and devices that are out there? 23 There's an extraordinary number of systems and 24 devices that it's going to be very difficult to have full 25 compatibility with down the road when there are many different

1	kind of possible protection systems that will be tried. Isn't
2	it likely that more problems are going to occur, and that at
3	least some of those will be related to a causally related to
4	the technological protection?
5	MR. MARKS: You mean with these particular
6	di sks?
7	MR. KASUNIC: No, I'm talking about into the
8	future.
9	MR. MARKS: No, I don't think you can draw that
10	conclusion, because it's entirely speculative to conclude that
11	the technology, if that were used, on these nine disks, are
12	ever going to be used again.
13	MR. KASUNIC: No, I'm not saying on those nine
14	disks, I'm saying any kind of technology that will be used in
15	the future. Isn't it going to be likely that there are going
16	to be some problems with the many types of legacy systems out
17	there, that you're not going to have full compatibility with
18	everythi ng?
19	MR. MARKS: I don't believe you can conclude
20	that. I think it depends on the technology that will be used.
21	And we just don't know what that technology is today because
22	there are different companies, like Mr. Belinsky's company
23	that are trying to you know, market very good technologies,
24	and different content owners will make different decisions
25	about what technologies to use.

1 MR. KASUNIC: Okay. My last question for you. 2 What harm would an exemption cause in this situation if it was 3 just for an individual being able to create interoperability 4 or compatibility with their device? 5 Given the limitation of that, the possibility 6 that this may occur anyway, whether there's an exemption or 7 not, people taking this, what harm of letting people just be 8 able to play what they have purchased on a device that where 9 there is a reasonable relationship -- we're not talking about 10 playing this on the toaster, but we are talking about playing 11 it on with the reasonable consumer expectation of playing it 12 on some kind of a CD player? 13 MR. MARKS: Well, I think that, for the most 14 part, those consumers are able to do that. Of the nine, some 15 had been re-released in unprotected form. Probably all of the 16 rest are available on new types of services, like the new 17 Apple service and downloading format, and could be downloaded 18 and played on that very device that they're trying to play the 19 disk on. So I don't think that there's any harm on the other 20 si de. 21 I think the harm to our side in the very broad 22 exemption that's been proposed, is that by broadly exempting 23 all CD -- so-called CD copy-protected disks that have access 24 problems, you are interfering with the ability to develop the 25 new technologies that will be used in the future. Which is

1 directly contrary to Congressional intent and directly harmful 2 to the industry's ability to market and to you know, defeat 3 pi racy. 4 MR. KASUNIC: If I could just ask one question, 5 (indistinguishable) don't feel left out, that of the EFF and 6 IP Justice. Isn't it likely that the market will correct the 7 si tuati on? 8 It's accepted that these malfunctions or 9 whatever they are, were not necessarily planned, but are just 10 the early action with the many types of systems out there, and 11 legacy systems existing. Isn't it likely that the recording 12 industry will try to you know, continue to accommodate and 13 make this less, make any problems that are occurring less 14 likely into the future? 15 And wouldn't a market solution to this be 16 preferable to just giving individuals who have the ability to 17 do so, the ability to circumvent? 18 MS. HINZE: I think that's a good question. As 19 I said, I -- EFF's position is that we believe that this is an 20 unintended consequence, so it's a fair question to us whether 21 or not we might expect to see this ameliorated. I have two 22 responses, one is even if it was unintended, the existing 23 situation is one where consumers can't play things on devices 24 that presumably they were intended to (indistinguishable) play 25 them on. For instance, the case of multi-section CD's.

1 So even if it wasn't intended, there's currently 2 Whether or not a market, the market may be able to 3 address that in the future is, I think -- it's difficult for 4 me to speculate on that. 5 Obviously, if it's the intent of copyright 6 owners to, as they say, to have their work available in as 7 many different formats and as many different devices as 8 possible, you would expect to see that. But the situation 9 that we currently see is that, even if it weren't intended, 10 there's no way a significant impact on consumers. There will 11 continue to be a significant impact on consumers for the 12 Legacy devices. 13 Even if I am to speculate and look into the 14 future and say, "Perhaps the copy protection technologies will 15 in the future somehow improve their compatibility with a whole 16 range of different devices, and magically those problems will 17 go away," there will continue to be a set of disks that are in 18 circulation and there will continue to be a set of playback 19 devices that will potentially have issues with those disks. 20 That's not going to go away. 21 I guess I would also like to address the burden 22 here. I've been told that EFF is willing to speculate, has 23 speculated in the future that there will be harm. What seems

likely is that there will be a large volume of copy-protected

CD's being released in the United States shortly. That much

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is clear. It seems likely there will be a significant time lag before any changes exist to the copy protecting technology that's currently being released. It's clear that the current technology, the current (indistinguishable), copy-protected technologies have problems, and that they were unintended.

I can't see that the market in the short term is going to be up to address the current problem, and to the extent that the market is able to address the problem going into the future. Our exemption would only apply where there is a malfunction, so in terms of that, a balance of harm (indistinguishable) here, well, I would say is that the consumers are the ones here who are currently bearing the burden of harm. They have purchased something that they can't use on advice they expect to be able to play back on.

The exemption we're proposing would allow them to play it back, only to the extent that it malfunctions, to the extent that the market is able to ameliorate these problems in the future and improve some of the compatibility issues, even if that's technically possible.

Our exemption would then not cover the situations where a device can play back the purchased CD. there is no harm in granting the exemption from that point of view from the copyrighter's point of view. There will not be any significant loss from the point of view of having the exemption granted.

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1	MR. MARKS: I don't think there's any basis to
2	conclude that any copy-protected CD's that are going to be
3	released in the market in the near future are going to be
4	based on the same technology. I just don't know how that
5	statement could be made. You know, Mr. Belinsky may have some
6	information on what kind of partnerships and deals his company
7	has done, but without seeing business plans about what's being
8	done, I just don't know how that statement can be made.
9	There's just no way, there's no evidence for it.
10	MS. HINZE: For the sake of clarifying the
11	record, I don't believe I said that I understood what the
12	technologies in the future would be, or that they would be
13	based on the current technologies. I was making a statement
14	about the current impact, and the statement my statement
15	about the future actually addressed the scope of our exemption
16	and whether or not it would apply in the event that
17	technologies were to improve and (indistinguishable)
18	compati bi l i ty.
19	I would just like to add that the again,
20	refer to the paper that EFF included in the comments we
21	submitted in December, which makes it clear that the nature of
22	the malfunctioning here is quite complex, it's difficult to
23	get a clear picture of that, exactly what formats will fail on
24	exactly which devices.
25	As I said, it appears to be that these

1	technologies currently exploit differences between the way the
2	stand alone audio CD players work, and multi-format players
3	work. And to the extent that we've seen multi-format players
4	over (indistinguishable) stand alone, stand alone CD players,
5	it's more likely than not within the next three years, there
6	will be increasing problems, because the playbacks the
7	pirate problems from the point of view of the devices will
8	i ncrease.
9	As people switch to these more modern players.
10	So, in terms of these speculations about future harm, I think
11	that should be taken into account.
12	MR. MARKS: I think (indistinguishable) actually
13	be the exact opposite, which is that you will see that .08
14	percent number go down as the technology is improved. And
15	along with you know, the clear incentives for the content
16	owners to be providing a consumer friendly experience for
17	their buyers.
18	MR. CARSON: Now that we have a consensus
19	MS. PETERS: You guys make it so easy for us. I
50	think David has some concluding questions.
21	MR. CARSON: Okay. Let me start with, I'm
22	sorry. Is it Miss Hinz or Hinze?
23	MS. HINZE: I answer to both.
24	MR. CARSON: Preference? I would like to
25	accommodate you. You stated earlier, and it's in your written
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1	comment as well, that assuming that what we're dealing with
2	here is a malfunctioning copy control, there is uncertainty in
3	the legal community as to whether that constitutes
4	(indistinguishable) that controls access, copyrighted works,
5	correct?
6	MS. HINZE: Um-hmm.
7	MR. CARSON: And I know that in your written
8	comment you cited one article by Mr. Halderman. I haven't
9	looked at it yet, I apologize, I will. But I mean, first of
10	all, beyond that article, any other sources for that statement
11	that there's uncertainty in the legal community?
12	MS. HINZE: I can't point to a specific
13	(indistinguishable) sources, but I've had numerous
14	conversations with people who are well versed in the history
15	of Section 1201, and people who've been involved in the debate
16	about the interpretation of content scramble systems for
17	digital (indistinguishable). And the joint nature have
18	emerged, copy and access control. I think it's
19	MR. CARSON: This isn't a question of merged copy
20	and access control, you're not even (indistinguishable) as
21	that.
22	MS. HINZE: Sorry?
23	MR. CARSON: You're not even (indistinguishable)
24	this is a case of merged copy and access control
25	MS. HI NZE: No

1 MR. CARSON: You're saying this is a copy control 2 that inadvertently blocks access. 3 MS. HINZE: That's correct. I would like to, I 4 guess, make two points. One is in terms of our understanding 5 of how to characterize this technology, we are partly 6 handicapped by the fact that there is no information out 7 there. 8 As far as we can tell, there is no application 9 of process information or a -- this is (indistinguishable) --10 or a technology for us to fall within -- for a copy protection 11 technology that malfunctions to fall within the definition in 12 1201(3)(c) or (3)(b) of a technology protection measure that 13 effectively controls access. 14 So in terms of a strict legal analysis, I think 15 part of the reason why there is uncertainty is that people 16 don't feel comfortable that they have enough information to 17 know how this technology is operating. There is very little 18 publicly available information about exactly what is 19 happening. As Mr. Belinsky and Mr. Marks have pointed out, 20 there is a number of different technologies there has been 21 some work done on each of those but it's like, by no means 22 comprehensi ve. 23 And as far as we can tell, our position is that 24 it doesn't appear to fall within the definitions, as I said, 25 about effectively controlling access because there doesn't

1	seem to be an application of the process of information. But
2	that is based on our limited understanding of what information
3	there is available publicly.
4	MR. CARSON: I guess, Mr. Marks, the point I
5	well, it's your burden whether you have the information or
6	not.
7	MS. HINZE: Well, and it
8	MR. MARKS: Well, the only thing else I would
9	point out is that there my understanding is there are
10	patent applications so those would presumably be, you know, a
11	good source of information as to how the technology works.
12	MS. NINZE: When the patent issues.
13	MR MARKS: in this department. What was
14	that?
	that? MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues.
15	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues.
15 16 17	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When.
15 16 17	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about
15 16 17 18	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in
15 16 17 18 19	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along the road you're talking
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along the road you're talking about that we've already said the burden is on the proponent
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along the road you're talking about that we've already said the burden is on the proponent of the exemption but let's explore how far that goes.
15 16 17 18 19 20	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along the road you're talking about that we've already said the burden is on the proponent of the exemption but let's explore how far that goes. If we're going to talk about burdens of proofs
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MS. HINZE: I said when the patent issues. MR. MARKS: When. MR. CARSON: Now, Mr. Marks, you did talk about the burden of proof and we'll go with I think we're in agreement at least somewhere along the road you're talking about that we've already said the burden is on the proponent of the exemption but let's explore how far that goes. If we're going to talk about burdens of proofs and presumptions, Lord knows it's been a long time since I've

1	the Rules of Evidence but I'm going to give it a shot
2	here. Isn't there a Rule of Evidence that when
3	evidence on a particular issue is within the control
4	of one of the parties, even if that party doesn't
5	initially have the burden, the finder of fact is
6	entitled to infer, from that party's failure to come
7	forward with any information whatsoever when that
8	information is totally in that party's control, that
9	if that information were out it might be adverse to
10	the party who has control of it?
11	MR. MARKS: I'm not sure we're in control. We
12	didn't we're not the technology companies.
13	MR. CARSON: But you are the people who are
14	putting the stuff out.
15	MR. MARKS: That's right but
16	MR. CARSON: You don't know what they do with
17	it. You just tell them to protect it and they protect it and
18	you' re happy?
19	MR. MARKS: Well, I you know, I don't know
20	the answer to your my I don't want to tell you what
21	grade I got in evidence so that would help me explain why I
22	can't answer that. But the short answer is I don't recall the
23	evidentiary standards but, you know, the truth is I honestly
24	don't know to what extent we even have that information about
25	how the specific technology works anyway. But I don't know
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what else to say on that.

MR. CARSON: Okay. One final question to the people on that side of the table, whether we're talking about a copy protection -- well, let's assume for the moment, because it really was inspired by the EFF testimony.

Let's assume for the moment we're talking about a copy protection that just is screwing up and restricting access unintentionally. Let's assume that. Based upon the experience you're familiar with, what would one have to do in order to be able to make one of those CD's that has the malfunctioning copy protection work on the particular player that you want to play it on but you can't play it on?

MS. HINZE: This comes not from personal experience like he said, as a lawyer. However, I would hate to be at risk of violating 1201(a)(1) since as I've not actually heard a clear statement from the other side of the room that they wouldn't sue consumers for having attempting to circumvent what may ostensibly be a copy protection measure, like we just said, it's not personal experience.

But however, my understanding is that it works fairly well to use a felt tip marker to mark around the end of the tape. Partly this is an issue about correct data being put into table of contents is my understanding on the technological (indistinguishable) of what works -- or how this works. Remember you have -- when we have a CD which has copy

1	protection and it's a multi-section CD for instance, on many
2	of these, it is visible that there is a second section.
3	MR. BUCHOLZ: There's a thin line between
4	demarcating the two sections, the first and second section.
5	MR. CARSON: Can't see it from here but we'll
6	take your word for it.
7	MR. BUCHOLZ: Sure. We can show you after the
8	
9	MS. HINZE: We'll be happy to show you that.
10	But basically, it's clear where the second section starts.
11	And apparently, it is possible to use a felt tip marker to
12	mark out the table of contents on the section that isn't
13	showing. And what that does is it basically prevents the
14	error from being introduced into the CD reader when it's
15	trying to read the table of contents. So it will see the
16	second section which well, it will see the first it will
17	see the section that it can't currently play. That's one way
18	of doing it. Essentially the same remedy happens if you use
19	masking tape to to again to obscure the section that won't
20	pl ay.
21	MR. CARSON: All right. this is the rather
22	celebrate case we all read about a few months ago, I guess,
23	about how you can get by this with a felt tip marker. Am I
24	correct?
25	MS. HINZE: Right, right.
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1	MR. CARSON: Is it safe to assume in light of
2	that experience, that we're probably not going to be seeing
3	that particular technology in the marketplace again given now
4	everyone knows how easy it is to get around it?
5	MS. HINZE: I think that would be a question for
6	Mr. Belinsky rather than me.
7	MR. CARSON: Okay, fine. Let's embarrass him.
8	MR. BELINSKI: Oh, this is crazy. I believe
9	that the disk you have and certainly the Magic Marker approach
10	worked in one version of Sony's key to audio technology. I
11	can tell you for sure that that doesn't work with our
12	technology. It's not a very effective technology for that to
13	be the circumvention method.
14	And I can't speak to what Sony's doing today but
15	I can speak to the fact that that's absolutely not a
16	generalize-able approach that would render our copy protection
17	approach, our copy protection technology inapplicable. So I
18	think that is one example that it was highly celebrated in the
19	press, as you pointed out, and I don't know of any labels, any
50	music companies, not even Sony that continued with that
21	technol ogy.
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22	MR. CARSON: Is there any reason to believe that
22	MR. CARSON: Is there any reason to believe that Sony would continue to market that particular technology given
23	Sony would continue to market that particular technology given

1	for the
2	MR. CARSON: Let's use common sense here for a
3	moment.
4	MS. HINZE: The common sense would say no to
5	that. I mean I would
6	MR. CARSON: So should we conclude that it's
7	likely that it's likely that's going to be happening in the
8	next three years?
9	MS. HINZE: The the
10	MR. CARSON: That particular technology's going
11	to be depl oyed?
12	MS. HINZE: You know, I obviously can't speak on
13	behalf of the technology companies. Common sense would
14	suggest that that particular technology will presumably morph
15	into something a little bit more secure.
16	However, I think the general principle is that
17	there will be there will be copy-protected CD's in the
18	future and the technologies will have it will be there
19	will be a possibility that, for instance, there will be tools
20	available. Obviously, this proceeding can't actually address
21	tools so I'm aware of the limitations of what a copyright
22	office can do in this hearing crisis.
23	The existence of tools that may be available to
24	assist consumers to circumvent should an exemption be granted
25	and presumably needed, based on the interpretation of

1 1201(a)(1). It's quite possible that in the future software 2 -- that software companies may, for instance, have incentive 3 for providing the software plays of CD ROMs, may have the 4 incentive for also producing more compatible drivers for their 5 -- there's a range of different way that this problem might be 6 meliorated. 7 It's different for me to speculate about what 8 the tools might that people might use to use them because as 9 everyone is aware that the existence of tools or the 10 manufacturing and trafficking in tools, unless they don't fit 11 the three conditions, would violate 1201(a)(2). So the fact 12 that I'm having trouble speculating about how this might work 13 in practice, I don't think actually (indistinguishable) 14 arguing about whether or not the exemption should be granted. 15 MR. CARSON: Okay. Let me come 16 (indistinguishable) may because the point of my question 17 really had nothing to do with felt tip markers. It had to do 18 with whether the prohibition on circumventing technological 19 measure that control access is likely to be preventing people 20 from engaging in non-infringing uses over the next three 21 years. 22 And part and parcel of that analysis, seems to 23 me, has to be you're making the case to us that in order to be 24 able to play those CD's on the player you want to play them 25 on, you need to circumvent an access control and there's a way

1	to circumvent an access control that will let you do that.
2	If there isn't, then there's no point in talking
3	about this. So what I'm really trying to get at is do you
4	have any information that, by circumventing a technological
5	measure that controls access, you will be able to play those
6	copy-protected CD's on players that, at the moment, can't play
7	them?
8	MS. HINZE: Do I have any evidence at all,
9	essentially, is that
10	MR. CARSON: Do you have any information on I
11	don't care about tools. A method, a way. Is this a futile
12	if we gave you this exemption, would it be a totally futile
13	act because circumventing an access control wouldn't do you
14	any good?
15	MS. HINZE: Right. I think I understand the
16	nature of the question. As I understand it, there is software
17	that currently is available that allows people to that
18	would allow people to make use of this exemption.
19	MR. CARSON: It may or may not violate the
20	1201(a)(2) is what you're saying I gather.
21	MS. HINZE: I appreciate that but from the point
22	of view of answering your question
23	MR. CARSON: No, no. What I'm really trying to
24	get at is
25	MS. HINZE: Can I cite you examples of software
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1	that doesn't violate 1201(a)(2)
2	MR. CARSON: No, no. I don't even care about
3	that necessarily but let's assume let's put that aside for
4	the moment. The software you're talking about, the way it
5	works is by circumventing an access control or circumventing
6	some kind of technological protection measure?
7	MS. HINZE: I'm not sure. I guess, one, that
8	would depend on whether or not this is an access measure,
9	which we appear not to have any agreement about. But two, I'm
10	not personally aware. I just understand that there are tools
11	that
12	MR. CARSON: Okay. Well, let's ask it another
13	way then. Since the whole premise of your case here is that a
14	malfunctioning copy control or a hyperactive copy control is
15	also serving to block access, whether intended or not, is the
16	way do we know, do you know that the way to make that CD
17	play on a particular device is to overcome the copy control?
18	To circumvent the copy control? Is that the solution or is it
19	not?
20	MS. HINZE: Yeah. I think it's a technology by
21	technology thing. As I understand it there are distinct
22	differences between the ways that the three main four main
23	technology copy protection technologies work and I'm not sure
24	that I know the answer across each of the four of those.
25	MR. CARSON: So you're not sure whether we can
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1 do you any good, in other words; is that right or --2 MS. HINZE: I think that -- I think -- I guess 3 my understanding of this is that people would have an 4 incentive for creating tools that wouldn't violate 1201(a)(2) 5 but could be used for exactly this purpose. If they were not, 6 the overhanging threat of a secondary circumvention liability 7 to the extent that tools currently existing can be used for 8 the current technologies that's largely because the tools have 9 been found by people who have arduously looked into this. 10 People are less inclined at the moment, to 11 arduously look into this because they worry about violating an 12 access protection measure and therefore violating 1201(a)(1). 13 If there were an exemption granted, I think that the flow and 14 effect would be that you would actually see the generation of 15 tools that don't violate 1201(a)(2) that might actually serve 16 to accommodate some of these purposes. 17 MR. MARKS: Well, then the tools that exist 18 today, do they address the copy controls or the access 19 controls? I mean I think that that's a key part of Mr. 20 Carson's question as well as -- I think that --21 MR. CARSON: Well, not necessarily because one 22 of the premises is that you can't tell the different between a 23 copy control and an access control or rather that a copy 24 control is acting as an access control. To buy her case we've 25 got to assume that the copy control is also operating as an

1	access control whether intended as such or not. Right?
2	MS. HINZE: I'd have to think a little harder
3	about that. I mean I think that's essentially what we're
4	saying but I'm not sure about the second part of your
5	question. I would have to think about whether you have to
6	for instance, there might logically be a space where you could
7	if an exemption were granted you could come up with some
8	sort of software that might, for instance, allow you to
9	potentially circumvent the access part but not the copy part.
10	I don't know if that's a the reason I'm
11	looking puzzled is I'm not sure, technologically, if that's
12	possible. I don't know the extent to which they merged as a
13	concept and whether it might be possible to have some
14	mechanism for circumventing one without the other. I think
15	that would be something that would be worked out by people who
16	have a better sense of how these four individual or however
17	many different types of copy protection technologies actually
18	work. I think it's difficult to speculate in the general, in
19	the abstract here.
20	MR. CARSON: Okay. Mr. Bucholz, did you have
21	anything else to say?
22	MR. BUCHOLZ: No, no. I'm fine. Thank you.
23	MS. PETERS: Mr. Belinsky, shed any light on
24	thi s?
25	MR. BELINSKY: A couple of things. First of

all, we're experts at the technology and we're not as expert at mapping the pieces of the technology to the specific definitions in the law so I don't want to go onto thin ice legally and say something that may or may not be correct.

But as I do understand the provisions with

respect to copy control system having information applied to it to the presence or absence of which controls whether a copy can be made or not, the technology that we're bringing to market now, in particular, with the second section capability that I described certainly includes that feature or that attribute, where there's information required to, for example, to move the music from the CD to the hard disk so you can play it on the computer without the CD present.

There's information required to be present to validate that you're moving it from an original disk to the post-concussion. There's also information required to be present when you want to move it off the computer to a portable device to go jogging with your music. So as I understand the interaction between the technology and the provisions of the law, that would qualify as the technological protection. I mean -- sorry -- as a copy control measure.

But it's also the aspect of in the context of the two sections taken together, the information is added to the first section so that the personal computer doesn't see it. And that's where I go onto complete thin ice legally as

1 to is that an access control measure as relates to just the 2 first section or is it because the two sections together is 3 really what, from our perspective, constitutes the copy-4 protected CD. 5 Is that just additional information -- and we do 6 add additional information to the first section, the s0-called 7 red book -- as part of the overall copy protection and 8 technol ogy. That could also look like just another example 9 where extra information is added in so I'm really not capable 10 of parsing it in any more level of detail than that to shed 11 any light on is it copy control, is it access control. 12 My guess is, depending on which prism you looked 13 at it through, you know, and if you wanted to make very 14 detailed arguments you might be able to sustain both arguments 15 at any one point would be my guess, depending on how narrowly 16 you looked at it and whether you looked at the two sections 17 together or just the first section or just the second section. 18 It's just hard for me to say, not being -- not being a legal 19 scholar. That's the best light I can shed on how the 20 technology actually works. 21 MS. PETERS: Maybe after we read some of the 22 papers we may have some more questions. 23 MR. CARSON: Good chance. 24 MS. PETERS: Good chance. Okay. This was a 25 long session but thank you very much, all of you. We

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1	appreciate your being here and helping us try to figure out	
2	how we're going to handle all the exemptions that have been	
3	requested. So I think you'll hear from us and we'll be back	
4	tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock, right? Right.	
5	(Whereupon, the hearing in the above-entitled	
6	matter was adjourned at 4:50 p.m.)	
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